You can’t be rooted unless you’re free and you can’t be free unless you’re rooted L. Ingalls Wilder

Constructive Recollection Philosophy Application

Finding Truth in Science, Justice, and Journalism


Ron de Weijze - September 2017

independent researcher


  Finding truth is an art we learned and willingly unlearned. Truth can only be found by looking for the facts, which independently confirm our ideas. Independence needs dualism, which is difficult to apply in personal- and social settings, as invariably, power and politics or dialectics turn 'seeking independent confirmation' into 'avoiding dependent rejection'. Truth and ethics change ideas to fit the facts, while power and politics change facts to fit the ideas. Thus post-modern philosophical monism took over modern philosophical dualism.   


When modern philosophy developed most articulately in Immanuel Kant's work (Rohlf 2016), post-modern philosophy was an accident waiting to happen, declaring our two sources of life, in dualism, or 'duality of origin' (Bergson 1932), to be one, in monism. At the beginning of the French Revolution (1789), Kant published his great work (1790), in which Anglo-Saxon philosophical 'sensibility after-the-fact' independently confirms Continental philosophical 'understanding before-the-fact', making it the famous 'sensibility before-the-fact' (the 'synthetic apriori'). The subject or 'phe-noumenon' extended the object or 'noumenon', which could establish inter-subjectivity between subjects referring to it. Hegel inverted this, making the object extend the subject. A person or subject should inter-subjectively 're-cognize' another, dependently confirming him for selective reciprocation, while they independently reject another. "The subject goes into the world and loses himself, or [else] he goes into himself, and loses the world" (Hegel 1807). Who or what is dependently confirmed counts, and who or what is independently rejected does not, in post-modern mode.

Post-modern deconstructionism (Žižek 2012, Derrida 1992) implies that existence is nothingness (Heidegger 1959, Sartre 1943), God is dead (Nietzsche 1882), truth is multiplicit or dialectical (Marx 1867), and reality is only a mental phenomenon (Hegel 1807), without an independent object. Post-modern philosophical monism or phe-noumenalism is very different from modern philosophical dualism or noumenalism. In spite of its praising Kant as the 'Copernicus of the philosophical revolution', calling space and time the basic categories of the phe-noumenon or subject, Kant never forgot the noumenon or object, as phenomenalism did. One and a half century after the French Revolution (1789-1799), the Cultural Revolution of May 1968 doubled down on the monistic premise, when Post-Modernism had gone- and come around the world, leaving its brand of social values in collectivism, socialism, and communism. Confronted with its missing open- and dynamic dualism, monism diverts to power, politics and dialectics, or groups competing to dominate and submit others, until one is left on top of the vertically power-distancing hierarchy (cf. Mulder 1973). 

If our sources, sensibility and understanding, may be called what-is-sensed and knowing, then the subject is the sensing- and knowing organism/self/belief, while the object is what-is-sensed or the sensed- and known environment/other/reality. The sensed object reflects itself in the sensing subject, as the knowing subject reflects itself in the known object. Therefore, what-is-sensed reflects itself in sensing, "here", or "there" on the object's other side, as the subject was moved in material space, while knowing reflects itself in what-is-known, "now", or "then" on the object's other side, as the subject moved in immaterial time. Truth is found, if and when our sources and the opposite source's self-reflections [1] coordinately coincide, and sensing what-is-sensed proves knowing what-is-known to be true, through [2] independent confirmation. Thus, by consecutive states of coordinated coincidence, at stages of independent confirmation, and in phases of dual social cycles, the independent individual [3] constructively recollects his world, by [a] social interaction, on the one hand constructing [b] social reality, and on the other recollecting a [c] social identity.


1. Coordinated Coincidence


From the outside, the subject is part of the object, while from the inside, the object is "ob-jected" or "off-thrown" from the subject, making it stand apart. Our sources are the sensed object, or what-is-sensed, reflecting itself in the sensing subject, and the knowing subject, reflecting itself in the known object, or what-is-known. The sources and their self-reflections are spheres, expanding inwardly from space/content/behavior at the peripheries, in recollection, or outwardly from time/form/consciousness at the depths, in construction. From the periphery to the depth of the sphere, space temporalizes, content-shapes-form, and behavior internalizes as consciousness. From the depth to the periphery of the sphere, time spatializes, form-shapes-content, and consciousness externalizes as behavior. Sensing and what-is-sensed expand facts, which are used and reused by ideas, in the three spatial dimensions of the periphery, from the tangent point between the spheres, while knowing and what-is-known expand ideas, which are using and reusing facts, synchronously in every direction, from the one temporal dimension, at the radii or depths of their spheres.

Today, space and time have nearly become monistically one, as 'spatiotemporality'. However, in a Euclidean sphere, the three spatial dimensions of its periphery, and the one temporal dimension of its radius, remain dualistically irreducible to each other, since their ratio π ("pi"), carries infinitely many, non-repetitive, decimal places. As the organism/self/belief interacts with the environment/other/reality, it uses space and time as separate sources, each source reflecting itself. Sensing "here" what-is-sensed at the peripheries of the source's and its self-reflection's spheres, dualistically separated from knowing "now" what-is-known at the depths of the other source's and its self-reflection's spheres, it attempts to co-incide space and time again, like it was before processing. In recollection, as space is about to temporalize, contents are facts, used and reused by ideas, whereas in construction, where time has spatialized, contents are ideas, using and reusing facts. Thus, if and when recollection and construction co-incide, their spheres are spatiotemporally commensurable. Although one is material and the other immaterial, their space and time are commensurable.

Our two sources, space and time, combined into the concept of 'space-time', describe the object or the sensed- and known environment/other/reality. The subject, or the sensing- and knowing organism/self/belief, processes space, through sensing what-is-sensed, separately from time, through knowing what-is-known. Our sources, as we experience them, are separate spheres, one for space at the periphery, and the other for time at the depth, as they have co-incided, "here and now". They are separated again, as sources, so that each is co-ordinated with its own self-reflection, where their peripheries meet. One source, and its self-reflection, recollect or sense "here" what-is-sensed, as the other source, and its self-reflection, construct or know "now" what-is-known. The sources' (what-is-sensed, knowing) and opposite sources' co-ordinated self-reflections (sensing, what-is-known) are positioned to potentially co-incide, if and when they are commensurable. Therefore, spatial co-ordination at the peripheries of the spheres lead to temporal co-incidence at the depths of the spheres, while the self-reflections, going around their sources, recollect and construct.

Materially sensing what-is-sensed only occurs (cf. Gendlin 1997) "here" in space/content/behavior, at the peripheries of the spheres in recollection, between the one source, the sensed object, and its co-ordinated self-reflection, the sensing subject. Immaterially knowing what-is-known is implied (idem) "now" in time/form/consciousness, at the depths of the spheres in construction, between the opposite source, the knowing subject, and its co-ordinated self-reflection, the known object. The self-reflections go around and come around their sources, co-ordinately reflecting them at the three spatial dimensions of their peripheries, while they recollect facts or what-is-sensed, subliminally, because sensing what-is-sensed is not knowing what-is-sensed (yet), and construct ideas or what-is-known, supraliminally, because knowing what-is-known is not sensing what-is-known (yet). The self-reflections aim to co-incide with their opposite sources, at the one temporal dimension of their radii, which requires commensurability between the spheres, to stay on track of truth. The three spatial dimensions of all "heres", follow the temporal dimension of all shared "nows".

The peripheries of the spheres are material and spatial, while their the depths are immaterial and temporal. The spatiality of the peripheries of the spheres enables them to co-ordinate their locations, while the temporality of their depths enables them to co-incide and synchronize their durations. Coincidence does imply coordination in the "here and now", although coordination does not imply coincidence. The sources have their self-reflections go around and come around them, because they spatiotemporally co-ordinate their locations at the tangent-line, where all "heres" and "nows" have met, meet or will meet, as the sources co-incide with their opposite's self-reflections, and synchronize in the subject as sensing and knowing, as well as in the object, as what-is-sensed and what-is-known. If and when possible, knowing and sensing, or time about to spatialize in the subject's source, and temporalized space in the object's self-reflection, both in the subject, plus what-is-known and what-is-sensed, or time about to spatialize in the subject's self-reflection, and temporalized space in the object's source, both in the object, co-incide as two spatiotemporalities.

The dimensions at the peripheries of the sensed object and the sensing subject, in recollecting space, content, and behavior, and those at the peripheries of the knowing subject and the known object, in constructed time, form, and consciousness, co-ordinate "here" or "there". In recollection, space is about to temporalize, from the peripheries to the depths of the spheres, in one direction, whereas in construction, time has spatialized, from the depths to the peripheries of the spheres, in the opposing direction. The temporal dimensions at the depths of the sensing subject and the knowing subject, and those at the depths of the sensed object and the known object, may co-incide or synchronize "now" or "then". In recollection, space has temporalized from the peripheries to the depths of the sphere, in one direction, whereas in construction, time is about to spatialize from the depths to the peripheries of the spheres, in the opposing direction. Thus, co-incidence allows for space to temporalize and time to spatialize, in the same sphere, if and when sources and opposite's reflections are spatiotemporally commensurable, although materially and immaterially distinct.

In recollection, space/content/behavior does occur causally, between the source and its self-reflection, or what-is-sensed and sensing, at their peripheries, temporalizing towards their depths. In construction, time/form/consciousness is implied teleologically, at the depths of knowing and what-is-known, spatializing towards their peripheries. Reflections go around and come around their spheres, as sensing around what-is-sensed in material recollection, and as what-is-known around knowing in immaterial construction, to coincide with the opposite source, as forms in the sensing and knowing subject, and as contents in the sensed and known object. Once sources and opposite self-reflections coincide, their inner directions, from the peripheries to the depths in recollection, and from the depths to the peripheries in construction, "line up", between subject and object, in two opposite directions. Knowing, from the depth to the periphery, continues in what-is-sensed, from the periphery to the depth, in one direction, and what-is-known, from the depth to the periphery, continues in sensing, from the periphery to the depth, goes in the opposite direction.

Recollection's source's self-reflection brings content from the object to the subject, for validity, while construction's source's self-reflection brings content from the subject to the object, for reliability, if and when these self-reflections co-incide with the opposite source. Thus, the sensing subject recollects the sensed object, going- and coming around it, to bring facts to the knowing subject, while the knowing subject constructs the known object, going- and coming around it, to bring ideas to the sensed object. The two self-reflections go around their sources, spatially co-ordinated at their peripheries, to temporally co-incide with their opposite sources. In the Euclidean spheres of spatiotemporally co-ordinated space and co-incided time, the spatial dimensions reach from the periphery to the depth, processing what-is-sensed, as space temporalizes, content-shapes-form, and behavior internalizes as consciousness, whereas the temporal dimension reaches from the depth to the periphery, processing what-is-known, as time spatializes, form-shapes-content, and consciousness externalizes as behavior. Thus, the two sources and their self-reflections keep each other in check.

Thoughts without content are empty and intuitions without conceptions blind (Kant 1790). In recollection, the source or the sensed environment/other/reality and its self-reflection, or the sensing organism/self/belief, subliminally, have 'empty' space/content/behavior at the peripheries-, whereas in construction, the source or the knowing organism/self/belief and its self-reflection, or the known environment/other/reality, supraliminally, have 'blind' time/form/consciousness at the depths, of their spheres. To fill the emptiness and heal the blindness, the sensing- and knowing organism/self/belief makes its forms co-incide, while the sensed- and known environment/other/reality makes its contents co-incide, to align spatializing time and temporalizing space, form-shaping-content and content-shaping-form, plus consciousness externalizing as behavior and behavior internalizing as consciousness, between the depths of the sensing- and knowing subject on the one side, and the peripheries of the sensed- and known object on the other side, in opposing directions. Interaction varies from supraliminal knowing and subliminal sensing, to social action and -reaction.

For sources to co-incide with the self-reflections of the opposite source, they must produce their own self-reflections, in the subject as well as in the object. Through coordinated reflection, the source in recollection, or the sensed environment/other/reality, must create its self-reflection to be the sensing organism/self/belief, while the source in construction, or the knowing organism/self/belief, must create its self-reflection to be the known environment/other/reality. Self-reflections recollect or construct content, by going around their sources, to bring it to the opposite source for processing, if the spheres are spatiotemporally commensurable. Space/content/behavior temporalizes, shapes form, and internalizes as consciousness, by causal occurrence in material recollection, from the peripheries to the depths of the source and its self-reflection, at the spatial tangent-points "here" or "there", whereas time/form/consciousness spatializes, shapes content, and externalizes as behavior, by teleological implication in immaterial construction, from the depths to the peripheries of the source and its self-reflection, at the temporal tangent-points, "now" or "then".

Sources reflect themselves in space/content/behavior, "here" at the spheres' peripheries, or "there" on the opposite source's side, in recollection, and in time/form/consciousness, "now" at the spheres' depths, or "then" on the opposite source's side, in construction, while the self-reflections go around their sources, to "there" or "then", seeking to co-incide with the opposite source. If they co-incide and they are commensurable, then from the depths to the peripheries of the spheres, time may spatialize, form may shape content and consciousness may externalize as behavior, and from the peripheries to the depths of the spheres, space may temporalize, content may shape form and behavior may internalize as consciousness, all in the same sphere. The subject or the sensing and knowing organism/self/belief can now interact with the object or the sensed and known environment/other/reality, lining-up knowing and what-is-sensed, streaming in one direction, as well as what-is-known and sensing, streaming in the opposite direction. Between organism and environment, self and other, or belief and reality, continuous dynamic social interaction then takes place.

If space, "here" or "there" at the peripheries-, and time, "now" or "then" at the depths of the subjects' and objects' spheres do co-incide, then spatializing time, form-shaping-content and consciousness externalizing as behavior, in construction, line up, in both directions, with temporalizing space, content-shaping-form and behavior internalizing as consciousness, in recollection, between subject and object. Thus, the objective source reflecting itself in the subject, and the subjective source reflecting itself in the object, can interact "here and now". What-is-sensed can "here and now" be critical of what-is-known, if the sensed and known object are commensurable in space and time as well, irrespective of their material or immaterial status. If they are, then what-is-known may be positively verified and therefore proven reliable by what-is-sensed, in order to be trusted, expected, presumed, predicted, believed and intended. Sensing can "here and now" be critical of knowing as well, if the sensing and knowing subject are also commensurable in space and time, when knowing is negatively falsified, warding off falsification, thereby proved valid through sensing.

figure 5

What-is-sensed are facts and what-is-known are ideas. As ideas relate facts, facts relate ideas, being reused between them, in the ideas' meaningful networks. Thus, interpretations, in recollection, are relations within-facts-between-ideas, and in construction, within-ideas-between-facts. When relations draw closer, within-groups-between-people, as a result of group-polarization (Moscovici 1969, Meertens 1980, 2006), those within-people-between-groups may get entangled and turn into conflicts of interest. To cope with this, the same facts may be treated as different, and/or different facts may be treated as the same, twisting the truth, to reduce cognitive dissonance between the two (Festinger 1962). This is changing the facts to fit the ideas, instead of the other way around, like it ought to be. Changing the facts takes away the possibility, from those who are accused, to prove their innocence. Remaining options at the level of the independent individual, are to create dissociative disorders like derealization and depersonalization (Dell and O'Neill 2009), possibly spreading into socioses (Van den Berg 1956), at the level of the (inter) dependent collective.

Facts are synthesized in the 'synthetic aposteriori' or sensibility after-the-fact, and ideas are analyzed in the 'analytic apriori' or understanding before-the-fact (Kant 1781). In recollection, from the periphery to the depth, relations in space/content/behavior, from the past (after-the-fact), through the present, cause the future ones to occur, within-facts-between-ideas. In construction, from the depth to the periphery of the spheres, relations in time/form/consciousness from the future (before the fact), through the present, teleologically imply those in the past, within-ideas-between-facts. Implication could be the "retrograde movement of the true growth of truth" (Bergson 1922b). Functional structuralism (Dooyeweerd 1935, Sanders 1976) contextualizes interpretations in recollection, temporalizing space, shaping form, and internalizing as consciousness. Structural functionalism (Parsons 1975) contextualizes interpretations in construction, spatializing time, shaping content, and externalizing as behavior. Truth and ethics change ideas to fit facts, in open and dynamic dualism, as power and politics change facts to fit ideas, piteously, in closed and static monism.

In recollection, "here" can be the same, while "now" continuously changes, from "then" in the past to "then" in the future. In construction, "now" can be the same, while "here" continuously changes, from "there" on any side to "there" on any other side. Thus, relations in space and time are functionally structured, within-facts-between-ideas, intrapolated from any "there and then" to "here and now", and within-ideas-between-facts, extrapolated from "here and now" to any "there and then". Intrapolating recollection and extrapolating construction share the same social reality or cultural history. Subliminally, in sensing what-is-sensed, still to be known, as well as supraliminally, in knowing what-is-known, still to be sensed, people realize and intuit these entities and how they are related. They are the object, or the sensed- and known environment/other/reality, and the subject, or the sensing- and knowing organism/self/belief, the sources of which must co-incide with their opposite's self-reflections, to be trusted, expected, presumed, predicted, believed and intended, as in Kant's 'transcendental idealism', 'sensibility before-the-fact', or the 'synthetic apriori'.

The sensing- and knowing organism/self/belief, or the subject, interacts with the sensed- and known environment/other/reality, or the object. In the "here and now", sensing "here" what-is-sensed in recollection, needs to independently confirm knowing "now" what-is-known in construction, rationally, emotionally, and/or compassionately. What-is-sensed and what-is-known, anywhere and anytime else, also needs to be trusted, expected, presumed, predicted, believed, and intended, by the sensing- and knowing subject. Space is temporalized in recollection while time is spatialized in construction, in order to bridge the spatiotemporal distance. Only in the "here and now", both spheres of material recollection and both spheres of immaterial construction touch, or are the same, by spatiotemporal co-incidence. All other locations at the peripheries and moments at the radii (in all directions except one) of the spheres, have behavioral content or conscious form attached to them, extending towards- or from the depth. The "here and now" relates to all other "theres and thens", all of which have conducted, or do currently conduct, their own "here and now".

2. Independent Confirmation


We can hardly do without recognition, for it gives us strength. Recognition has been institutionalized, to guide us all of our lives, only taken away as a punishment for not 're-cognizing' as expected. We can do this to ourselves as well. Puritans and Protestants notoriously do so, by never complimenting another on his or her achievements, nor expecting such to happen to themselves. Still, there is a third way. This is by letting truth speak for itself, or things-in-themselves, which includes the rationality, emotionality or compassion of particular things (Strawson 1959) or living beings, only shared when they appear to the one, as they appear to the other, and as they appear to everybody, without any supportive commonality or bias, such as upbringing, perceptual training, subculture or general culture. A nod is enough, a smile, or just the way one looks out of his or her eyes. This is what will never detach the organism/self/belief from the environment/other/reality, keeping him or her on track of truth, unbiased judgment and non-extremist self-expression. It can replace institutionalized recognition and it must, supporting (mental) health and happiness, for survival.

Opposing Kant, Hegel claimed that the object was insignificant. For him, the thing-in-itself was clear, and not opaque, since he claimed the object to be the subject itself. If facts did not fit ideas, it was “too bad for the facts”. Apparently, they needed to be changed, to make them fit the ideas. The object for Kant was what he called the 'noumenon', literally the unnamable thing-in-itself, which was able to establish intersubjectivity between people or subjects referring to it. Intersubjectivity, for Hegel, meant one subject, dependently confirming (or ‘re-cognizing’) another, as they independently rejected a third party. By literally ‘re-cognizing’ the other, “the subject goes into the world and loses himself, or [else] he goes into himself and loses the world”. This 're-cognition', if it were selectively reciprocated by the other, was believed to be a prerequisite for self-consciousness. Therefore, while for Kant the 'phenoumenon' or subject extended the 'noumenon' or object, for Hegel the object, or intersubjectivity based on 're-cognition', extended the subject, which is exactly the reverse and revolutionary indeed, to hack such a great work before the ink was even dry.

Phenomenological monism describes cultural reality as social constructs which are based on intersubjectivity (Schütz 1945, Berger and Luckman 1966). We can wonder, whether such intersubjectivity leaves any room for independent confirmation, because independence needs dualism, which is difficult to apply in social- and personal settings, as sooner or later, power and politics turn the attempt to 'seek independent confirmation' into a request to 'avoid dependent rejection', dependently confirm friends (cronies) and independently reject enemies. Power and politics change facts to fit the ideas, when they use different facts as if they were the same, or by using the same facts as if they were different. For example, when voters show behavioral contagion (Wheeler 1966), votes cannot be interpreted as independent confirmations. Truth and ethics' intrinsic motivation to seek independent confirmation should not be confused with power and politics' extrinsic motivation to avoid dependent rejection, by elite's requirements to 're-cognize' the gatekeepers, polarizing the minds of group-members. Truth and ethics change ideas to fit facts, not change facts to fit ideas.

Processing facts and ideas, or what-is-sensed and what-is-known, is finding spatiotemporal coincidence and independent confirmation between material and immaterial substances. If and when sensing what-is-sensed does independently confirm knowing what-is-known, then both forms, or sensing and knowing, can process both contents, or what-is-sensed and what-is-known. Therefore, contents can copy-and-swap forms, between recollection and construction. Knowing what-is-sensed (or realization) and sensing what-is-known (or intuition) will then emerge from subconsciousness, as different material and immaterial substances, and use the new forms to process old contents. These new forms on both sides, will also generate two separate streams of content, relative to form, between object and subject. Each goes from the depth to the periphery, in spatializing time, and from the periphery to the depth, in temporalizing space, teleologically as form-shaping-content and causally as content-shaping-form. One stream holds both spheres of recollection as 'knowing what-is-sensed', and the other holds both spheres of construction as 'sensing what-is-known'.

Intrinsically motivated by truth and ethics, modern dualism separates subject and object. Sensing what-is-sensed or external normativity, as temporalized space in recollection, and knowing what-is-known or internal normativity, as time about to spatialize in construction, co-incide. Independent confirmation should follow, between forms (sensing and knowing) at the depths of their spheres, through negative falsification, and between contents (what-is-sensed and what-is-known) at the peripheries of their spheres, through positive verification. However, post-modern monism is belief in dependency, or the one-ness, of subject and object (Hegel 1807), extrinsically motivated by power and politics. Recollection's external-, and construction's internal normativity are consecutive, not simultaneous, as in dualism. Internal normativity is sent from the top of the hierarchy, while external normativity is received at the bottom. Roles are sent and received (Boekestijn 1978), by dependent confirmation at the top, independent rejection at the bottom, and both in between. The lower ranks compete for selective reciprocity and sharing privileged power and politics.

If 'sensing what-is-sensed' has not turned yet into 'knowing what-is-sensed', and 'knowing what-is-known' has not turned yet into 'sensing what-is-known', then what-is-sensed, coordinately reflected "here" in sensing, and knowing, coordinately reflected "now" in what-is-known, have not yet co-incided for current content, or facts and ideas. Interaction between the sensing- and knowing organism/self/belief on the one hand, and its sensed- and known environment/other/reality on the other, have to accomplish that. Once co-incidence has been reached, space can temporalize while time can spatialize, thus enabling independent confirmation between 'sensing what-is-sensed' and 'knowing what-is-known', to happen as well. When forms are copied-and-swapped, following independent confirmation, 'knowing what-is-sensed' and 'sensing what-is-known', or 'realizing what-is-realized' and 'intuiting what-is-intuited', at the second stage, emerge from subconsciousness. Depending on the reliability of what-is-known and the validity of knowing, the next stages of independent confirmation prove reliable and valid as well, to be reached in a similar way.

If the reliability of current contents, and the validity of current forms, prove to be robust enough, then co-incidence and independent confirmation reoccur at a higher stage, between forms (this time realizing and intuiting instead of sensing and knowing) and between contents (this time what-is-realized and what-is-intuited instead of what-is-sensed and what-is-known), then they can emerge as (1) 'valuing what-is-valued', or 'intuiting what-is-realized' ('sensing what-is-known-what-is-sensed', or 'sensing what-is-known' merged with 'knowing what-is-sensed'), and (2) 'trying what-is-tried', or 'realizing what-is-intuited' ('knowing what-is-sensed-what-is-known', or 'knowing what-is-sensed' merged with 'sensing what-is-known'). If reliability and validity then are still robust enough, the same copy-and-swap of forms between recollection and construction in the subject and in the object, happens between valuing and trying, making them emerge as 'trying what-is-valued' or 'reacting what-is-reacted' and 'valuing what-is-tried' or 'acting what-is-acted'. Thus, in processing, newly copied forms occur, while old forms must be implied as new contents.

Co-inciding facts or what-is-sensed, e.g. white swans, and ideas or what-is-known, "white swans", are proexamples of each other (Corcoran 2005). Contents (what-is-sensed and what-is-known) copy-and-swap forms (sensing and knowing), if they co-incide, to emerge as 'knowing what-is-sensed' or realizing white swans, and 'sensing what-is-known' or intuiting "white swans". Realizing counterexamples falsifies intuiting, and halts processing. More proexamples make contents (what-is-known-what-is-sensed or what-is-realized, and what-is-sensed-what-is-known or what-is-intuited) copy-and-swap forms (realizing and intuiting), to emerge as 'intuiting what-is-realized', or valuing white swans, and 'realizing what-is-intuited', or trying "white swans". Valuing counterexamples falsifies trying and halts processing. More proexamples make contents (what-is-sensed-what-is-known-what-is-sensed or what-is-valued and what-is-known-what-is-sensed-what-is-known or what-is-tried) copy-and-swap forms (valuing and trying), to emerge as 'trying what-is-valued', or reacting to white swans, and 'valuing what-is-tried', or acting to "white swans", socially.

At the highest stage of processing current content, 'trying what-is-valued', or reacting, and 'valuing what-is-tried', or acting, emerge as social interaction. Object and subject turn into other and self. The self has built trust, expectation, presumption, prediction, belief, and intention, regarding current content, to be exchanged through social interaction, in social reality. This consciousness or internal normativity, is not externalized as behavior, until one's reaction in response to the other's action, or external normativity, independently confirms it, rationally, emotionally, and/or compassionately, and internalizes it as consciousness. One's action before-the-fact is "unleashed" in response to one's own reaction after-the-fact (which is the other's action). Thus a social cycle appears, in which one reacts in response to the other's action, and acts in response to one's own reaction, followed by the other reacting in response to one's action, and acting in response to the other's own reaction. These are the four forms or phases in social interaction, between object and subject, or environment/other/reality and organism/self/belief, through which contents are remitted.

Recollection and construction take place in the sensing- and knowing subject, as well as in the sensed- and known object. Constructive recollection happens in the subject, between forms, as well as in the object, between contents (facts and ideas). Sources' self-reflections seek to co-incide with their sources' opposites, to copy-and-swap forms, if and when recollection independently confirms construction, in the subject by negative falsification, for validity, and in the object, by positive verification, for reliability. Due to independent confirmation, contents copy-and-swap forms. New forms in recollection and construction process old-forms-reduced-to-contents, letting them emerge as new substances, at a higher level of functional structure, or stage of independent confirmation. At the highest stage, recollection and construction have become part of social reality, where subject and object openly interact in social reality, noticeable to each other, externalizing as behavior in construction, and internalizing as consciousness in recollection, between time/form/consciousness at the depth-, and space/content/behavior at the periphery of each of the spheres.

In recollection, the object's source reflects itself in the subject, whereas in construction, the subject's source reflects itself in the object. Once object and subject have turned into other and self, at the highest level of independent rational-, emotional- and/or compassionate confirmation, while they are socially interacting, the other reflects him- or herself in the one, and the one reflects her- or himself in the other. Thus, in modern dualism, independent individuals can still relate to each other, without the other's actual presence. In post-modern monism, this is different. In modern dualism, truth and ethics motivate intrinsically, to seek and find independent rational-, emotional-, and/or compassionate confirmation, while in post-modern monism, power and politics motivate extrinsically, to avoid dependent rejection from the group, 're-cognizing' the other as a friend by dependent confirmation (cronyism) or as an enemy by independent rejection (prejudice), both of which may elicit reciprocity, as they allegedly lead to self-consciousness (Hegel 1807, Marx 1867). Thus, hierarchies develop through power-distancing (Mulder 1973) between elites and commons.



figure 9



3. Constructive Recollection


After religion and philosophy, physical science now appears to harbor dualism as well, because spatiotemporality can be ontologically material or epistemologically immaterial. Material space temporalizes from the periphery towards the depth-, while immaterial time spatializes from the depth towards the periphery, in the four dimensions of a Euclidean sphere, of which the three spatial dimensions at the periphery cannot be reduced to the one temporal dimension at the depth. Spatial, empirical sensibility after-the-fact, in recollection, can independently confirm temporal, rational understanding before-the-fact, in construction, the product of both of which is sensibility before-the-fact, or the 'synthetic apriori'. Science, justice, and journalism should be trusted, expected, presumed, predicted, believed and intended. Coordinated co-incidence [1] and reflections seeking independent confirmation with opposite sources [2], in constructive recollection [3], should take social interaction [3a] to social reality [3b] and social identity [3c]. Power and politics in post-modern monism, dominating and submitting truth and ethics in modern dualism, is not awarded.

3a. Social Interaction

Normativity between socially interacting, independent individuals, is rather different from that between members of the same group. At the individual level, seeking independent confirmation combines external normativity in recollection, with internal normativity in construction. At the collective level, avoiding dependent rejection separates external normativity received from superiors, from internal normativity sent to inferiors. Individually, truth does not change from within-facts-between-ideas to within-ideas-between-facts, or from within-people-between-groups to within-groups-between-people. Freedom of choice is offered or forwarded to whom deserves it. Collectively, group-polarization within-groups-between-people develops untruth within-people-between-groups, or from within-ideas-between-facts to within-facts-between ideas. In other words, collectively, facts are turned and twisted, to fit the narrative, and do not allow anyone to prove his or her innocence. Thus, normative rationality (Habermas 1982, 1991) for independent individuals and for 'dependently confirming friends' and/or 'independently rejecting enemies', are not alike.

Recollection and construction continuously seek coordinated co-incidence and independent confirmation, at consecutive levels, or sensing/realizing/valuing/reacting, and knowing/intuiting/trying/acting. Contents copy-and-swap forms, replacing older ones, reducing them to content, down the chain. Form and contents expand into higher order substances, both in the subject and in the object. Swapping forms makes recollection, at all levels of independent confirmation, follow construction, as two-state dualities, at the same level, each time moving up one level. Alternating facts (or what-is-sensed), and ideas (or what-is-known), are processed by forms as content. In recollection, facts-relate-ideas, while in construction, ideas-relate-facts, until consciousness externalizes as behavior, on one side-, and behavior internalizes as consciousness, on the other side of social interaction, continuously renewing facts and ideas. Relations occur causally within-facts-between-ideas, as content-shapes-form in recollection, while they are implied teleologically within-ideas-between-facts, as form-shapes-content in construction, before forms are copied-and-swapped.

Contents are brought from one source to the other by the sources' self-reflections, seeking co-incidence and independent confirmation, as they go around their source's peripheries, recollecting facts or constructing ideas, while they are shaping-, or being shaped by form. What is trusted, expected, presumed, predicted, believed and intended in action before-the-fact, is 'unleashed' in action after-the-fact, if and when the subject's reaction, in response to the object's action, independently confirms his own action before-the-fact, rationally, emotionally, and/or compassionately. The self senses/realizes/values/reacts, in social interaction, what the other knows/intuits/tries/acts, while the other senses/realizes/values/reacts what the self knows/intuits/tries/acts. Recollected content expands to 'knowing (by the other) what-is-sensed (by the other) what-is-known (by the self) what-is-sensed (by the self)', or 'what-is-reacted', while dualistically separated, constructed content expands, to 'sensing (by the self) what-is-known (by the other) what-is-sensed (by the other) what-is-known (by the self)', or 'what-is-acted', for every consecutive state, stage, and phase.

States of coordinated co-incidence and stages of independent confirmation combine into phases of constructive recollection. States alternate between material recollection after-the-fact and immaterial construction before-the-fact, for subject and object, or environment/other/reality and organism/self/belief, co-inciding in material space as recollection or sensing "here" or "there" what-is-sensed, as well as in immaterial time as construction or knowing "now" or "then" what-is-known, in social interaction. Copied-and-swapped forms with their new contents, comprise one of four kinds, for recollection and construction, depending on their stage of independent rational-, emotional-, and/or compassionate confirmation, following their current content's co-incidence and independent confirmation. Up to four states- and four stages per phase, constitute one social cycle. Subject and object, or self and other, follow the other's recollection and construction, and their own, as phases continuously repeat themselves and overlap each other. Recollection after-the-fact must independently confirm construction before-the-fact, sufficient to continue the cycling.

Four dual states of coordinated co-incidence, one of recollection and one of construction, at four stages of independent confirmation, play roles in the four phases of the social cycle between other and self, as the phases overlap, across at least one to at most three states. For example, the subject needs four states for its reaction to take place in response to the action of the object, or 'knowing (by the other) what-is-sensed (by the other) what-is-known (by the one) what-is-sensed (by the one)', also called 'reacting what-is-reacted'. Started with sensing, extended with three new forms, old forms were reduced to new contents. The latter two states are from the object's point of view, as the former two are from the subject's point of view. The latter three are shared with the next phase, the subject's action in response to his own reaction, expanded by one state, the copied-and-swapped form of reacting, which is now part of 'sensing (by the one) what-is-known (by the other) what-is-sensed (by the other) what-is-known (by the one)', also called 'acting what-is-acted'. Phases add a new form-state to the beginning, and delete an old content-state from the end.

States, stages, and phases logistically integrate across two social cycles, or eight states, in pairs of recollected material- and constructed immaterial substance, differentiated by forms, when they are copied-and-swapped. Four stages of independent confirmation can possibly be reached, for each state, from sensing or knowing, to realizing or intuiting, valuing or trying, and reacting or acting. Two cycles of four phases follow each other in social interaction, each phase expanding from one to four states in duration, depending on the number of stages that were reached. Phases repeat themselves and overlap each other, as they start and finish one state beyond the previous phase, from the subject responding to the object and to itself, to the object responding to the subject and to itself, using the same states in different roles, constituting different phases, and taking contents from previous phases, processing- and then passing them to following phases, across states. The first cycle of four states applies to the subject, expanded to take the object’s point of view, while the second cycle of four states applies to the object, expanded to take the subject’s point of view instead.

3b. Social Reality

Social reality needs social recognition, personally or collectively. At the personal level, "an objective, rationally necessary and unconditional principle that we must always follow, despite any natural desires or inclinations we may have to the contrary” (Johnson & Cureton 2016), was Kant's Categorical Imperative, instructing the autonomous individual to “act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law” (Kant 1785). This is the 'synthetic apriori' or 'sensibility before-the-fact', created when 'sensibility after-the-fact' could independently confirm 'understanding before-the-fact'. Soon after, Hegel made re-cognition conditional upon the one person's dependency of the other. Re-cognition was to be taken literally, allegedly necessary for self-consciousness, and should mean "going into the world and losing oneself", as opposed to "going into oneself and losing the world" (Hegel 1807). Power and politics, avoiding dependent rejection, by dependently confirming friends and/or by independently rejecting enemies, thus substituted truth and ethics, seeking independent confirmation, by a revolution.

Power and politics change facts (what-is-sensed) to fit the ideas (what-is-known), while truth and ethics change ideas to fit the facts. Ideas relate facts, while facts relate ideas. When facts are used in one idea, and reused in another idea, it depends on the ideas’ respect for the facts, not to have relations within them logically entangled, for example, if one fact is treated as multiple, or multiple facts as if they are one. Similarly, people relate groups and groups relate people. If people belong to one group, as well as to another, it depends on the groups’ respect for the people, not to make their relations inconsistent. Power and politics motivate extrinsically to avoid dependent rejection, by the threat of excommunication or homelessness, within-groups-between-people and within-ideas-between-facts. Truth and ethics on the contrary, motivate intrinsically to seek independent rational-, emotional-, and/or compassionate confirmation, within-facts-between-ideas and within-people-between-groups. Power and politics, in need of closed- and static monism, replaced truth and ethics, in need of open- and dynamic dualism (Bergson 1932), causing relations to entangle.

People either seek power and politics, or truth and ethics. Power and politics lead to people's (inter)dependency, as they avoid dependent rejection from the group, fearing excommunication or homelessness. 'Enemies' or 'friends' (of their leader) are independently rejected or dependently confirmed, which can possibly result in selective reciprocity and access to those privileged few. Truth and ethics, on the contrary, lead to people's independency, as they look for reality, to independently confirm their beliefs, rationally, emotionally, and/or compassionately. When object and subject become other and self,  inter-subjectivity or truth between them, to which each refers, strengthens them both as independent rational-, emotional-, and/or compassionate individuals. Independence needs dualism, which is difficult to apply in personal- and social settings, because power and politics turn 'seeking independent confirmation' into 'avoiding dependent rejection'. Power and politics change facts to fit the ideas, as truth and ethics change ideas to fit the facts. Entangled relations within-ideas-between-facts show up within-facts-between-ideas, as stress and dissociation.

Truth is 'knowing "now" what-is-known', or ideas, that are independently confirmed by 'sensing "here" what-is-sensed', or facts, rationally, emotionally, and/or compassionately. Between forms in the organism/self/belief, sensing (the objective subject; cf. De Wit 1991) then negatively falsifies knowing (the subjective subject) for validity, whereas between contents in the environment/other/reality, what-is-sensed or facts (the objective object), positively verifies what-is-known or ideas (the subjective object) for reliability. However, power and politics invariably turn 'seeking independent confirmation' between the sensing- and the knowing organism/self/belief (the objective- and the subjective subject), and between the known- and the sensed environment/other/reality (the subjective- and the objective object), although subtly, into 'avoiding dependent rejection', by taking a negative, non-constructive attitude. It creates monistic dialectics, forcing people to take sides (or leave), to dependently confirm friends and independently reject enemies (of their own or of their leader's). It is writing on collectivist-, socialist-, or communist walls by Hegel and Marx.


Our world is divided and mixed. The main part was created by post-modern, immanently dialectic monism or power and politics, after the Kantian era and the French Revolution, whereas the rest was created by modern, independent individual dualism or truth and ethics, before that time. Monism can be made to look like dualism, comparable to dialectics, although monism assumes that we are all (inter) dependent and that subgroups or individuals will compete for their own pretense to dominate and submit the other (Hegel 1807, Marx 1867, Nietzsche 1901). Monistic (inter) dependency leads to re-cognition, by dependent confirmation of a dominant other, and independent rejection of submitted others, bypassing truth, to provoke polarization and extremism. Duality, on the other hand, assumes that there are two sources instead of one, which interact through any two individuals, "other" and "self", or object and subject, in social belief and social reality, to stay on track of truth. Dualistic (inter) dependency of independent, autonomous individuals seeks independent rational-, emotional-, and/or compassionate confirmation, for- and from each other, instead.

Within-groups-between-people, independent rejection of (the dominant other's) enemies, and/or dependent confirmation of (the dominant other's) friends, help avoid dependent rejection from the group, by excommunication and homelessness. Relations within-groups-between-people naturally translate into relations within-people-between-groups, which enables manipulating individual group members, since honesty can always easily be explained as disloyalty, or loyalty as dishonesty, which deeply confuses the individual member. Choosing the opposite explanation, intentionally manipulating, dominates and submits another. The difference between, on one hand, Hegel's (1807) literal interpretation of 're-cognizing' the other, or dependent confirmation of friends and independent rejection of enemies, and on the other, Kant's independent rational-, emotional-, and/or compassionate confirmation of another, could be a complete disguise of dualism, by monism. We cannot know what we don't know, unless the group takes away our individual independence, as it does in revolutions, and tells us what we were expected to know. Thus, laws are put into place.

If post-modern monism and modern dualism run into each other in daily life, role-sending and role-receiving by the former may either grow more intense, or it may be weakened by the latter. In monism, the one's internal normativity, which is sent, is the other's external normativity, which is received. Thus, ignored are the sender's external- and the receiver's internal normativity. Monism exists since Hegel hijacked Kant's dualism, cutting it in half, during the French Revolution and, doubling down, since the Cultural Revolution of May 1968. At crucial episodes in history, group-polarization was able to extremize monism into absolute dictatorship or the subject totally dominating and submitting the object. This has stimulated the will to power (Nietzsche 1901) and activism through politics, media and marketing. Power and politics can simply bulldoze their way forward and let facts it created "prove" the ideas. This is what Hegel meant by "too bad for the facts". Thus, power and politics can disguise as truth and ethics. Power changes facts to fit the ideas, making innocence defenseless, whereas truth instead changes ideas to fit the facts.


3c. Social Identity

The kind of social order which is recollected or constructed, determines how social identity develops. Monistically created social order, by power and politics, motivates avoiding dependent rejection, by dependent confirmation of the other, hoping for selective reciprocity, and independent rejection of the competition, making up one's identity, as inter-dependent among friends, and surrounded by enemies. Dualistically created social order, by truth and ethics, motivates seeking independent confirmation, strengthening the other's and one's own identity, as the object establishes inter-subjectivity between subjects. Re-cognition of other and self (reciprocally) avoids dependent rejection, in monism, or seeking independent confirmation, in dualism. In monism, the object is neglected, while in dualism, the subject is controlled through the object, by classic- and operand conditioning (Pavlov 1910, Skinner 1930). Reflexes are conditioned responses to conditioning stimuli, controlled by nature or by culture. Power and politics condition reflexes by demanding 're-cognition' of a dominant other's cognition, threatening one to be excommunicated and be made homeless.

What-is-sensed, the source of the object, or 'objective object', reflects in the subject, as sensing, or the 'objective subject'. Knowing, the source of the subject, or 'subjective subject', reflects in the object, as what-is-known, or the 'subjective object'. As they are socially interacting, subject and object may each become the other's Significant Other, apart from their Selves. Then, the one's Self is the other's Significant other, as one source's self-reflection, and the other's Self is the one's Significant Other, as the other source's self-reflection. The one's subjective subject, or knowing, is reflected in the other's subjective object, or what-is-known, while the other's objective object, or what-is-sensed, is reflected in the one's objective subject, or sensing. Thus, knowing and what-is-known, in construction, as well as sensing and what-is-sensed, in recollection, could divide within- and between two people, in themselves and between themselves, the Self and its Significant Other. The more significant the Significant Other is to the Self, the less independent confirmation needs to be only rational, and the more it may be emotional or compassionate, in their social interaction.

Between modern philosophical dualism or truth and ethics, and post-modern philosophical monism or power and politics, the relation between Self and Significant Other is critical for the kind of social order, compatible with it. A partnership or relationship grows tense, when there is competition which is valued at-, or above, the comparison level (Thibaut and Kelley 1959). Are Self and Significant Other (inter) dependent and therefore, will they avoid each other's dependent rejection, by dependently confirming each other and independently rejecting the competition, or instead, will they seek each other's independent confirmation? The former relies on the power and politics of the relations within-groups-between-people and within-ideas-between-facts, as in subjective cultures and subcultures, neglecting the objective world, protecting each other against it, and the latter relies on the truth and ethics of relations within-facts-between-ideas and within-people-between-groups not getting entangled, where the facts are used in one idea, and reused in another, to establish objectivity or inter-subjectivity between subjects independently referring to them.

Somehow we are all related, either by receiving- and returning favors through dependent confirmation and cronyism, or by seeking independent rational-, emotional-, and/or compassionate confirmation, both from- and for the other. What happens if these two schemes are mixed? Monistic power and politics extrinsically motivate dependent reaction-and-action within groups, where friends receive- and return favors. Dualistic truth and ethics intrinsically motivate independent action-and-reaction between individuals, if and when after-the-fact 'sensing what-is-sensed' independently confirms before-the-fact 'knowing what-is-known'. Intrinsically motivated reactions, in response to extrinsically motivated actions, could only be intended as independent confirmations, truly understanding extrinsic motivation. However, the two worlds are so apart, that this is highly unlikely. Extrinsically motivated reactions in response to intrinsically motivated actions, may interpret the independent confirmation as as a return of favor, which it was not. Such reactions assimilate the independent individual into the group, claiming his dependent confirmation in return.

The objective subject, or the recollected object's self-reflection in the subject, does copy-and-swap forms with the subjective subject, or the constructive source, if and when they co-incide, and recollection independently confirms construction. In recollection, within-facts-between-ideas, ideas reuse facts as linking-pins, which relate them as 'knowing what-is-sensed', 'intuiting what-is-realized', or 'trying what-is-valued', while in construction, within-ideas-between-facts, ideas relate facts as 'sensing what-is-known', 'realizing what-is-intuited', or 'valuing what-is-tried'. Relations generate meaningful networks, continuously expanding their horizon, since the facts, or objects, establish inter-subjectivity between the ideas, or subjects referring to them, by seeking- and hopefully finding independent confirmation. However, power and politics, motivating to avoid dependent rejection within-groups-between-people and, by group-polarization, within-people-between-groups, may dominate truth and ethics, motivating to seek independent confirmation, from recollection within-facts-between-ideas, for construction within-ideas-between-facts, to make it disappear.

Modern philosophical, open- and dynamic dualism can prevent post-modern philosophical, closed- and static monism, from using power and politics to polarize group members' opinions. Minority influence is strong, if consistent over long periods of time, not dividing the majority’s attention (Moscovici 1974). Relations within-facts-between-ideas and within-people-between-groups critically must not entangle, which happens if and when ideas treat different facts as if they were the same, to simulate finding independent confirmation, or they treat the same fact as if it was different, to make finding independent confirmation impossible. In a closed and static approach, Bergson has been interpreted as if he criticized Kant, asking how ideas categorically demand their own realization, following the Categorical Imperative (Lawlor and Moulard 2016). Stating that by "re-establish[ing] the duality, the difficulties vanish", Bergson (1932) has implied seeking independent confirmation, between the two sources, in "duality of origin" (p.79). His post-modern, monistic biographers called it, presumptuously and patronizingly, "but two complementary manifestations of life".

Notions of rationality, emotion, and compassion, are recollected facts and constructed ideas, co-inciding and independently confirming each other, with contents about to copy-and-swap forms. To reach our full potential, recollection within-facts-between-ideas must independently confirm construction within-ideas-between-facts, which is impossible within-people-between-groups and within-groups-between-people, due to group-polarization, as it shifts personal opinions to a dominant extreme, of concentrated power and politics. Independent rational-, emotional-, and/or compassionate confirmation creates meaningful networks of logical-, chronological-, and/or associative relations within-ideas-between-facts, reusing facts as their linking-pins, which expands the network of meaningful relations. Reusing facts to link ideas should not change the meaning of these networks, by calling the same facts different, or different facts the same, through power and politics. Once relations entangle, no truth proves one's innocence, facts isolate from their meaning, and people isolate from their identity, stoking up traumatic stress, as well as tormenting dissociation1.





Philosophy Application


figure 15



Finding truth is an art we learned and willingly unlearned. Truth can only be found by looking for the facts, which independently confirm our ideas. Independence needs dualism, which is difficult to apply in personal- and social settings, as invariably, power and politics or dialectics turn 'seeking independent confirmation' into 'avoiding dependent rejection'. Truth and ethics change ideas to fit the facts, while power and politics change facts to fit the ideas. Thus post-modern philosophical monism took over modern philosophical dualism.   



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