You can’t be rooted unless you’re free and you can’t be free unless you’re rooted L. Ingalls Wilder
Constructive Recollection Philosophy Application
Finding Truth in Science, Justice, and Journalism
Ron de Weijze -
Finding truth is an art we learned and willingly unlearned. Truth can only be found by looking for the facts, which independently confirm our ideas. Independence needs dualism, which is difficult to apply in personal- and social settings, as invariably, power and politics or dialectics turn 'seeking independent confirmation' into 'avoiding dependent rejection'. Truth and ethics change ideas to fit the facts, while power and politics change facts to fit the ideas. Thus post-modern philosophical monism took over modern philosophical dualism.
When modern philosophy developed most articulately in Immanuel Kant's work (Rohlf 2016), post-modern philosophy was an accident waiting to happen, declaring our two sources of life, in dualism, or
'duality of origin' (Bergson 1932), to be one, in monism. At the beginning of the French Revolution (1789), Kant published his great work (1790), in which Anglo-Saxon philosophical
'sensibility after-the-fact' independently confirms Continental philosophical
'understanding before-the-fact', making it the famous 'sensibility before-the-fact' (the
'synthetic apriori'). The subject or 'phe-noumenon' extended the object or
'noumenon', which could establish inter-subjectivity between subjects referring to it. Hegel inverted this, making the object extend the subject. A person or subject should inter-subjectively
're-cognize' another, dependently confirming him for selective reciprocation, while they independently reject another. "The subject goes into the world and loses himself, or [else] he goes into himself, and loses the world" (Hegel 1807).
Who or what is dependently confirmed counts, and who or what is
independently rejected does not, in post-modern mode.
Post-modern deconstructionism (Žižek 2012, Derrida 1992)
implies that existence is nothingness (Heidegger 1959, Sartre 1943), God is dead (Nietzsche 1882), truth is multiplicit or dialectical (Marx 1867), and reality
is only a mental phenomenon (Hegel 1807),
without an independent object. Post-modern philosophical monism or
phe-noumenalism is very different from modern philosophical dualism
or noumenalism. In spite of its praising Kant as the 'Copernicus of the
philosophical revolution', calling space and time
the basic categories
of the phe-noumenon or subject, Kant never forgot the noumenon or object, as
phenomenalism did. One and a half century after the French Revolution (1789-1799), the Cultural Revolution of May 1968 doubled down on the monistic
premise, when Post-Modernism had gone- and come around the world, leaving its brand of social values in collectivism, socialism, and communism. Confronted with
its missing open- and dynamic dualism, monism diverts to power, politics and dialectics, or groups competing to dominate and submit
others, until one is left on top of the vertically power-distancing
hierarchy (cf. Mulder 1973).
If our sources, sensibility and understanding, may be called what-is-sensed and knowing, then the subject is the sensing- and knowing organism/self/belief, while the object is
what-is-sensed or the sensed- and known environment/other/reality. The sensed object reflects itself in the sensing subject,
as the knowing subject reflects itself in the known object.
Therefore, what-is-sensed reflects itself in sensing, "here", or "there" on the
object's other side, as the subject was moved in material space, while knowing reflects itself in what-is-known, "now", or "then" on the
object's other side, as the subject moved in immaterial time. Truth is found, if
and when our sources and the opposite source's self-reflections 
coordinately coincide, and sensing what-is-sensed proves knowing
what-is-known to be true, through 
consecutive states of coordinated coincidence, at stages of independent confirmation,
and in phases of dual social cycles, the independent individual 
constructively recollects his world, by [a]
social interaction, on the one hand constructing [b]
social reality, and on the other recollecting a [c]
1. Coordinated Coincidence
From the outside, the subject is part of the object, while from the
inside, the object is "ob-jected" or "off-thrown" from the subject,
making it stand apart. Our sources are the sensed object,
or what-is-sensed, reflecting itself in the sensing subject, and the knowing subject,
reflecting itself in the known object, or what-is-known. The sources and
their self-reflections are spheres, expanding inwardly from space/content/behavior at the peripheries,
in recollection, or outwardly from time/form/consciousness at the depths,
in construction. From the periphery to the depth of the sphere,
space temporalizes, content-shapes-form, and behavior internalizes
as consciousness. From the depth to the periphery of the sphere, time spatializes, form-shapes-content, and consciousness externalizes as behavior. Sensing and what-is-sensed expand
facts, which are used and reused by ideas, in the three spatial dimensions of the periphery, from the
tangent point between the spheres, while knowing and what-is-known expand
ideas, which are using and reusing facts, synchronously in
every direction, from the one temporal dimension, at the radii or depths of their spheres.
Today, space and time have nearly become monistically one, as 'spatiotemporality'.
However, in a Euclidean sphere, the three spatial dimensions of its periphery, and the one temporal dimension of its radius,
remain dualistically irreducible to each other, since their ratio π ("pi"),
carries infinitely many, non-repetitive, decimal places. As the organism/self/belief interacts with the environment/other/reality, it uses space and time as separate sources,
each source reflecting itself. Sensing "here" what-is-sensed at the peripheries of the
source's and its self-reflection's spheres, dualistically separated from knowing "now" what-is-known at the depths of the
other source's and its self-reflection's spheres, it attempts to
co-incide space and time again, like it was before processing. In
recollection, as space is about to temporalize, contents are facts,
used and reused by ideas, whereas in construction, where time has
spatialized, contents are ideas, using and reusing facts. Thus, if
and when recollection and construction co-incide, their spheres are spatiotemporally commensurable.
Although one is material and the other immaterial, their space and
time are commensurable.
Our two sources, space and time,
combined into the concept of 'space-time', describe the object or the sensed- and known environment/other/reality. The subject, or the sensing- and knowing organism/self/belief, processes space,
through sensing what-is-sensed, separately from time, through knowing what-is-known.
Our sources, as we experience them, are separate spheres, one for space at the periphery, and the other for time at the depth, as they
have co-incided, "here and now". They are separated
again, as sources, so that each is co-ordinated with its own
self-reflection, where their peripheries meet. One source, and its self-reflection, recollect
or sense "here" what-is-sensed, as the other source, and its
self-reflection, construct or know "now" what-is-known. The sources'
(what-is-sensed, knowing) and opposite sources' co-ordinated self-reflections
(sensing, what-is-known) are positioned to potentially co-incide, if
and when they are commensurable. Therefore, spatial co-ordination at the
peripheries of the spheres lead to temporal co-incidence at the
depths of the spheres, while the self-reflections, going around their
sources, recollect and construct.
Materially sensing what-is-sensed
only occurs (cf. Gendlin 1997) "here" in space/content/behavior, at the
peripheries of the spheres in recollection, between
the one source, the sensed object, and its co-ordinated self-reflection, the sensing subject.
Immaterially knowing what-is-known is implied (idem) "now" in time/form/consciousness, at the
depths of the spheres in construction, between the opposite source, the knowing subject, and its co-ordinated self-reflection, the known object. The self-reflections go around and come around
their sources, co-ordinately reflecting them at the three spatial dimensions of their peripheries,
while they recollect facts or what-is-sensed,
subliminally, because sensing what-is-sensed is not knowing what-is-sensed (yet),
and construct ideas or what-is-known,
supraliminally, because knowing what-is-known is not sensing what-is-known (yet). The self-reflections aim to co-incide with their opposite sources, at the one temporal dimension of their radii,
which requires commensurability between the spheres, to stay on track of truth.
The three spatial dimensions of all "heres", follow the temporal
dimension of all shared "nows".
The peripheries of the spheres are material and spatial, while their the
depths are immaterial and temporal. The spatiality of the peripheries
of the spheres enables them to co-ordinate their locations, while the temporality
of their depths enables them to co-incide
and synchronize their durations. Coincidence does imply coordination in
the "here and now", although coordination does not imply
coincidence. The sources have their self-reflections go around and
come around them, because they spatiotemporally co-ordinate
their locations at the tangent-line, where all "heres" and "nows" have met, meet or will meet, as the sources co-incide with
their opposite's self-reflections, and synchronize in the subject as sensing and knowing,
as well as in the object,
as what-is-sensed and what-is-known. If and when possible, knowing and
sensing, or time about to spatialize in the subject's source, and temporalized space in the object's
self-reflection, both in the subject, plus what-is-known and
what-is-sensed, or time about to spatialize in the
subject's self-reflection, and temporalized space
in the object's source, both in the object, co-incide as two
The dimensions at the peripheries of the sensed object and the sensing subject, in recollecting
space, content, and behavior, and those at the peripheries of the knowing subject and the known object, in constructed
time, form, and consciousness, co-ordinate "here" or "there". In recollection, space is about to temporalize, from the peripheries to the depths of the spheres, in one direction,
whereas in construction, time has spatialized, from the depths to the peripheries of the spheres, in the
opposing direction. The temporal dimensions at the depths of the sensing subject and the knowing subject,
and those at the depths of the sensed object and the known object,
may co-incide or synchronize "now" or "then". In recollection, space has temporalized from the peripheries to the depths of the sphere, in one direction,
whereas in construction, time is about to spatialize from the depths to the peripheries of the spheres, in the
opposing direction. Thus, co-incidence allows for space to temporalize and time to spatialize,
in the same sphere, if
sources and opposite's reflections are spatiotemporally
commensurable, although materially and immaterially distinct.
In recollection, space/content/behavior
does occur causally, between the source and its self-reflection, or what-is-sensed and sensing, at their peripheries, temporalizing towards their depths.
In construction, time/form/consciousness is implied teleologically, at the depths of knowing and what-is-known, spatializing towards their
peripheries. Reflections go around and come around their spheres, as sensing around what-is-sensed in material recollection, and as what-is-known around knowing in immaterial construction, to coincide with the opposite source, as forms in the sensing and knowing subject, and as contents in the sensed and known object. Once sources and opposite self-reflections coincide, their
inner directions, from the peripheries to the depths in
recollection, and from the depths to the peripheries in construction, "line up", between subject and object,
in two opposite directions. Knowing, from the depth to the periphery, continues in what-is-sensed, from the periphery to the depth, in one direction,
and what-is-known, from the depth to the periphery, continues in
sensing, from the periphery to the depth, goes in the opposite
Recollection's source's self-reflection brings content from the object to the subject,
for validity, while construction's source's self-reflection brings content from the subject to the object,
for reliability, if and when these self-reflections co-incide with
the opposite source. Thus, the sensing subject recollects the sensed object, going- and coming around it, to bring
facts to the knowing subject, while the knowing subject constructs the known object, going- and coming around it, to bring
ideas to the sensed object. The two self-reflections go around their sources, spatially co-ordinated at their peripheries, to temporally co-incide with their opposite sources. In the Euclidean spheres of spatiotemporally co-ordinated space and co-incided time, the spatial dimensions reach
from the periphery to the depth, processing what-is-sensed, as space
temporalizes, content-shapes-form, and behavior internalizes as
consciousness, whereas the temporal dimension reaches from the depth
to the periphery, processing what-is-known, as time spatializes,
form-shapes-content, and consciousness externalizes as behavior.
Thus, the two sources and their self-reflections keep each other in
Thoughts without content are
empty and intuitions without conceptions blind (Kant 1790).
In recollection, the source or the sensed environment/other/reality and its self-reflection,
or the sensing organism/self/belief,
subliminally, have 'empty' space/content/behavior at the peripheries-,
whereas in construction, the source or
the knowing organism/self/belief and its self-reflection, or the known environment/other/reality,
supraliminally, have 'blind' time/form/consciousness at the depths, of their spheres. To fill the emptiness and heal the blindness, the sensing- and knowing organism/self/belief makes its forms co-incide, while the sensed- and known environment/other/reality makes its contents co-incide, to align spatializing time and temporalizing space, form-shaping-content and content-shaping-form,
plus consciousness externalizing as behavior and behavior internalizing as consciousness, between the depths of the sensing- and knowing subject on
the one side, and the peripheries of the sensed- and known object on the other side, in opposing directions.
Interaction varies from supraliminal knowing and subliminal sensing,
to social action and -reaction.
For sources to co-incide with the self-reflections of the opposite
source, they must produce their own self-reflections, in the subject
as well as in the object. Through coordinated reflection, the source
in recollection, or the sensed environment/other/reality, must
create its self-reflection to be the sensing organism/self/belief,
while the source in construction, or the knowing
organism/self/belief, must create its self-reflection to be the
known environment/other/reality. Self-reflections recollect or
construct content, by going around their sources, to bring it to the
opposite source for processing, if the spheres are spatiotemporally
commensurable. Space/content/behavior temporalizes, shapes form, and
internalizes as consciousness, by causal occurrence in material
recollection, from the peripheries to the depths of the source and
its self-reflection, at the spatial tangent-points "here" or
"there", whereas time/form/consciousness spatializes, shapes
content, and externalizes as behavior, by teleological implication
in immaterial construction, from the depths to the peripheries of
the source and its self-reflection, at the temporal tangent-points,
"now" or "then".
Sources reflect themselves in
space/content/behavior, "here" at the spheres' peripheries, or "there" on the opposite source's side,
in recollection, and in time/form/consciousness, "now" at the spheres' depths, or "then" on the opposite source's side,
in construction, while the self-reflections go around their sources,
to "there" or "then", seeking to co-incide with the opposite source. If they co-incide and
they are commensurable, then from the depths to the peripheries of the spheres, time
may spatialize, form may shape content and consciousness may externalize as behavior,
and from the peripheries to the depths of the spheres, space may temporalize, content
may shape form and behavior may internalize as consciousness, all in the same sphere. The
subject or the sensing and knowing organism/self/belief can now interact with the
object or the sensed and known environment/other/reality, lining-up knowing and what-is-sensed, streaming in one direction, as well as what-is-known and sensing, streaming in the opposite direction.
and environment, self and other, or belief and reality, continuous
dynamic social interaction then takes place.
If space, "here" or "there" at the peripheries-, and time, "now" or "then" at the depths of the subjects' and objects' spheres do co-incide,
then spatializing time, form-shaping-content and consciousness externalizing as behavior,
in construction, line up, in both directions, with temporalizing space, content-shaping-form and behavior internalizing as consciousness,
in recollection, between subject and object. Thus, the objective source
reflecting itself in the subject, and the subjective source
reflecting itself in the object, can interact "here and now".
What-is-sensed can "here and now" be critical of what-is-known, if
the sensed and known object are commensurable in space and time as well, irrespective of their material or immaterial status. If they are, then what-is-known may be positively verified and therefore proven reliable by what-is-sensed, in order to be trusted, expected, presumed, predicted, believed and intended. Sensing can "here and now" be critical of knowing as well, if
the sensing and knowing subject are also commensurable in space and time, when knowing is negatively falsified,
warding off falsification, thereby proved valid through sensing.
What-is-sensed are facts
and what-is-known are ideas. As ideas relate facts, facts relate
ideas, being reused between them, in the ideas' meaningful
networks. Thus, interpretations, in recollection, are relations
within-facts-between-ideas, and in construction,
within-ideas-between-facts. When relations draw closer,
within-groups-between-people, as a result of group-polarization
(Moscovici 1969, Meertens 1980, 2006), those
within-people-between-groups may get entangled and turn into
conflicts of interest. To cope with this, the same facts may be
treated as different, and/or different facts may be treated as the
same, twisting the truth, to reduce cognitive dissonance
between the two (Festinger 1962).
This is changing the facts to fit the ideas, instead of the other
way around, like it ought to be. Changing the facts takes away the
possibility, from those who are accused, to prove their innocence.
Remaining options at the level of the independent individual, are to
create dissociative disorders like derealization and
depersonalization (Dell and O'Neill 2009),
possibly spreading into socioses (Van den Berg 1956),
at the level of the (inter) dependent collective.
Facts are synthesized in the 'synthetic aposteriori' or sensibility after-the-fact, and ideas are analyzed in the 'analytic apriori' or understanding before-the-fact (Kant 1781).
In recollection, from the periphery to the depth, relations in
space/content/behavior, from the past (after-the-fact), through the
present, cause the future ones to occur, within-facts-between-ideas.
In construction, from the depth to the periphery of the spheres,
relations in time/form/consciousness from the future (before the
fact), through the present, teleologically imply those in the past,
within-ideas-between-facts. Implication could be the "retrograde movement of the true growth of truth"
1922b). Functional structuralism (Dooyeweerd 1935, Sanders 1976)
contextualizes interpretations in recollection, temporalizing space, shaping form, and internalizing as consciousness.
Structural functionalism (Parsons 1975)
contextualizes interpretations in construction, spatializing time, shaping content, and externalizing as behavior. Truth and ethics
change ideas to fit facts, in open and dynamic dualism, as power and politics
change facts to fit ideas, piteously, in closed and static monism.
In recollection, "here" can be
the same, while "now" continuously changes, from "then" in the past
to "then" in the future. In construction, "now" can be the same,
while "here" continuously changes, from "there" on any side to
"there" on any other side. Thus, relations in space and time are
functionally structured, within-facts-between-ideas, intrapolated
from any "there and then" to "here and now", and
within-ideas-between-facts, extrapolated from "here and now" to any
"there and then". Intrapolating recollection and extrapolating
construction share the same social reality or cultural history.
Subliminally, in sensing what-is-sensed, still to be known, as well
as supraliminally, in knowing what-is-known, still to be sensed,
people realize and intuit these entities and how they are related.
They are the object, or the sensed- and known
environment/other/reality, and the subject, or the sensing- and
knowing organism/self/belief, the sources of which must co-incide
with their opposite's self-reflections, to be trusted, expected,
presumed, predicted, believed and intended, as in Kant's
'transcendental idealism', 'sensibility before-the-fact', or the
and knowing organism/self/belief, or the subject, interacts with the sensed- and known environment/other/reality,
or the object. In the "here and now", sensing "here" what-is-sensed
in recollection, needs to independently confirm knowing "now"
what-is-known in construction, rationally, emotionally, and/or
compassionately. What-is-sensed and what-is-known, anywhere and
anytime else, also needs to be trusted, expected, presumed,
predicted, believed, and intended, by the sensing- and knowing
subject. Space is temporalized in recollection while time is
spatialized in construction, in order to bridge the spatiotemporal
distance. Only in the "here and now", both spheres of
material recollection and both spheres of immaterial construction touch, or are the same,
by spatiotemporal co-incidence.
All other locations at the peripheries and moments at the radii
(in all directions except one) of the spheres, have behavioral content or conscious form attached
to them, extending towards- or from the depth.
The "here and now" relates to all other "theres and
thens", all of which have conducted, or do currently conduct, their
own "here and now".
2. Independent Confirmation
We can hardly do without recognition, for it gives us
strength. Recognition has been institutionalized, to guide us all of our lives,
only taken away as a punishment for not 're-cognizing' as expected.
We can do this to
ourselves as well. Puritans and Protestants notoriously do so, by
never complimenting another on his or her achievements, nor expecting such to happen to themselves. Still, there is a third way.
This is by letting truth speak for itself, or things-in-themselves,
which includes the
rationality, emotionality or compassion of particular things
1959) or living beings, only shared when they
appear to the one, as they appear to the other, and as they appear to
everybody, without any supportive commonality or bias, such as upbringing,
perceptual training, subculture or general culture. A nod is enough, a
smile, or just the way one looks out of his or her eyes. This is
what will never detach the organism/self/belief from the
environment/other/reality, keeping him or her on track of truth,
unbiased judgment and non-extremist self-expression. It can replace
institutionalized recognition and it must, supporting (mental)
health and happiness, for survival.
Opposing Kant, Hegel claimed that the object was insignificant.
For him, the thing-in-itself was clear,
and not opaque, since he claimed the object to be the subject itself. If facts did not fit ideas, it was “too bad for the facts”.
Apparently, they needed to be changed, to make them fit the ideas. The object for Kant was
what he called the 'noumenon', literally the unnamable thing-in-itself, which was able to establish intersubjectivity between
people or subjects referring to it. Intersubjectivity, for Hegel, meant one subject, dependently confirming (or ‘re-cognizing’) another, as they independently rejected a third
party. By literally ‘re-cognizing’ the other, “the subject goes into the world and loses himself, or [else] he goes into himself and loses the world”. This
it were selectively reciprocated by the other, was believed to be a prerequisite for self-consciousness. Therefore, while for Kant the
'phenoumenon' or subject extended the 'noumenon' or object, for Hegel the object, or intersubjectivity based on
extended the subject, which is exactly the reverse and
revolutionary indeed, to hack such a great work before the ink was
Phenomenological monism describes cultural reality
as social constructs which are based on intersubjectivity (Schütz 1945, Berger
and Luckman 1966). We can wonder, whether such intersubjectivity
leaves any room for independent confirmation, because independence needs
dualism, which is difficult to apply in social- and personal
settings, as sooner or later, power and politics turn the attempt to
'seek independent confirmation' into a request to 'avoid dependent rejection',
dependently confirm friends (cronies) and independently reject
enemies. Power and politics
change facts to fit the ideas, when they use different facts as if they
were the same, or by using the same facts as if they were different.
For example, when voters show behavioral contagion (Wheeler 1966),
votes cannot be interpreted as independent confirmations. Truth and
ethics' intrinsic motivation to seek independent confirmation should
not be confused with power and politics' extrinsic motivation to
avoid dependent rejection, by elite's requirements to 're-cognize'
the gatekeepers, polarizing the minds of group-members. Truth
and ethics change ideas to fit facts, not change facts to fit ideas.
Processing facts and ideas, or
what-is-sensed and what-is-known, is finding spatiotemporal coincidence
and independent confirmation between material and immaterial substances. If
and when sensing what-is-sensed does independently confirm knowing what-is-known, then both forms, or sensing and knowing,
can process both contents, or what-is-sensed and what-is-known.
Therefore, contents can copy-and-swap forms, between recollection and construction. Knowing what-is-sensed (or realization) and sensing what-is-known (or intuition)
will then emerge from subconsciousness, as different material and
immaterial substances, and use the new forms to process old contents.
These new forms on both sides, will also generate two separate streams of content, relative to form, between object and subject.
Each goes from the depth to the periphery, in spatializing time, and
from the periphery to the depth, in temporalizing space,
teleologically as form-shaping-content and causally as
content-shaping-form. One stream holds both spheres of recollection as 'knowing what-is-sensed',
the other holds both spheres of construction as 'sensing what-is-known'.
Intrinsically motivated by truth and ethics, modern dualism
separates subject and object. Sensing what-is-sensed or external
normativity, as temporalized space in recollection, and knowing
what-is-known or internal normativity, as time about to spatialize
in construction, co-incide. Independent confirmation should follow,
between forms (sensing and knowing) at the depths of their spheres,
through negative falsification, and between contents (what-is-sensed
and what-is-known) at the peripheries of their spheres, through
positive verification. However, post-modern monism is belief in
dependency, or the one-ness, of subject and object (Hegel
1807), extrinsically motivated by power and politics.
Recollection's external-, and construction's internal normativity
are consecutive, not simultaneous, as in dualism. Internal
normativity is sent from the top of the hierarchy, while external
normativity is received at the bottom. Roles are sent and received (Boekestijn
1978), by dependent confirmation at the top, independent
rejection at the bottom, and both in between. The lower ranks
compete for selective reciprocity and sharing privileged power and
If 'sensing what-is-sensed'
has not turned yet into 'knowing what-is-sensed', and 'knowing what-is-known'
has not turned yet into 'sensing what-is-known', then what-is-sensed, coordinately reflected "here" in sensing, and knowing, coordinately reflected "now" in what-is-known,
have not yet co-incided for current content, or facts and ideas.
Interaction between the sensing- and knowing organism/self/belief on
the one hand, and its sensed- and known environment/other/reality on
the other, have to accomplish that. Once co-incidence has been reached, space can temporalize
while time can spatialize, thus enabling independent confirmation between
'sensing what-is-sensed' and 'knowing what-is-known', to happen as well.
When forms are copied-and-swapped, following independent
confirmation, 'knowing what-is-sensed' and 'sensing what-is-known', or
'realizing what-is-realized' and 'intuiting what-is-intuited', at the second stage, emerge from subconsciousness.
Depending on the reliability of what-is-known and the validity of knowing, the
next stages of independent confirmation prove reliable and valid as well,
to be reached in a similar way.
If the reliability of current contents, and the validity of current forms,
prove to be robust enough, then co-incidence and independent confirmation reoccur at a higher stage, between forms (this time realizing and intuiting instead of sensing and knowing) and between contents (this time what-is-realized and what-is-intuited instead of what-is-sensed and what-is-known),
then they can emerge as (1) 'valuing what-is-valued', or 'intuiting what-is-realized' ('sensing what-is-known-what-is-sensed', or
'sensing what-is-known' merged with 'knowing what-is-sensed'), and (2)
'trying what-is-tried', or 'realizing what-is-intuited' ('knowing what-is-sensed-what-is-known', or
'knowing what-is-sensed' merged with 'sensing what-is-known'). If reliability and validity then
are still robust enough, the same copy-and-swap of forms between
recollection and construction in the subject and in the object, happens between valuing and trying, making them emerge as
'trying what-is-valued' or 'reacting what-is-reacted' and 'valuing what-is-tried' or
'acting what-is-acted'. Thus, in processing, newly copied forms occur,
while old forms must be implied as new contents.
Co-inciding facts or
what-is-sensed, e.g. white swans, and ideas or what-is-known, "white
swans", are proexamples of each other (Corcoran
2005). Contents (what-is-sensed and what-is-known)
copy-and-swap forms (sensing and knowing), if they co-incide, to
emerge as 'knowing what-is-sensed' or realizing white swans, and
'sensing what-is-known' or intuiting "white swans". Realizing
counterexamples falsifies intuiting, and halts processing. More
proexamples make contents (what-is-known-what-is-sensed or
what-is-realized, and what-is-sensed-what-is-known or
what-is-intuited) copy-and-swap forms (realizing and intuiting), to
emerge as 'intuiting what-is-realized', or valuing white swans, and
'realizing what-is-intuited', or trying "white swans". Valuing
counterexamples falsifies trying and halts processing. More
proexamples make contents
(what-is-sensed-what-is-known-what-is-sensed or what-is-valued and
what-is-known-what-is-sensed-what-is-known or what-is-tried)
copy-and-swap forms (valuing and trying), to emerge as 'trying
what-is-valued', or reacting to white swans, and 'valuing
what-is-tried', or acting to "white swans", socially.
At the highest stage of processing current content,
'trying what-is-valued', or reacting, and 'valuing what-is-tried',
or acting, emerge as social interaction. Object and subject turn
into other and self. The self has built trust, expectation,
presumption, prediction, belief, and intention, regarding current
content, to be exchanged through social interaction, in social
reality. This consciousness or internal normativity, is not
externalized as behavior, until one's reaction in response to the
other's action, or external normativity, independently confirms it,
rationally, emotionally, and/or compassionately, and internalizes it as
consciousness. One's action before-the-fact is "unleashed" in response to one's own reaction after-the-fact (which is the other's action). Thus a social cycle appears, in which one reacts in response to the other's action, and acts in response to
one's own reaction, followed by the other reacting in response to one's action, and acting in response to
the other's own reaction. These are the four forms or phases in social interaction, between object and subject, or
environment/other/reality and organism/self/belief, through which
contents are remitted.
Recollection and construction take place in the sensing- and knowing
subject, as well as in the sensed- and known object. Constructive
recollection happens in the subject, between forms, as well as in
the object, between contents (facts and ideas). Sources'
self-reflections seek to co-incide with their sources' opposites, to
copy-and-swap forms, if and when recollection independently confirms
construction, in the subject by negative falsification, for
validity, and in the object, by positive verification, for
reliability. Due to independent confirmation, contents copy-and-swap
forms. New forms in recollection and construction process
old-forms-reduced-to-contents, letting them emerge as new
substances, at a higher level of functional structure, or stage of
independent confirmation. At the highest stage, recollection and
construction have become part of social reality, where subject and
object openly interact in social reality, noticeable to each other,
externalizing as behavior in construction, and internalizing as
consciousness in recollection, between time/form/consciousness at
the depth-, and space/content/behavior at the periphery of each of
In recollection, the object's
source reflects itself in the subject, whereas in construction, the subject's
source reflects itself in the object. Once object and subject have
turned into other and self, at the highest level of independent
rational-, emotional- and/or compassionate confirmation, while they are
socially interacting, the other reflects him- or herself in the one, and the one reflects her- or himself in the other.
Thus, in modern dualism, independent individuals can still relate to each other, without the other's actual presence. In post-modern monism, this is different.
In modern dualism, truth and ethics motivate intrinsically, to seek
and find independent rational-, emotional-, and/or compassionate
confirmation, while in post-modern monism, power and politics
motivate extrinsically, to avoid dependent rejection from the group,
're-cognizing' the other as a friend by dependent confirmation
(cronyism) or as an enemy by independent rejection (prejudice), both
of which may elicit reciprocity, as they allegedly lead to
self-consciousness (Hegel 1807, Marx 1867).
Thus, hierarchies develop through power-distancing (Mulder
1973) between elites and commons.
3. Constructive Recollection
After religion and philosophy, physical science now appears to harbor dualism
as well, because spatiotemporality can be ontologically material or epistemologically immaterial. Material space temporalizes
from the periphery towards the depth-, while immaterial time spatializes
from the depth towards the periphery, in the four dimensions of a Euclidean sphere,
of which the three spatial dimensions at the periphery cannot be reduced to the one temporal dimension
at the depth. Spatial, empirical sensibility after-the-fact, in recollection,
can independently confirm temporal, rational understanding before-the-fact,
in construction, the product of both of which is sensibility before-the-fact,
or the 'synthetic apriori'. Science, justice, and journalism should
be trusted, expected, presumed, predicted, believed and intended. Coordinated
and reflections seeking independent confirmation with opposite
sources , in constructive recollection ,
should take social interaction [3a]
to social reality [3b]
and social identity [3c].
Power and politics in post-modern monism, dominating and submitting
truth and ethics in modern dualism, is not awarded.
3a. Social Interaction
Normativity between socially interacting,
independent individuals, is rather different from that between
members of the same group. At the individual level, seeking
independent confirmation combines external normativity in
recollection, with internal normativity in construction. At the
collective level, avoiding dependent rejection separates external
normativity received from superiors, from internal normativity sent
to inferiors. Individually, truth does not change from
within-facts-between-ideas to within-ideas-between-facts, or from
within-people-between-groups to within-groups-between-people.
Freedom of choice is offered or forwarded to whom deserves it.
Collectively, group-polarization within-groups-between-people
develops untruth within-people-between-groups, or from
within-ideas-between-facts to within-facts-between ideas. In other
words, collectively, facts are turned and twisted, to fit the
narrative, and do not allow anyone to prove his or her innocence.
Thus, normative rationality (Habermas 1982, 1991)
for independent individuals and for 'dependently confirming friends'
and/or 'independently rejecting enemies', are not alike.
Recollection and construction continuously seek
coordinated co-incidence and independent confirmation, at
consecutive levels, or sensing/realizing/valuing/reacting, and
knowing/intuiting/trying/acting. Contents copy-and-swap forms,
replacing older ones, reducing them to content, down the chain. Form
and contents expand into higher order substances, both in the
subject and in the object. Swapping forms makes recollection, at all
levels of independent confirmation, follow construction, as
two-state dualities, at the same level, each time moving up one
level. Alternating facts (or what-is-sensed), and ideas (or
what-is-known), are processed by forms as content. In recollection,
facts-relate-ideas, while in construction, ideas-relate-facts, until
consciousness externalizes as behavior, on one side-, and behavior
internalizes as consciousness, on the other side of social
interaction, continuously renewing facts and ideas. Relations occur
causally within-facts-between-ideas, as content-shapes-form in
recollection, while they are implied teleologically
within-ideas-between-facts, as form-shapes-content in construction,
before forms are copied-and-swapped.
Contents are brought from one source to the other
by the sources' self-reflections, seeking co-incidence and
independent confirmation, as they go around their source's peripheries,
recollecting facts or constructing ideas, while they are shaping-, or being shaped by form. What is trusted, expected, presumed, predicted, believed and intended in action before-the-fact, is
'unleashed' in action after-the-fact, if and when the subject's reaction, in response to the object's action, independently confirms
his own action before-the-fact, rationally, emotionally, and/or compassionately.
The self senses/realizes/values/reacts, in social interaction, what
the other knows/intuits/tries/acts, while the other
senses/realizes/values/reacts what the self
knows/intuits/tries/acts. Recollected content expands to 'knowing
(by the other) what-is-sensed (by the other) what-is-known (by the
self) what-is-sensed (by the self)', or 'what-is-reacted', while
dualistically separated, constructed content expands, to 'sensing (by the self) what-is-known (by the other) what-is-sensed (by the other) what-is-known (by the self)',
or 'what-is-acted', for every consecutive state, stage, and phase.
States of coordinated
co-incidence and stages of independent confirmation combine into phases of constructive recollection. States alternate between material recollection
after-the-fact and immaterial construction before-the-fact, for
subject and object, or environment/other/reality and organism/self/belief, co-inciding
in material space as recollection or sensing "here" or "there"
what-is-sensed, as well as in immaterial time as construction or knowing
"now" or "then" what-is-known, in social interaction.
Copied-and-swapped forms with their new contents, comprise one of four kinds,
for recollection and construction, depending on their stage of independent rational-, emotional-, and/or compassionate confirmation, following
their current content's co-incidence and independent
confirmation. Up to four states- and four stages per phase, constitute one social cycle. Subject and object, or self and other, follow the other's recollection and construction, and their own, as phases continuously repeat themselves and overlap each other. Recollection after-the-fact must independently confirm construction before-the-fact,
sufficient to continue the cycling.
Four dual states of
coordinated co-incidence, one of recollection and one of
construction, at four stages of independent confirmation, play roles in the
four phases of the social cycle between other and self, as the phases overlap, across
at least one to at most three states. For example, the subject needs four states for its reaction
to take place in response to the action of the object, or 'knowing (by the other) what-is-sensed (by the other) what-is-known (by the one) what-is-sensed (by the one)',
also called 'reacting what-is-reacted'. Started with sensing, extended with three new forms,
old forms were reduced to new contents. The latter two states are from the object's
point of view, as the former two are from the subject's point of view. The latter three are shared with the next phase, the subject's action in response to his own reaction,
expanded by one state, the copied-and-swapped form of reacting, which is now part of
'sensing (by the one) what-is-known (by the other) what-is-sensed (by the other) what-is-known (by the one)', also called
'acting what-is-acted'. Phases add a new form-state to the
beginning, and delete an old content-state from the end.
States, stages, and phases
logistically integrate across two social cycles, or eight states,
in pairs of recollected material- and constructed immaterial substance, differentiated by forms,
when they are copied-and-swapped. Four stages of independent confirmation
can possibly be reached, for each state, from sensing or knowing, to realizing or intuiting, valuing or trying, and reacting or acting. Two cycles of four phases follow each other in social interaction, each
phase expanding from one to four states in duration, depending on the number of stages
that were reached. Phases repeat themselves and overlap each
other, as they start and finish one state beyond the previous
phase, from the subject responding to the object and to itself, to the object responding to the subject and
to itself, using the same states in different roles, constituting different phases, and taking contents from previous phases, processing- and
then passing them to following phases, across states. The first cycle of four states applies to the subject,
expanded to take the object’s point of view, while the second cycle of four states applies to the object,
expanded to take the subject’s point of view instead.
3b. Social Reality
Social reality needs social recognition, personally or collectively.
At the personal level, "an objective, rationally necessary and
unconditional principle that we must always follow, despite any
natural desires or inclinations we may have to the contrary” (Johnson
& Cureton 2016), was Kant's Categorical Imperative,
instructing the autonomous individual to “act only according to that
maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a
universal law” (Kant
1785). This is the 'synthetic apriori' or 'sensibility
before-the-fact', created when 'sensibility after-the-fact' could
independently confirm 'understanding before-the-fact'. Soon after,
Hegel made re-cognition conditional upon the one person's dependency
of the other. Re-cognition was to be taken literally, allegedly
necessary for self-consciousness, and should mean "going into the
world and losing oneself", as opposed to "going into oneself and
losing the world" (Hegel
1807). Power and politics, avoiding dependent rejection,
by dependently confirming friends and/or by independently rejecting
enemies, thus substituted truth and ethics, seeking independent
confirmation, by a revolution.
Power and politics change facts (what-is-sensed) to fit the ideas (what-is-known), while truth and ethics change ideas to fit the facts. Ideas relate facts,
while facts relate ideas. When facts are used in one idea, and reused in another
idea, it depends on the ideas’ respect for the facts, not to have relations within them
logically entangled, for example, if one fact is treated as
multiple, or multiple facts as if they are one. Similarly, people relate groups and groups relate people. If people belong to one group, as well as to another, it depends on the groups’ respect for the people, not to
make their relations inconsistent. Power and politics motivate extrinsically to avoid dependent rejection,
by the threat of excommunication or homelessness, within-groups-between-people and within-ideas-between-facts. Truth and ethics
on the contrary, motivate intrinsically to seek independent rational-, emotional-, and/or compassionate confirmation, within-facts-between-ideas and within-people-between-groups. Power and politics, in need of closed- and static monism, replaced truth and ethics, in need of open- and dynamic dualism (Bergson 1932),
causing relations to entangle.
People either seek power and
politics, or truth and ethics. Power and politics lead to people's
(inter)dependency, as they avoid dependent rejection from the group,
fearing excommunication or homelessness. 'Enemies' or 'friends' (of
their leader) are independently rejected or dependently confirmed,
which can possibly result in selective reciprocity and access to
those privileged few. Truth and ethics, on the contrary, lead to
people's independency, as they look for reality, to independently
confirm their beliefs, rationally, emotionally, and/or
compassionately. When object and subject become other and self,
inter-subjectivity or truth between them, to which each refers,
strengthens them both as independent rational-, emotional-, and/or
compassionate individuals. Independence needs dualism, which is
difficult to apply in personal- and social settings, because power
and politics turn 'seeking independent confirmation' into 'avoiding
dependent rejection'. Power and politics change facts to fit the
ideas, as truth and ethics change ideas to fit the facts. Entangled
relations within-ideas-between-facts show up
within-facts-between-ideas, as stress and dissociation.
Truth is 'knowing "now" what-is-known', or ideas,
that are independently confirmed by 'sensing "here" what-is-sensed', or facts,
rationally, emotionally, and/or compassionately. Between forms in
the organism/self/belief, sensing
(the objective subject; cf.
De Wit 1991)
then negatively falsifies knowing (the subjective subject) for
validity, whereas between contents in the environment/other/reality, what-is-sensed
or facts (the objective object), positively verifies what-is-known
or ideas (the subjective object)
for reliability. However, power and politics invariably turn 'seeking independent confirmation' between the
sensing- and the knowing organism/self/belief (the objective- and
the subjective subject), and between the known- and the sensed
environment/other/reality (the subjective- and the objective object),
although subtly, into 'avoiding dependent rejection', by taking a negative,
non-constructive attitude. It creates monistic dialectics, forcing
people to take sides (or leave), to dependently confirm
friends and independently reject enemies (of their own or of their
leader's). It is writing on collectivist-, socialist-, or communist
walls by Hegel and Marx.
Our world is divided and mixed. The
main part was created by post-modern, immanently dialectic monism or power and politics,
after the Kantian era and the French Revolution, whereas the rest was created by modern, independent individual dualism or truth and ethics,
before that time. Monism can be made to look like dualism,
comparable to dialectics, although monism assumes that we are all (inter) dependent and that subgroups or individuals will compete for their own
pretense to dominate and submit the other (Hegel 1807, Marx 1867, Nietzsche 1901).
Monistic (inter) dependency leads to re-cognition, by dependent confirmation of
a dominant other, and independent rejection of submitted others, bypassing truth,
to provoke polarization and extremism. Duality, on the other hand, assumes that there are two sources instead of one, which interact
through any two individuals, "other" and "self", or object and subject, in social belief and social reality, to stay on track of truth.
Dualistic (inter) dependency of independent, autonomous individuals seeks independent rational-, emotional-, and/or compassionate confirmation, for- and from each other, instead.
independent rejection of (the dominant other's) enemies, and/or
dependent confirmation of (the dominant other's) friends, help avoid
dependent rejection from the group, by excommunication and
homelessness. Relations within-groups-between-people naturally
translate into relations within-people-between-groups, which enables
manipulating individual group members, since honesty can always
easily be explained as disloyalty, or loyalty as dishonesty, which
deeply confuses the individual member. Choosing the opposite
explanation, intentionally manipulating, dominates and submits
another. The difference between, on one hand, Hegel's (1807)
literal interpretation of 're-cognizing' the other, or dependent
confirmation of friends and independent rejection of enemies, and on
the other, Kant's independent rational-, emotional-, and/or
compassionate confirmation of another, could be a complete disguise
of dualism, by monism. We cannot know what we don't know, unless the
group takes away our individual independence, as it does in
revolutions, and tells us what we were expected to know. Thus, laws
are put into place.
If post-modern monism and
modern dualism run into each other in daily life, role-sending and
role-receiving by the former may either grow more intense, or it may
be weakened by the latter. In monism, the one's internal
normativity, which is sent, is the other's external normativity,
which is received. Thus, ignored are the sender's external- and the
receiver's internal normativity. Monism exists since Hegel hijacked
Kant's dualism, cutting it in half, during the French Revolution
and, doubling down, since the Cultural Revolution of May 1968. At
crucial episodes in history, group-polarization was able to
extremize monism into absolute dictatorship or the subject totally
dominating and submitting the object. This has stimulated the will
to power (Nietzsche
1901) and activism through politics, media and marketing.
Power and politics can simply bulldoze their way forward and let
facts it created "prove" the ideas. This is what Hegel meant by "too
bad for the facts". Thus, power and politics can disguise as truth
and ethics. Power changes facts to fit the ideas, making innocence
defenseless, whereas truth instead changes ideas to fit the facts.
3c. Social Identity
The kind of social order
which is recollected or constructed, determines how social identity develops.
Monistically created social order, by power and politics, motivates
avoiding dependent rejection, by dependent confirmation of the
other, hoping for selective reciprocity, and independent
rejection of the competition, making up one's identity, as inter-dependent
among friends, and surrounded by enemies. Dualistically created
social order, by truth and ethics, motivates seeking independent confirmation, strengthening
the other's and one's own identity, as the object establishes inter-subjectivity between subjects.
Re-cognition of other and self (reciprocally)
avoids dependent rejection, in monism, or seeking independent confirmation,
in dualism. In monism, the object is neglected, while in dualism,
the subject is controlled through the object, by classic- and operand conditioning (Pavlov 1910, Skinner 1930).
Reflexes are conditioned responses to conditioning stimuli, controlled by nature or
Power and politics condition reflexes by demanding
're-cognition' of a dominant other's cognition, threatening one
to be excommunicated and be made homeless.
What-is-sensed, the source of the object, or 'objective
object', reflects in the subject, as sensing, or the 'objective subject'.
Knowing, the source of the subject, or 'subjective subject', reflects
in the object, as what-is-known, or the 'subjective object'. As they are
socially interacting, subject and object may each become the
other's Significant Other, apart from their Selves. Then, the
one's Self is the other's Significant other, as one source's
self-reflection, and the other's Self is the one's Significant
Other, as the other source's self-reflection. The one's
subjective subject, or knowing, is reflected in the other's
subjective object, or what-is-known, while the other's objective
object, or what-is-sensed, is reflected in the one's objective
subject, or sensing. Thus, knowing and what-is-known, in
construction, as well as sensing and what-is-sensed, in
recollection, could divide within- and between two people, in
themselves and between themselves, the Self and its Significant
Other. The more
significant the Significant Other is to the Self, the less independent confirmation
needs to be only rational, and the more it may be emotional or compassionate,
in their social interaction.
Between modern philosophical dualism or truth
and ethics, and post-modern philosophical monism or power and
politics, the relation between Self and Significant Other is
critical for the kind of social order, compatible with it. A
partnership or relationship grows tense, when there is
competition which is valued at-, or above, the comparison level
and Kelley 1959). Are Self and Significant Other
(inter) dependent and therefore, will they avoid each other's
dependent rejection, by dependently confirming each other and
independently rejecting the competition, or instead, will they seek each other's independent confirmation? The former relies on
the power and politics of the relations
within-groups-between-people and within-ideas-between-facts, as
in subjective cultures and subcultures, neglecting the objective
protecting each other against it, and the
latter relies on the truth and ethics of relations
within-facts-between-ideas and within-people-between-groups not
getting entangled, where the facts are used in one idea, and
reused in another, to establish objectivity or
inter-subjectivity between subjects independently referring to
Somehow we are all related,
either by receiving- and returning favors through dependent
confirmation and cronyism, or by seeking independent
rational-, emotional-, and/or compassionate confirmation, both from- and for the other.
What happens if these two
schemes are mixed? Monistic power and politics extrinsically
motivate dependent reaction-and-action within groups, where friends
receive- and return favors. Dualistic truth and ethics intrinsically
motivate independent action-and-reaction between individuals, if and
when after-the-fact 'sensing what-is-sensed' independently confirms
before-the-fact 'knowing what-is-known'. Intrinsically
motivated reactions, in response to extrinsically motivated actions,
could only be intended as independent confirmations, truly understanding extrinsic motivation.
However, the two worlds are so apart, that this is highly unlikely.
Extrinsically motivated reactions in response to intrinsically motivated actions,
may interpret the independent confirmation as as a
return of favor, which it was not. Such reactions assimilate the independent individual
into the group, claiming his dependent confirmation in return.
The objective subject, or the
recollected object's self-reflection in the subject, does
copy-and-swap forms with the subjective subject, or the constructive
source, if and when they co-incide, and recollection independently
confirms construction. In recollection, within-facts-between-ideas,
ideas reuse facts as linking-pins, which relate them as 'knowing
what-is-sensed', 'intuiting what-is-realized', or 'trying
what-is-valued', while in construction, within-ideas-between-facts,
ideas relate facts as 'sensing what-is-known', 'realizing
what-is-intuited', or 'valuing what-is-tried'. Relations generate
meaningful networks, continuously expanding their horizon, since the
facts, or objects, establish inter-subjectivity between the ideas,
or subjects referring to them, by seeking- and hopefully finding
independent confirmation. However, power and politics, motivating to
avoid dependent rejection within-groups-between-people and, by
group-polarization, within-people-between-groups, may dominate truth
and ethics, motivating to seek independent confirmation, from
recollection within-facts-between-ideas, for construction
within-ideas-between-facts, to make it disappear.
Modern philosophical, open- and dynamic dualism
can prevent post-modern philosophical, closed- and static monism, from using power and politics
to polarize group members' opinions. Minority influence is strong,
if consistent over long periods of time, not dividing the majority’s attention (Moscovici 1974).
Relations within-facts-between-ideas and
within-people-between-groups critically must not entangle, which
happens if and when ideas treat different facts as if they were the same,
to simulate finding independent confirmation, or they treat the same
fact as if it was different, to make finding independent confirmation
impossible. In a closed and static approach, Bergson has been
interpreted as if he criticized Kant, asking how ideas categorically demand their own realization,
following the Categorical Imperative (Lawlor and Moulard 2016).
Stating that by "re-establish[ing] the duality, the difficulties vanish", Bergson (1932)
has implied seeking independent confirmation, between
the two sources, in "duality of origin" (p.79). His post-modern,
monistic biographers called it, presumptuously and patronizingly, "but two complementary
manifestations of life".
Notions of rationality, emotion, and compassion,
are recollected facts and constructed ideas, co-inciding and
independently confirming each other, with contents about to
copy-and-swap forms. To reach our full potential, recollection
within-facts-between-ideas must independently confirm construction
within-ideas-between-facts, which is impossible
within-people-between-groups and within-groups-between-people, due
to group-polarization, as it shifts personal opinions to a dominant
extreme, of concentrated power and politics. Independent rational-,
emotional-, and/or compassionate confirmation creates meaningful
networks of logical-, chronological-, and/or associative relations
within-ideas-between-facts, reusing facts as their linking-pins,
which expands the network of meaningful relations. Reusing facts to
link ideas should not change the meaning of these networks, by
calling the same facts different, or different facts the same,
through power and politics. Once relations entangle, no truth proves
one's innocence, facts isolate from their meaning, and people
isolate from their identity, stoking up traumatic stress, as well as tormenting dissociation1.
Finding truth is an art we learned and willingly unlearned. Truth
can only be found by looking for the facts, which independently
confirm our ideas. Independence needs dualism, which is difficult to
apply in personal- and social settings, as invariably, power and
politics or dialectics turn 'seeking independent confirmation' into
'avoiding dependent rejection'. Truth and ethics change ideas to fit
the facts, while power and politics change facts to fit the ideas.
Thus post-modern philosophical monism took over modern philosophical
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