You can’t be rooted unless you’re free and you can’t be free unless you’re rooted L. Ingalls Wilder

Constructive Recollection Philosophy Application

Finding Truth in Science, Justice and Journalism


Ron de Weijze - March 2017

independent researcher


  Finding truth is an art we learned and willingly unlearned. Truth can only be found by looking for reality, independently confirming our beliefs. Independence needs dualism, which is difficult to apply in personal- and social settings, because power and politics turn 'seeking independent confirmation' into 'avoiding dependent rejection'. The one changes its ideas and does not change the facts, while the other changes the facts and does not change its ideas, to the detriment of social reality and -identity. 


When modern philosophy developed most articulately in Immanuel Kant's work (Rohlf 2016), post-modern philosophy was an accident waiting to happen, declaring our two sources in life, duality of origin (Bergson 1932), or dualism, to be one, in monism. At the beginning of the French Revolution (1789), Kant had published his magnum opus (1790). Anglo-Saxon philosophical "sensibility after-the-fact" should independently confirm Continental philosophical "understanding before-the-fact", turning it into "sensibility before-the-fact" (the "synthetic apriori"). The subject or "phe-noumenon" extended the object or "noumenon", which could establish inter-subjectivity between subjects referring to it. Hegel inverted this, making the object extend the subject. A person or subject should inter-subjectively "re-cognize" another, dependently confirming him and be selectively reciprocated, while they independently rejected another. "The subject goes into the world and loses himself or [else] he goes into himself and loses the world" (Hegel 1807). 

In Post-Modernism, deconstructing the world (Žižek 2012, Derrida 1992) implies existence is nothingness (Heidegger 1959, Sartre 1943), God is dead (Nietzsche 1882), truth is multiplicit or dialectical (Marx 1867), and reality can only be a mental phenomenon (Hegel 1807), without an independent object. Although post-modern philosophers herald Kant as their "Copernicus" of the Philosophical Revolution, bringing even space and time into the phe-noumenon, he never forgot the noumenon or object. One and a half century after the French Revolution (1789-1799), the May 1968 Cultural Revolution doubled down on the monistic premise, after Post-Modernism had gone and come around the world, leaving its brand of social order, collectivism, socialism, or communism. Confronted with its missing open and dynamic dualism, monism refers to dialectics, power and politics, or groups competing for dominating themselves and submitting others, until only one still stands on top of a power-distancing hierarchy (Mulder 1973).

When our two sources, in modern philosophical- or Kantian dualism, may be called "sensing what-is-sensed" and "knowing what-is-known", then the subject is the sensing- and knowing organism/self/belief and the object is the sensed- and known environment/other/reality. The sensed object reflects itself in the sensing subject, and the knowing subject reflects itself in the known object. What-is-sensed coordinately reflects itself in sensing, "here" or "there" in material space, while knowing coordinately reflects itself in what-is-known, "now" or "then" in immaterial time [1]. Truth is found, when sources and their opposite's reflections spatiotemporally coincide, while sensing what-is-sensed independently confirms knowing what-is-known [2]. Through states of coordinated reflection, at stages of independent confirmation, and in phases of social cycles, the independent individual constructively recollects his world [3], by social interaction [a], constructing social reality on the one hand [b], and recollecting social identity on the other [c].


1. Coordinated Reflection


From the outside, the subject is part of the object, while from the inside, the object is "ob-jected" or "thrown-off" (Sanders and Van Rappard 1982) from the subject. Our sources are the sensed object, reflecting in the sensing subject, and the knowing subject, reflecting in the known object. Both sources and their self-reflections are spheres, expanding inwardly from the space/content/behavior at the peripheries, in recollection, or outwardly from the time/form/consciousness at the depths in construction. Related contents unfold, spatially at the peripheries as material facts, and temporally at the radius (in all directions) as immaterial ideas. Space temporalizes, content shapes form and behavior internalizes as consciousness, from the periphery to the depth, whereas time spatializes, form shapes content and consciousness externalizes as behavior, from the depth to the periphery. Sensing and what-is-sensed expand from the tangent point between the spheres, at the peripheries, as knowing and what-is-known expand from the depths.

Space and time have nearly become one, in the concept of spatiotemporality. However, in a Euclidean sphere, the three spatial dimensions of its periphery, and the one temporal dimension of its radius, remain dualistically irreducible to each other, because their ratio is π ("pi"), a number carrying infinitely many, non-repetitive, decimal places. Still, space without time is only a point, as well as time without space, being separated at the start of processing, as the sensed- and known contents of the environment/other/reality, by the sensing- and knowing forms of the organism/self/belief. Coincidence allows for space to temporalize and, independently, for time to spatialize. Temporalized space is not time and spatialized time is not space, although they are compatible, as self-reflections of their sources. Time at the depth of the sphere is either the source of time itself, or the temporalized self-reflection of space, whereas space at the periphery of the sphere is either the source of space itself, or the spatialized self-reflection of time.

Object and subject interact as space and time. Therefore, they must be separated as two sources, first in spheres, one for space at its periphery, and the other for time at its depth. At this point in time, and in space, they still reflect themselves in the other source. Then they are also separated from the opposite's self-reflection, so that one source and its self-reflection remain as recollection in material space, and separately as construction in immaterial time. Space and time are thus in a position to coincide again, with their opposite source's self-reflection, allowing for space to temporalize, in recollecting facts, and for time to spatialize, in constructing ideas. Content-shapes-form and behavior internalizes as consciousness, by recollection, while separately, form-shapes-content and consciousness externalizes as behavior, by construction. From that point in space and time, the sensing- and knowing organism/self/belief is prepared to constructively recollect-, or socially interact with, its sensed- and known environment/other/reality.

What-is-sensed, produced in material space, by the environment/other/reality, is separated from what-is-known, produced in immaterial time, by the organism/self/belief. What-is-sensed in one source, the sensed environment/other/reality, is temporalized in its self-reflection, the sensing organism/self/belief, whereas knowing in the other source, the knowing organism/self/belief, is spatialized in its self-reflection, the known environment/other/reality. Coordinated material- and immaterial substances, after-the-fact in recollection, sensing "here" what-is-sensed, and before-the-fact in construction, knowing "now" what-is-known, can spatiotemporally coincide "here and now". One reflection, the temporalized, sensing subject, may then coincide with the opposite source, the knowing subject, in time/form/consciousness, at the depth of the sphere, while the opposite reflection, the spatialized, known object, may then coincide with the one source, the sensed object, in space/content/behavior, at the periphery of the sphere.

The peripheries of the spheres are material and spatial, while their depths are immaterial and temporal. Therefore, "here" is less clear temporally than spatially, as "now" is less clear spatially than temporally. The spatiality of the spheres' peripheries enables them to co-ordinate their locations, whereas the temporality of the spheres' depths enables them to synchronize their durations. From the peripheries to the depths of the sensed environment/other/reality and the sensing organism/self/belief, space temporalizes, content-shapes-form and behavior internalizes as consciousness, whereas from the depths to the peripheries of the knowing organism/self/belief and the known environment/other/reality, time spatializes, form-shapes-content and consciousness externalizes as behavior. The sources' self-reflections go around them, as they spatiotemporally co-ordinate the locations and synchronize the durations at the tangent-line or -plane, between sensing plus knowing on the one side, and what-is-sensed plus what-is-known on the other.

Between one source and its self-reflection in recollection, what-is-sensed and sensing, space/content/behavior are occurring causally, whereas between the other source and its self-reflection in construction, knowing and what-is-known, time/form/consciousness are implied teleologically. Both originate from their tangent point, either "there" or "then". The reflections go around the spheres, as sensing around what-is-sensed in material recollection, and as what-is-known around knowing in immaterial construction, coinciding "here and now" with the opposite source, as forms in the sensing- and knowing subject and as contents in the sensed- and known object. Coincided, spheres can expand in the three spatial dimensions of their periphery-, and deepen in the one temporal dimension of their radius. Thus, in recollection, space temporalizes, content-shapes-form and behavior internalizes as consciousness, while independently from it, in construction, time spatializes, form-shapes-content and consciousness externalizes as behavior.

The sensing organism/self/belief recollects the sensed environment/other/reality "here", to posit it "there", for the source's self-reflection (sensing) to bring it from the object to the subject, going around its source (what-is-sensed). Independently, the knowing organism/self/belief constructs the known environment/other/reality "now", to posit it "then", for the source's self-reflection (what-is-known) to bring it from the subject to the object, going around its source (knowing). In the Euclidean sphere of spatiotemporally coincided space and time, the three spatial dimensions of the periphery reach for the depth, processing what-is-sensed by temporalizing space, shaping form and internalizing behavior, while independently, from the depth, the one temporal dimension reaches for the periphery, processing what-is-known by spatializing time, shaping content and externalizing consciousness. Thus, self-reflections repetitively go around their sources, aiming for coincidence with the opposite source, to process content by form.

In recollection, the source or sensed environment/other/reality and its self-reflection, the sensing organism/self/belief, have space/content/behavior at the 'empty' spheres' peripheries. In construction, the source or knowing organism/self/belief and its self-reflection, the known environment/other/reality, have time/form/consciousness at the 'blind' spheres' depths. (cf. Kant 1790). The organism/self/belief coincides forms (sensing and knowing), to spatialize time, let form-shape-content and consciousness externalize as behavior, while the environment/other/reality coincides contents (what-is-sensed and what-is-known), to temporalize space, let content-shape-form and behavior internalize as consciousness. Thus, coincidence between sources and their opposite's self-reflections, or between material- and immaterial time/form/consciousness, at the depth of the organism/self/belief, as well as, separately, between material- and immaterial space/content/behavior, at the periphery of the environment/other/reality, enables interaction.

The spatial dimensions at the periphery of the sensing subject and the temporal dimension at the depth of the knowing subject must coincide, just as the temporal dimension at the depth of the known object and the spatial dimensions at the periphery of the sensed object must coincide. If that happens, the spheres harbor three spatial dimensions for the periphery and one temporal dimension for the depth. Then, space at the peripheries can temporalize towards the depths, as time at the depths can spatialize towards the peripheries. This enables what-is-sensed to coordinately reflect itself in sensing, "here" or "there" in space, as well as knowing to coordinately reflect itself in what-is-known, "now" or "then" in time. Recollection and construction of current content therefore basically happen outside of our awareness, or subliminally in space/content/behavior and supraliminally in time/form/consciousness, since sensing what-is-sensed is not (yet) knowing what-is-sensed, while knowing what-is-known is not (yet) sensing what-is-known.

To coincide, organism and environment, self and other, or belief and reality, have to coordinately reflect themselves. For sources to coincide with the self-reflection of the opposite source, their own self-reflections need to recollect or construct content, go around them and bring that content to the opposite source to be processed, if that would be spatiotemporally possible. From the periphery to the depth of the source's self-reflection or the sensing subject, space/content/behavior temporalizes, shapes form, and internalizes as consciousness, through causal occurrence (Gendlin 1997), coordinately reflected "here" or "there" by the source, the sensed environment/other/reality, in material recollection. From the depth to the periphery of the source's self-reflection or the known object, time/form/consciousness spatializes, shapes content, and externalizes as behavior, through teleological implication (id.), coordinately reflected "now" or "then" by the source, the knowing organism/self/belief, in immaterial construction.  

Sources reflect themselves "here" or "there" in recollection and "now" or "then" in construction, when the self-reflections go around their sources, seeking to coincide with the opposite source. To reflect themselves only in space/content/behavior or in time/form/consciousness, the "here" and "now" do not need to be united. However, if they are united, then space can also temporalize and time can also spatialize. This requires a coordinated effort between the subject or the sensing- and knowing organism/self/belief, and the object or the sensed- and known environment/other/reality, to coincide forms and to coincide contents simultaneously. Sources then convey content to their opposite sources, which is either content-shaping-form, causally from the periphery to the depth in sensing, or content-shaped-by-form, teleologically from the depth to the periphery in what-is-known. In social interaction, they turn into consciousness externalizing as behavior, on the one side, and behavior internalizing as consciousness, on the other side.

As space and time coincide, space temporalizes in recollection, to be the limited "here and now", while time spatializes in construction, to be the unlimited expansion of space-time. The subjective source constructs its objective self-reflection by spatializing time, form-shaping-content and consciousness externalizing as behavior, across all "theres and thens", which are potential "heres and nows". The objective source recollects its subjective self-reflection by temporalizing space, content-shaping-form and behavior internalizing as consciousness, differentiated, immediate, actual, changing, continuous, new, and simple (Bergson 1911). Thus, recollected, temporalizing space in the material "here and now" restrains constructed, spatializing time in all of immaterial spatiotemporality. Outside of the "here and now", material spatiotemporality is not yet critical, while immaterial spatiotemporality is preparing for the critical coincidence, as it trusts, expects, presumes, predicts, believes and intends it will be, once place and time have arrived.

figure 5


What-is-sensed are facts and what-is-known are ideas. Ideas relate facts and facts relate ideas. In recollection, meaningful relations are created by temporalizing space, content-shaping-form and behavior internalizing as consciousness, within-facts-between-ideas, and in construction by spatializing time, form-shaping-content and consciousness externalizing as behavior, within-ideas-between-facts. Relations within-ideas-between-facts naturally translate into relations within-facts-between-ideas. If facts and ideas do not fit, we experience cognitive dissonance (Festinger 1962), which may be reduced by changing the ideas to fit the facts, seeking truth and ethics, in open and dynamic dualism, or by changing the facts to fit the ideas, executing power and politics, in closed and static monism. The latter option destroys the possibility to prove one's innocence. Continuous dissonance leads to collective socioses (Van den Berg 1956) and/or to personal traumatic stress, if not to tormenting dissociation (Dell and O'Neill 2009).

Facts are synthesized in the 'synthetic aposteriori' or sensibility after-the-fact, as ideas are analyzed, in the 'analytic apriori' or understanding before-the-fact (Kant 1781). In space/content/behavior, from the sphere's periphery to the depth, relations within-facts-between-ideas, from the past (after-the-fact), through the present, cause those in the future to occur, for no apparent reason. In time/form/consciousness, from the depth to the periphery, relations within-ideas-between-facts from the future (before the fact), through the present, teleologically imply those in the past. Contexts are created in recollection, by functional structuralism (Dooyeweerd 1935, Sanders 1976), temporalizing space, shaping form, and internalizing as consciousness, as well as in construction, by structural functionalism (Parsons 1975), spatializing time, shaping content, and externalizing as behavior. Truth and ethics in open and dynamic dualism forbid ideas to change the facts, as opposed to power and politics in closed and static monism (Bergson 1932).

In temporalized space, "here" reaches from "now" to the infinite past and future, as in spatialized time, "now" reaches from "there" to all the ends of the universe. Relations are functionally structured, by temporalizing space in recollection, within-facts-between-ideas, 'intrapolated' "here and now", and by spatializing time in construction, within-ideas-between-facts, extrapolated "anywhere and anytime". It may seem that intrapolation and extrapolation are related. However, culture and history interpolate subliminally in sensing what-is-sensed, which cannot (yet) be known, and supraliminally in knowing what-is-known, which cannot (yet) be sensed. Included are power and politics, motivating extrinsically to avoid dependent rejection, like excommunication and homelessness, within-groups-between-people and within-ideas-between-facts, as well as truth and ethics, motivating intrinsically to seek independent rational-, emotional and/or compassionate confirmation within-facts-between-ideas and within-people-between-groups.

2. Independent Confirmation


Power and politics need closed and static monism, to have the one person or subject dependently confirm (or 're-cognize') the other, as they independently reject third parties. "The subject goes into the world and loses himself, or [else] he goes into himself and loses the world" (Hegel 1807). People may be accused of disloyalty if they belong to one group as well as another. Facts are called fake if they are used in one idea as well as in another. Truth and ethics, on the contrary, need open and dynamic dualism, to seek independent rational-, emotional- and/or compassionate confirmation, both within-facts-between-ideas and within-people-between-groups. The autonomous or independent individual strengthens himself as he strengthens others, constructively recollecting what he can trust, expect, presume, predict, believe and intend, if his understanding before-the-fact is independently confirmed by his sensibility after-the-fact, the way Kant's famous "synthetic apriori" or sensibility before-the-fact handed it to us (Kant 1770).

Opposing Kant, Hegel claimed that the object was insignificant. To him, the thing-in-itself was clear, not opaque, since the object was the subject itself. If facts did not fit ideas, it was “too bad for the facts”. The object for Kant was the noumenon, the unnamable thing-in-itself, which was able to establish intersubjectivity between subjects referring to it. For Hegel, intersubjectivity was a person or subject, dependently confirming (or ‘re-cognizing’) the other, as they independently rejected a third. By literally ‘re-cognizing’ the other, “the subject goes into the world and loses himself, or [else] he goes into himself and loses the world”. This recognition, if selectively reciprocated by the other, was supposed to be a prerequisite for self-consciousness. Therefore, while for Kant the phenoumenon or subject extended the noumenon or object, for Hegel the object, or intersubjectivity based on recognition, extended the subject, which was exactly the reverse and revolutionary indeed, just after Kant's magnum opus was published (Kant 1790).

Processing is spatiotemporal coincidence and independent confirmation, between material- and immaterial substances. If sensing what-is-sensed independently confirms knowing what-is-known, then both forms, or sensing and knowing, could process both contents, or what-is-sensed and what-is-known. Forms are therefore copied and swapped. Knowing what-is-sensed (or realization) and sensing what-is-known (or intuition) then emerge from subconsciousness, as different material- and immaterial substances, using the new forms to process old contents. Forms which are copied and swapped, also generate two separate streams of content, relative to form, between object and subject. Both flow from the depth to the periphery in spatializing time, and from the periphery to the depth in temporalizing space, teleologically as form-shaping-content and causally as content-shaping-form. One stream is knowing what-is-sensed (or realization), in recollection, whereas the other stream is sensing what-is-known (or intuition), in construction.

The difference between modern dualism and post-modern monism is belief in independence. In modern dualism, the object was the thing-in-itself, establishing intersubjectivity between subjects referring to it, through independent confirmation, if possible, thus intrinsically motivating them by truth and ethics. In post-modern monism, the object was intersubjectivity based on 're-cognition' of one subject by the other, dependently confirming him and possibly be selectively reciprocated, thus extrinsic motivation the one by power and politics. "The subject goes into the world and loses himself, or he goes into himself and loses the world" (Hegel 1807). In dualism, the external normativity of recollection and internal normativity of construction seek coincidence and independent confirmation. In monism, sending is internally normative and receiving is externally normative, which is in line with 're-cognition' by dependent confirmation of "friends" and independent rejection of "enemies" (Mulder 1973, Boekestijn 1978).

When sensing what-is-sensed is not yet knowing what-is-sensed and knowing what-is-known is not yet sensing what-is-known, "here" in what-is-sensed coordinately reflecting itself in sensing, and "now" in knowing coordinately reflecting itself in what-is-known, did not yet coincide. The sensing- and knowing organism/self/belief still interacts with its sensed- and known environment/other/reality to accomplish that. Once coincidence is reached for the current content, space can temporalize and time can spatialize, enabling independent confirmation between sensing what-is-sensed and knowing what-is-known to happen as well. As forms are copied and swapped, knowing what-is-sensed and sensing what-is-known, or realizing what-is-realized and intuiting what-is-intuited at the second stage of independent confirmation, emerge from subconsciousness. It depends on the reliability of what-is-known and the validity of knowing, whether next stages of independent confirmation can be reached as well.

If the reliability of current contents, and the validity of current forms, are strong enough, coincidence and independent confirmation can reoccur, at a higher stage, between forms (this time realizing and intuiting instead of sensing and knowing) and between contents (this time what-is-realized and what-is-intuited instead of what-is-sensed and what-is-known), they emerge (1) as valuing what-is-valued, or intuiting what-is-realized (sensing what-is-known-what-is-sensed, or sensing what-is-known merged with knowing what-is-sensed), and (2) as trying what-is-tried, or realizing what-is-intuited (knowing what-is-sensed-what-is-known, or knowing what-is-sensed merged with sensing what-is-known). If reliability and validity still hold, the same happens between valuing and trying, which results in trying what-is-valued or reacting what-is-reacted and valuing what-is-tried or acting what-is-acted. Thus, in processing, newly copied forms occur, while old forms are implied as new contents.

At the highest stage of processing current content, trying what-is-valued, or reacting, and valuing what-is-tried, or acting, emerge as social interaction. Object and subject become other and self. The self has built trust, expectation, presumption, prediction, belief, and intention, regarding current content, exchanged in social interaction. This consciousness or internal normativity, is not externalized as behavior, until one's reaction in response to the other's action, or external normativity, independently confirms it, rationally, emotionally, and/or compassionately, internalizing it as consciousness. Once it is "set free", it is one's action before-the-fact in response to one's (own) reaction after-the-fact (which is the other's action). Thus a social cycle appears, in which one reacts in response to the other's action, and acts in response to his own reaction, followed by the other reacting in response to the one's action, and acting in response to his own reaction. These are four phases in social interaction between object and subject or other and self.

Recollection has a stake in the sensing subject and the sensed object, and construction has a stake in the knowing subject and the known object. Therefore, constructive recollection takes place in the subject between forms, and separately, in the object between contents. Sources' self-reflections seek coincidence with their opposite sources, and swap copied forms when recollection can independently confirm construction by negative falsification and positive verification. When forms are copied and swapped, both recollection and construction have new forms to process old contents, including old forms which were copied, turning them into substances at a higher stage of independent confirmation. At the highest stage, recollection and construction are part of social reality, as subject and object socially interact, noticeable to each other, externalizing as behavior and internalizing as consciousness, between time/form/consciousness and space/content/behavior, at the depth- and the periphery of the sphere.

In recollection, the object reflects itself in the subject, whereas in construction, the subject reflects itself in the object. Once object and subject have become other and self, at the final level of independent rational-, emotional- and/or compassionate confirmation, the other reflects him- or herself in the one, like the one reflects him- or herself in the other. One's reacting in response to the other's acting, or acting in response to one's own reacting, therefore can be an interior dialog, like in a dream, or in social belief, as opposed to social reality. This is how independent individuals can still relate to each other, without the other's actual presence, or without the economic necessity, need, obligation, or desire, to dependently confirm and 're-cognize' the other, independently rejecting any third party and hoping for selective reciprocity from the other, as appears customary in our post-modern society of immanent dialectics through dominance and submission (Hegel 1807, Marx 1867), to develop social hierarchies of power-distancing.



figure 9



3. Constructive Recollection


Constructive recollection is spatiotemporal dualism. After religion and philosophy, physical science now appears to harbor dualism as well. Spatiotemporality can be material or immaterial. The four dimensions of a Euclidean sphere allow material space to temporalize and immaterial time to spatialize, although the periphery's three spatial dimensions cannot be reduced to the radius' one temporal dimension. Empirical sensibility after-the-fact, or recollection, must independently confirm rational understanding before-the-fact, or construction, to produce sensibility before-the-fact, Kant's "synthetic apriori", or what we trust, expect, presume, predict, believe and intend. It is essential to research methodology, as in science, justice and journalism. Through coordinated reflection [1], the two sources seek independent confirmation [2], to stay on track of truth, in constructive recollection [3]. Truth and ethics, in need of modern, open and dynamic dualism, must turn the tables on power and politics, in need of post-modern, closed and static monism (Bergson 1932).

3a. Social Interaction

Groups are formed and society is ordered, either by modern dualism or by post-modern monism. Normativity may be sent and received in social interaction, as both acting- and reacting individuals are looking for independent confirmation for- and from each other, within-facts-between-ideas and within-people-between-groups, by offering their own freedom of choice, like money or attention, when they believe the other earned it and should be paid (forward) for. If independent confirmation happens, one individual's independence confirms and strengthens the other individual's independence, as well as his own. It is the final stage of independent confirmation for current content, "reacting what-is-acted" and "acting what-is-reacted", as new content is arriving. The alternative option is, that normativity is sent from the top-, and received at the bottom of the hierarchy, by people who are busy avoiding dependent rejection, within-groups-between-people and within-ideas-between-facts, as if by military order of command.

Content is brought from one source to the other, by the source's self-reflection, going around its periphery, to recollect facts or construct ideas, shaping- or shaped by form. What is trusted, expected, presumed, predicted, believed and intended in action before-the-fact, is released or set free in action after-the-fact, if the subject's reaction in response to the object's action independently confirms the subject's action before-the-fact rationally, emotionally, and/or compassionately. Every time this happens, a new stage is reached and the streams expand one state of sensing or knowing, or a newly copied and swapped form, added to their current contents, reducing old form to new content. Thus, sensing replaces what-is-sensed and what-is-known replaces knowing in the original scheme of forms (sensing and knowing) on the subject's side and contents (what-is-sensed and what-is-known) in the objects side, because the subject is taking the object's point of view and the object is taking the subject's point of view, in social interaction.

While content is continuously renewing as moments pass and places change, even if only an eyeball rolls, content must first shape-, or be shaped by, form. In recollection, where content-shapes-form, within-facts-between-ideas, relations occur causally, while in construction, when form-shapes-content, within-ideas-between-facts, relations are implied teleologically. Alternating facts or what-is-sensed, and ideas or what-is-known, process content. Facts relate ideas or ideas relate facts, until consciousness externalizes as behavior on one side-, and behavior internalizes as consciousness on the other side of social interaction, either still in social belief or eventually in social reality. Independent confirmation takes place every time forms are copied and swapped, extending the currents of recollection and construction, one to four times per phase, or responses from subject and object to each other and to themselves, before they dissolve as reacting what-is-acted, in response to the other, and acting what-is-reacted, in response to themselves.

States of coordinated reflection and stages of independent confirmation add up to phases of constructive recollection. The states alternate between material recollection and immaterial construction, for the object and the subject or the environment/other/reality and the organism/self/belief, in social interaction, possibly coinciding as recollection or sensing what-is-sensed, "here" or "there" in material time, and construction or knowing what-is-known, "now" or "then" in immaterial time. They can be one of four kinds, different for recollection and construction, depending on the stage of independent rational-, emotional-, and/or compassionate confirmation, following coincidence, that was reached for the current content. Together, states and stages form the phases of constructive recollection in social interaction, as both sides take their own point of view and each others, checking for possible coincidence and independent confirmation, as the streams or waves of content extend, in recollection and construction, stage after stage.

The states-, stages- and phases of constructive recollection unite across two social cycles. Eight states of alternatingly material- and immaterial substance can be differentiated, due to forms, being copied and swapped. Four stages of independent confirmation are possibly reached, for each state, from sensing or knowing, to realizing or intuiting, valuing or trying, and reacting or acting. Two cycles of four phases follow each other in social interaction, varying from one to four states in duration, depending on the number of stages reached. Phases repeat themselves and overlap each other, as they begin one state apart, from the subject responding to the object and itself, to the object responding to the subject and itself, using the same states in different roles, taking contents from previous phases, processing- and passing them to following phases, across states. The first cycle applies to the subject, also taking the object’s point of view, and the second cycle applies to the object, also taking the subject’s point of view.

Every state at every stage plays four different roles in the phases of the social cycle between object and subject, or other and self, because the four phases overlap each other, one to three states. For example, the subject or the organism/self/belief needs four states for its reaction in response to the action of the object or the environment/other/reality, or for knowing what-is-sensed-what-is-known-what-is-sensed (acting what-is-acted). The sequence or wave started out with knowing as its first form, and then extended three new forms, one by one, reducing the old forms to new content. Reading "back" from the first state, or form, of knowing, the latter two states are from the object's point of view, while the former two are from the subject's (own) point of view. The latter three states are shared with the next phase, the subject's action in response to its own reaction, to which sequence one state was added, the newly copied and swapped form of reacting, which is now part of sensing what-is-known-what-is-sensed-what-is-known (reacting what-is-reacted).

3b. Social Reality

Recognition can be dependent confirmation of the other, while independently rejecting a third person, "going into himself and losing the world" (Hegel 1807), or it can be independent confirmation, benefiting both the other and the self. The former option creates a hierarchy of power-distancing people, for whom a check-and-balance system between legislative, judiciary, and executive powers is indeed necessary (Montesquieu 1749). The latter option was Kant's social order, “based on an objective, rationally necessary and unconditional principle that we must always follow, despite any natural desires or inclinations we may have to the contrary” (Johnson & Cureton 2016). His "categorical imperative" (Kant 1785) tells the autonomous individual “to act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law”. Kant's "sensibility before-the-fact" or "synthetic apriori" was the dualistically independent confirmation of "understanding before-the-fact" by "sensibility after-the-fact".

Power and politics change facts (or what-is-sensed) to fit the ideas (or what-is-known), while truth and ethics change ideas to fit the facts. Ideas relate facts and facts relate ideas. If facts are used in one idea, and reused in another, it depends on the ideas’ respect for the facts, not to have relations within them entangled. Identically, people relate groups and groups relate people. If people belong to one group, as well as to another, it depends on the groups’ respect for the people, not to have relations within them entangled. Power and politics motivate extrinsically, to avoid dependent rejection, excommunication or homelessness, within-groups-between-people, and within-ideas-between-facts. Truth and ethics motivate intrinsically, to seek independent rational-, emotional-, and/or compassionate confirmation, within-facts-between-ideas and within-people-between-groups. Unfortunately, truth and ethics, in need of open- and dynamic dualism, were replaced by power and politics, in need of closed- and static monism (Bergson 1932).

Most of society is based on dependency or interdependency. Implied is either a protestant work ethic and/or any kind of cronyism. People fear excommunication or homelessness, if they do not work hard and/or do not dependently confirm those they depend on in the hierarchy and, together with them, independently reject the 'enemies'. The poor may hope for selective reciprocity, for their dependent confirmation of those 'friends', and for independent rejection of the enemies. Else they may independently confirm-, or be independently confirmed, rationally, emotionally and/or compassionately, by others who are (still) sensitive to it, and practice it themselves. Others may still be driven by truth and ethics, instead of power and politics, able to dependently confirm them positively, offering another opportunity to succeed in the struggle for survival, possibly as (forward) payment for what is perceived as (forwardly) earned. By seeking independent confirmation for- and from the other, giving and taking happen simultaneously.


Our world is divided and mixed. One big part is created by post-modern, immanent dialectic monism or power and politics, and the rest is created by modern, independent individual dualism or truth and ethics. Monism may look like dualism, as it is dialectic, however it assumes that we are all interdependent and that subgroups or individuals will compete for their own dominance and the other's submission (Hegel 1807, Marx 1867, Nietzsche 1901). Interdependency leads to recognition as dependent confirmation of the other and independent rejection of a third, and letting go of truth, leading to polarizations, extremisms and terrorism. Dualism, on the contrary, assumes there are two sources, instead of one, which interact between any two individuals, other and self, or object and subject, in social belief and social reality, to stay on track of truth. Interdependency based on independent, autonomous individuals seeks independent rational-, emotional-, and/or compassionate confirmation for- and from each other, instead.

Within-groups-between-people, honesty is independent rejection, while loyalty is dependent confirmation. Both help the people to avoid dependent rejection such as excommunication and homelessness. Within-people-between-groups, values and norms are personal and cannot be used to categorize other's behaviors as honest or loyal. Disloyalty may be interpreted as honesty, while dishonesty may be interpreted as loyalty. This means that anybody can always be either praised or put down by simply choosing the alternative interpretation. Since independent individuals can also be loyal or disloyal, honest or dishonest to themselves, they must be led or misled by ambiguity. For example, re-cognition as Hegel interpreted it, literally reproducing the other's cognition, was dependent confirmation of the other and independent rejection of a third person. However, independent confirmation could also literally reproduce the other's cognition. The ambiguity should not turn one's image of himself against him, as being disloyal or dishonest.

If post-modern monism and modern dualism run into each other, role-sending and role-receiving by the former may grow intense, or the latter may diminish it. The one sends internal normativity to the other who receives it as external normativity. The sender's external- and the receiver's internal normativity are ignored in monism, which happened since the French Revolution and, revitalized, since the Cultural Revolution. Group-polarization (Moscovici 1969, Meertens 2006) at crucial episodes in history, such as the Second World War, has extremized monism into absolute dictatorship. This stimulates the will to power (Nietzsche 1901) and a propensity for action through politics, media and marketing. Power and politics can simply bulldoze their way forward and let facts it created "prove" the ideas. This is what Hegel meant by "too bad for the facts". Thus, power and politics can disguise as truth and ethics. Power changes facts to fit the ideas, making innocence defenseless, while truth changes ideas to fit the facts.


3c. Social Identity

The kind of social order that is given or chosen, determines how social identity develops. When social order is created by power and politics, motivating to avoid dependent rejection, dependent confirmation of the other, hoping for selective reciprocity, and independent rejection of any competition, is what makes up one's mind. This is co-dependency or inter-dependency. If, on the contrary, social order is created by truth and ethics, motivating to seek independent confirmation, independent confirmation is sought to strengthen other and self. Recognition of the other (or self) could be avoiding dependent rejection (reciprocally) or seeking independent confirmation. The object is absent in the former case, while in the latter, it is controlled by classic- and operant conditioning (Pavlov 1910, Skinner 1930). Our reflexes are conditioned responses to conditioning stimuli controlled by nature or culture. They should not be conditioned by power and politics demanding re-cognition and selective reciprocity thereof.

As the material source of the object reflects itself in the subject, and the immaterial source of the subject reflects itself in the object, both in need of independent confirmation either by negative falsification for the validity of the immaterial subject and by positive verification for the reliability of the immaterial object, in social interaction, object and subject or other and self may become Significant Other and Self. As parents united in looking after their children, the one's role is looking after material substance in recollection while the other's is looking after immaterial substance in construction, making sure that knowing by the one is valid, and what-is-sensed by the other is reliable. The knowing by the one is what-is-known by the Significant Other of the other, in the other, as what-is-sensed by the other is sensing by the Significant Other of the one, in the one. The more significant the other has become, the less independent confirmation needs to be rational and the more it can be emotional or compassionate.

It is between modern philosophical dualism or truth and ethics, and post-modern philosophical monism or power and politics, where and when Self and Significant Other are most critical for the kind of social order, commensurable with it. A partnership or relationship grows tense, when there is competition which is valued at-, or above, the comparison level (Thibaut and Kelley 1959). Are Self and Significant Other avoiding each other's dependent rejection by dependently confirming each other and independently rejecting third parties, or instead seeking each other's independent confirmation? The former relies on the power and politics of relations within-groups-between-people as in large families or (sub-)cultures, protecting each other against the outside word, while the latter relies on the truth and ethics of relations within-facts-between-ideas not getting entangled, when facts are used in one idea, and reused in another, to establish objectivity or intersubjectivity between subjects independently referring to them.

Ideas relate facts in recollection, as knowing what-is-sensed, intuiting what-is-realized or trying what-is-valued, while facts relate ideas in construction, as sensing what-is-known, realizing what-is-intuited or valuing what-is-tried. Relations create meaningful networks, defining the situation. Relations within-facts-between-ideas are the relations within-ideas-between-facts, where facts have been used in one idea and reused in another. Normally, this widens the network of meaningful relations, as facts or objects establish inter-subjectivity or independent confirmation between subjects referring to them. However, the motivation to avoid dependent rejection within-groups-between-people and within-ideas-between-facts may grow stronger than the motivation to seek independent confirmation within-facts-between-ideas and within-groups-between-people. When power and politics, in need of closed and static monism, take over from truth and ethics, in need of open and dynamic dualism, facts are changed to fit the ideas.

Modern philosophical, open- and dynamic dualism can prevent post-modern philosophical, closed- and static monism, from using polarized power and politics for group-polarization and -extremization,  because minority influence has turned out to be strong, when consistent over long periods of time and not dividing the majority’s attention (Moscovici 1974). Relations within-facts-between-ideas and within-people-between-groups, entangled by conflicts of loyalty when facts are reused in different ideas and/or people belong to different groups, may be untangled by seeking independent confirmation. In a closed and static approach, Bergson has been accused of criticizing Kant, asking how ideas could categorically demand their own realization through the Categorical Imperative (Lawlor and Moulard 2016). By "re-establish the duality, [and] the difficulties vanish", Bergson (1932) refers to independent confirmation, between what was disqualified by his post-modern promoters, as "but two complementary manifestations of life".

Notions of compassion, emotion and/or rationality are facts we recollect. Apart from healing illnesses caused by entangled relations, within-people-between-groups and within-facts-between-ideas, to seek independent rational-, emotional-, and/or compassionate confirmation can also help us reach our full potential. Meaningful networks of logical-, chronological-, and/or associative relations within-ideas-between-facts, reusing the same facts as their linking-pins, may broaden and deepen their context. Multiple perspectives in immaterial construction support object-orientation in material recollection. The networks merge into larger contexts, visualize relations that went unnoticed and may even change neural pathways. This will only happen if power and politics respect the facts and do not overstep their bounds, changing facts to fit the ideas, causing the entanglements, isolating facts from their meaning and people from their identity, instigating traumatic stress and tormenting dissociation1.





Philosophy Application


figure 15



Finding truth is an art we learned and willingly unlearned. Truth can only be found by looking for reality, independently confirming our beliefs. Independence needs dualism, which is difficult to apply in personal- and social settings, because power and politics turn 'seeking independent confirmation' into 'avoiding dependent rejection'. The one changes its ideas and does not change the facts, while the other changes the facts and does not change its ideas, to the detriment of social reality and -identity.   



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