You can’t be rooted unless you’re free and you can’t be free unless you’re rooted L. Ingalls Wilder
Constructive Recollection Philosophy Application
Finding Truth in Science, Justice and Journalism
Ron de Weijze -
Finding truth is an art we learned and willingly
unlearned. Truth can only be found by looking for
the facts, that independently confirm our ideas.
Independence needs dualism, which is difficult to
apply in personal- and social settings, as
invariably, power and politics turn 'seeking
independent confirmation' into 'avoiding dependent
rejection'. Truth and ethics change ideas to fit the
facts, while power and politics change facts to fit
the ideas. Thus post-modern philosophical monism
took over modern philosophical dualism to restore
modern philosophy developed most articulately in Immanuel Kant's
work (Rohlf 2016),
post-modern philosophywas an accident waiting to happen,
declaring our two sources in life, dualism, or duality of
origin (Bergson 1932), to be
just one, in monism. At the beginning of the French
Revolution (1789), Kant had published his magnum opus (1790).
Anglo-Saxon philosophical "sensibility after-the-fact" should
independently confirm Continental philosophical "understanding
before-the-fact", turning it into "sensibility before-the-fact" (the
"synthetic apriori"). The subject or "phe-noumenon" extended the
object or "noumenon", which could establish inter-subjectivity
between subjects referring to it. Hegel inverted this, making the object
extend the subject. A person or subject should inter-subjectively
"re-cognize" another, dependently confirming him for
while they independently reject another. "The subject
goes into the world and loses himself or [else] he goes into himself and
loses the world" (Hegel 1807).
In Post-Modernism, deconstructing the world (Žižek 2012, Derrida 1992)
implies existence is nothingness (Heidegger 1959, Sartre 1943), God is dead (Nietzsche 1882), truth is multiplicit or dialectical (Marx 1867),
and reality can only be a mental phenomenon (Hegel 1807),
without an independent object. Even though post-modern philosophers
herald Kant as their "Copernicus" of the Philosophical Revolution,
calling space and time basic categories of the phe-noumenon, he never forgot the noumenon or object
the way they did.
One and a half century after the French
Revolution (1789-1799), the Cultural Revolution
of May 1968 doubled down on its monistic premise, as
Post-Modernism had gone- and come around the world, leaving its
brands of social values in collectivism, socialism, and communism.
Confronted with missing open- and dynamic dualism, monism
diverts to power, politics and dialectics, or groups competing to
dominate and submit, until just one could still stand, on top of a
power-distancing pyramid (Mulder
When our sources may be called what-is-sensed
or sensibility, and understanding or knowing, in modern
philosophical- or Kantian dualism, then
the subject is the sensing- and knowing organism/self/belief and the
object is the sensed- and known environment/other/reality. The
sensed object reflects itself in the sensing subject, and the
knowing subject reflects itself in the known object. What-is-sensed
coordinately reflects  itself in sensing, "here" or "there"
in material space, as knowing coordinately reflects itself in
what-is-known, "now" or "then" in immaterial time. Truth is found,
when sources and the opposite's reflections
spatiotemporally coincide, when sensing what-is-sensed independently confirms knowing what-is-known.
Through states of coordinated reflection, at stages of independent confirmation,
and in phases of social cycles, the independent individual constructively recollects 
by social interaction [a],
constructing social reality [b]
on the one hand, while recollecting his social identity [c]
on the other.
1. Coordinated Reflection
From the outside, the subject
is part of the object, and from the inside, the object is
"ob-jected" or "thrown-off" (Sanders and Van Rappard 1982)
from the subject. Our sources are the sensed object, reflecting
itself in the sensing
subject, and the knowing subject, reflecting itself in the known object.
Sources and their self-reflections are spheres,
expanding inwardly from the space/content/behavior at the
peripheries, in recollection, or outwardly from the time/form/consciousness
at the depths in construction. Inwardly, space temporalizes,
content-shapes-form and behavior internalizes as consciousness, from
the periphery to the depth; outwardly, time spatializes,
form-shapes-content and consciousness externalizes as behavior, from
the depth to the periphery. Sensing and what-is-sensed expand in the
three spatial dimensions of the periphery, from the tangent point
between their spheres, whereas knowing and what-is-known expand, in
all directions, from the one temporal dimension of the depth or the
radius of their spheres.
Space and time have
nearly become one, in the concept of spatiotemporality. However, in
a Euclidean sphere, the three spatial dimensions of its periphery,
and the one temporal dimension of its radius, remain dualistically
irreducible to each other, because their ratio π ("pi"),
is a number
carrying infinitely many, non-repetitive, decimal places. Still, as
the organism/self/belief interacts with the
space without time, nor time without space, can be processed. Co-incidence,
of space and time, allows for
space to temporalize and, independently or dualistically, for time to
spatialize. Temporalized space is not time but a surrogate, as spatialized time is not space
but a surrogate. However, these surrogates may be commensurable, as self-reflections, with their opposite sources. Time at the depth of the sphere is either the source of time itself, or the self-reflection of
temporalized, while space at the periphery of the sphere is either the source of space itself, or the self-reflection of
Our two sources are space and
time, or space-time, in the object or the sensed- and known
environment/other/reality. The subject or the sensing- and knowing
organism/self/belief processes space, in sensing what-is-sensed,
separately from time, in knowing what-is-known. The sources are
separated as spheres, one for space at the periphery,
and the other for time at the depth, as they are still connected.
Then they are separated again, as sources, each with its own
self-reflection, where the other source used to be; one source and
its co-ordinated self-reflection for recollection or sensing
what-is-sensed, and the other for construction or knowing
what-is-known. Sources and their opposite's co-ordinated
self-reflections are now positioned to potentially co-incide, if
they are commensurable. The sensing- and knowing
organism/self/belief or subject, together with the sensed- and known
environment/other/reality or object, aim to co-incide and find
commensurability, as it benefits each of them, to continuously stay
on track of truth.
what-is-sensed, produced "here" in space/content/behavior, at the
peripheries of the spheres, between one source or the sensed object
and its co-ordinated self-reflection, or the sensing subject, in
recollection, is separated from immaterially knowing what-is-known,
produced "now" in time/form/consciousness, at the depths of the
spheres, between the other source or the knowing subject and its
co-ordinated self-reflection, or the known object, in construction.
The self-reflections go around and come around, co-ordinately
reflecting their sources at the three spatial dimensions of their
peripheries, subliminally recollecting facts or what-is-sensed, as
sensing what-is-sensed is not knowing what-is-sensed (yet) and
supraliminally constructing ideas or what-is-known, as knowing
what-is-known is not sensing what-is-known (yet). The
self-reflections also aim to co-incide with their opposite sources,
at the one temporal dimension of their radiuses, for
commensurability between the spheres to stay on track of truth.
The peripheries of the
spheres are material and spatial, while their depths are immaterial
and temporal. Thus, "here" is more clear at the
peripheries, while "now" is more clear at the depths. The spatiality of the
spheres' peripheries enables them to co-ordinate their locations,
as the temporality of the spheres' depths enables them to co-incide
or synchronize their
durations. From the peripheries to the depths of
environment/other/reality and the sensing organism/self/belief,
space temporalizes, content-shapes-form and behavior internalizes as
consciousness, as from the depths to the peripheries of the knowing organism/self/belief
and the known environment/other/reality, time spatializes,
form-shapes-content and consciousness externalizes as behavior. The
sources have their self-reflections go around them, as they
spatiotemporally co-ordinate locations at the tangent-line, and
co-incide or synchronize, in the subject between sensing and knowing,
as well as in the object between what-is-sensed and what-is-known.
The spatial dimensions at the
peripheries of the sensed object and the sensing subject in
recollection, as well as those at the peripheries of the knowing
subject and the known object in construction, co-ordinate "here" or
"there". In recollection, space is about to temporalize from the
peripheries to the depths of the spheres, while in construction,
time has spatialized from the depths to the peripheries of the
spheres. The temporal dimensions at the depths of the sensing
subject in recollection and the knowing subject in construction, as
well as those at the depths of the sensed object in recollection and
the known object in construction, co-incide or synchronize "now" or
"then". In recollection, space has temporalized from the peripheries
to the depths of the sphere, while in construction, time is about to
spatialize from the depths to the peripheries of the spheres. Thus,
co-incidence allows for space to temporalize and time to spatialize
within the same sphere, if sources and their opposite's
self-reflections are commensurable.
space/content/behavior occurs causally, between the source and its self-reflection,
or what-is-sensed and sensing at the periphery, temporalizing
towards the depths-, while in construction, time/form/consciousness
is implicated teleologically, at the depths of knowing and
what-is-known, spatializing towards the peripheries of the spheres. Reflections go around their spheres, as
sensing around what-is-sensed in material recollection, and as what-is-known around knowing in immaterial construction,
with the opposite source, as forms in the sensing-
and knowing subject and as contents in the sensed- and known object.
Once sources and opposite self-reflections coincide, their
directions "line up". Knowing, from the depth- to the periphery in
the subject, continues in what-is-sensed, from the periphery to the
depth in the object, in one direction, and what-is-known, from the
depth- to the periphery in the object, continues in sensing, from
the periphery to the depth in the subject, in the other
One source's self-reflection
brings content from the object to the subject, while the other
source's self-reflection brings content from the subject to the
sensing subject recollects the sensed object, to go- and come around
it, and conveys it to the knowing subject, while knowing subject
constructs the known object, to go- and come around it, and conveys
it to the sensed object. Both self-reflections go around their sources,
by their peripheries, to co-incide with the opposite sources,
temporally co-ordinated by their radiuses. In the Euclidean sphere
spatiotemporally co-incided space and time, from the periphery, the three spatial
dimensions reach for the depth, by temporalizing space,
content-shaping-form and consciousness internalizing as behavior,
processing what-is-sensed, while independently, from the depth, the
one temporal dimension reaches for the periphery, by spatializing time,
behavior externalizing as consciousness, also processing
In recollection, the source
or sensed environment/other/reality and its self-reflection, the
sensing organism/self/belief, have 'empty'
space/content/behavior at the peripheries-, and in construction, the source
or knowing organism/self/belief and its self-reflection, the known
environment/other/reality, have 'blind' time/form/consciousness at the depths
of their spheres (cf. Kant 1790). To fill the emptiness
and heal the blindness, the sensing- and knowing
organism/self/belief coincides its forms, and the sensed- and known
environment/other/reality coincides its contents, to align
spatializing time and temporalizing space, form-shaping-content and
content-shaping-form, as well as consciousness externalizing as
behavior and behavior internalizing as consciousness, between the
depths of the sensing- and knowing subject on one side, and the
peripheries of the sensed- and known object on the other side, in
opposing directions. The interactions vary from simple sensing and
knowing to (socially) complex reacting and acting.
To coincide, organism and
environment, self and other, or belief and reality, have to
coordinately reflect themselves first. For sources to coincide with
the self-reflection of the opposite source, their own
self-reflections must recollect or construct content, go around them
and bring that content to the opposite source to be processed, if
that would be spatiotemporally commensurable. In material
recollection, from the peripheries to the
depths of the source or the sensed object and its self-reflection or the sensing subject,
space/content/behavior temporalizes, shapes form, and internalizes
as consciousness, through causal occurrence (Gendlin 1997), "here"
or "there", on the other side, in coordinate reflection. In
immaterial construction, from the depths
to the peripheries of the source or the knowing subject and its self-reflection or the known
object, time/form/consciousness spatializes, shapes content, and
externalizes as behavior, through teleological implication (id), "now"
or "then", on the other side, in coordinate reflection.
Sources reflect themselves
"here" at the spheres' peripheries in recollection, or "there" on
the opposite source's side, and "now" at the spheres' depths in
construction, or "then" on the opposite source's side, while the
self-reflections go around their sources, seeking to coincide with
the opposite source. If they
do coincide and they are commensurable, then from the depths to the
peripheries of the spheres, time can spatialize, form can shape
content and consciousness can externalize as behavior, whereas from
the peripheries to the depths of the spheres, space can temporalize,
content can shape form and behavior can internalize as
consciousness, all in the same sphere. The sensing- and knowing
organism/self/belief can now interact with the sensed- and known
environment/other/reality, lining-up knowing and what-is-sensed,
streaming in one direction, as well as what-is-known and sensing,
streaming in the opposite direction. Social interaction can now take
place between time/form/consciousness and space/content/behavior.
If space, "here" or "there"
at the peripheries-, and time, "now" or "then" at the depths of the
subjects' and objects' spheres coincide,
spatializing time, form-shaping-content and consciousness
externalizing as behavior, line up with temporalizing space,
content-shaping-form and behavior internalizing as consciousness,
between subject and object, in both directions. Thus, the objective source reflected in the subject,
and the subjective source reflected in the object, can interact
"here and now", and what-is-sensed can "here and now"
be critical of what-is-known,
if they are commensurable in space and time, irrespective of their
material- or immaterial status. If they are commensurable, what-is-known
may be positively verified and therefore proven reliable by
what-is-sensed, to be trusted, expected, presumed,
predicted, believed and intended. Sensing can also "here and now" be
critical of knowing, if they are commensurable in space and time,
and knowing is negatively falsified, and thus it may be proven
valid by sensing.
What-is-sensed are facts and what-is-known are ideas. Ideas relate
facts and facts relate ideas. Meaningful relations are created, in recollection, by
temporalizing space, content-shaping-form and behavior internalizing
as consciousness, within-facts-between-ideas, and in construction, by
spatializing time, form-shaping-content and consciousness
externalizing as behavior, within-ideas-between-facts. Relations within-ideas-between-facts translate into relations within-facts-between-ideas.
When facts and ideas are incommensurable in space-time, we experience
cognitive dissonance (Festinger 1962),
to be reduced by
changing the ideas to fit the facts, seeking truth and ethics in
open and dynamic dualism, or by changing the facts to fit the ideas,
avoiding power and politics in closed and static monism. The
latter option destroys the possibility to prove innocence.
Continuous dissonance leads to collective socioses (Van den Berg
1956) and/or to personal traumatic stress, if not to tormenting dissociation (Dell and O'Neill 2009).
Facts are synthesized in the
'synthetic aposteriori' or sensibility after-the-fact, as ideas are
analyzed in the 'analytic apriori' or understanding before-the-fact
1781). In recollection, from the periphery to the depth,
relations in space/content/behavior, from the past (after-the-fact),
through the present, cause those in the future to occur,
within-facts-between-ideas. In construction, from the depth to the
periphery, relations in time/form/consciousness from the future
(before the fact), through the present, teleologically imply those
in the past, within-ideas-between-facts. Functional structuralism (Dooyeweerd
Sanders 1976) creates contexts in
recollection, temporalizing space, shaping form, and internalizing
as consciousness; structural functionalism (Parsons
1975) creates contexts in construction, spatializing
time, shaping content, and externalizing as behavior. Truth and
ethics in open and dynamic dualism, forbid ideas to change the
facts, as opposed to power and politics in closed and static monism
In temporalized space, "here"
relates "now" to any past or -future moment, while in spatialized
time, "now" relates "here" to any place in the universe. Relations
are functionally structured, by temporalizing space in recollection,
within-facts-between-ideas, intrapolated from "there and then" to
"here and now", and by spatializing time in construction,
within-ideas-between-facts, extrapolated from "here and now" to
"there and then". Intrapolation and extrapolation therefore share
places and moments in cultural history. Subliminally in sensing
what-is-sensed, which cannot be known (yet), as well as
supraliminally in knowing what-is-known, which cannot be sensed
(yet), we are to realize and intuit these relations. They are the
object or the sensed- and known environment/other/reality, to
reflect- and coincide with the subject or the sensing- and knowing
organism/self/belief, to be trusted, expected, presumed, predicted,
believed and intended as the "synthetic apriori" or sensibility
before-the-fact, while this is happening.
2. Independent Confirmation
Opposing Kant, Hegel claimed that the object
was insignificant. To him, the thing-in-itself was clear, not
opaque, since the object was the subject itself. If facts did not
fit ideas, it was “too bad for the facts”. The object for Kant was
the noumenon, the unnamable thing-in-itself, which was able to
establish intersubjectivity between subjects referring to it. For
Hegel, intersubjectivity was a person or subject, dependently
confirming (or ‘re-cognizing’) the other, as they independently
rejected a third. By literally ‘re-cognizing’ the other, “the
subject goes into the world and loses himself, or [else] he goes
into himself and loses the world”. This recognition, if selectively
reciprocated by the other, was supposed to be a prerequisite for
self-consciousness. Therefore, while for Kant the phenoumenon or
subject extended the noumenon or object, for Hegel the object, or
intersubjectivity based on recognition, extended the subject, which
was exactly the reverse and revolutionary indeed, just
after Kant's magnum opus was published (Kant
Phenomenological monism describes cultural
reality as social constructs based on intersubjectivity (Schütz
1945, Berger and Luckman 1966). Question
is, whether this intersubjectivity leaves room for independent
confirmation. Independence needs dualism, which is difficult to
apply in social- and personal settings, because invariably, power
and politics turn 'seeking independent confirmation' into 'avoiding
dependent rejection'. Truth and ethics change ideas to fit the
facts, while power and politics change facts to fit the ideas,
either by using different facts as if they were the same or by using
the same facts as if they were different. For example, democracy is
based on the idea that votes are free and independently confirm one
or other electable candidate, while people may be dependent upon
him, dependently confirming him, while independently rejecting any
others they do not depend on. Dependency called independency,
suggests independent confirmation or truth, while it actually may be
a case of abusing people's dependencies.
spatiotemporal coincidence and independent confirmation, between
material- and immaterial substances. If sensing what-is-sensed
independently confirms knowing what-is-known, then both forms, or sensing
and knowing, could process both contents, or what-is-sensed and
what-is-known. Forms are therefore copied and swapped. Knowing
what-is-sensed (or realization) and sensing what-is-known (or
intuition) then emerge from subconsciousness, as different material-
and immaterial substances, using the new forms to process old
contents. Forms which are copied and swapped, also generate two
separate streams of content, relative to form, between object and
subject. Both flow from the depth to the periphery in spatializing
time, and from the periphery to the depth in temporalizing space,
teleologically as form-shaping-content and causally as
content-shaping-form. One stream is knowing
what-is-sensed (or realization), in recollection, whereas the other
stream is sensing what-is-known (or intuition), in construction.
Modern dualism, as opposed to post-modern monism,
is belief in independency, as opposed to dependency. In modern
dualism, the object is Kant's thing-in-itself, establishing
intersubjectivity between subjects who refer to it, having
sensibility after-the-fact independently
confirm their understanding before-the-fact, intrinsically motivated
by truth and ethics. In
post-modern monism, the object is intersubjective, as the
're-cognition' or dependent confirmation of one person or subject by
the other, for selectively reciprocity, extrinsically motivated by
power and politics. "The subject goes into the world and loses
himself, or he goes into himself and loses the world" (Hegel
1807). In dualism, external normativity of recollection
and internal normativity of construction coincide and independently
confirm each other. In monism, internal normativity is sent from the
top by command structure, whereas external normativity is received
at the bottom, dependently confirming "friends" and independently
rejecting "enemies" along the way.
When sensing what-is-sensed
is not yet knowing what-is-sensed and knowing what-is-known is not
yet sensing what-is-known, "here" in what-is-sensed coordinately
reflected in sensing, and "now" in knowing coordinately reflected in
what-is-known, did not yet coincide for current content. The
sensing- and knowing organism/self/belief interacts with its sensed-
and known environment/other/reality to accomplish that. Once
coincidence is reached, space can temporalize and time can
spatialize, enabling independent confirmation between sensing
what-is-sensed and knowing what-is-known to happen as well. As forms
are copied and swapped, knowing what-is-sensed and sensing
what-is-known, or realizing what-is-realized and intuiting
what-is-intuited, at the second stage of independent confirmation,
emerge from subconsciousness. It depends on the reliability of
what-is-known and the validity of knowing, whether the next stages
of independent confirmation prove reliable and valid enough as well,
for them to be reached.
When the reliability of
current contents, and the validity of current forms, are robust
enough, coincidence and independent confirmation reoccur
at a higher stage, between forms (this time realizing and intuiting
instead of sensing and knowing) and between contents (this time
what-is-realized and what-is-intuited instead of what-is-sensed and
what-is-known), they can emerge as (1) valuing what-is-valued, or
intuiting what-is-realized (sensing what-is-known-what-is-sensed, or
sensing what-is-known merged with knowing what-is-sensed), and (2)
trying what-is-tried, or realizing what-is-intuited (knowing
what-is-sensed-what-is-known, or knowing what-is-sensed merged with
sensing what-is-known). If reliability and validity then still are
robust enough, the
same happens between valuing and trying, making them emerge as trying
what-is-valued or reacting what-is-reacted and valuing what-is-tried
or acting what-is-acted. Thus, in processing form and content, newly copied forms
occur, while old forms are implied as new contents.
At the highest stage of
processing current content, trying what-is-valued, or reacting, and
valuing what-is-tried, or acting, emerge as social interaction.
Object and subject become other and self. The self has built trust,
expectation, presumption, prediction, belief, and intention,
regarding current content, exchanged in social interaction. This
consciousness or internal normativity, is not externalized as
behavior, until one's reaction in response to the other's action, or
external normativity, independently confirms it, rationally,
emotionally, and/or compassionately, internalizing it as
consciousness. Once it is "set free", it is one's action
before-the-fact in response to one's (own) reaction after-the-fact
(which is the other's action). Thus a social cycle appears, in which
one reacts in response to the other's action, and acts in response
to his own reaction, followed by the other reacting in response to
the one's action, and acting in response to his own reaction. These
are the four phases in social interaction between object and subject or
other and self.
Recollection has an
interest in the sensing subject and the sensed object, while construction has
an interest in the knowing subject and the known object. Thus,
constructive recollection takes place in the sensing- and knowing subject between forms,
and separately, in the object between the sensed- and known contents. Sources'
self-reflections seek coincidence with their opposite sources, and
swap copied forms when recollection independently confirms
construction by negative falsification and positive verification.
As forms are copied and swapped, recollection and
construction let new forms process old contents and old
forms, which were copied, turning them into substances at a higher
stage of independent confirmation. At the highest stage,
recollection and construction are part of social reality, as subject
and object socially interact, noticeable to each other,
externalizing as behavior and internalizing as consciousness,
between time/form/consciousness at the depth-, and
space/content/behavior at the periphery of the sphere.
In recollection, the
object reflects itself in the subject, as in construction, the
subject reflects itself in the object. Once object and
subject have become other and self, in social interaction, at the final level of independent
rational-, emotional- and/or compassionate confirmation, the other reflects
him- or herself in the one, and the one reflects her- or himself in
the other. Independent individuals thus can still relate to each other,
without the other's actual presence. In post-modern monism, this is
different. Instead of bringing people together into their society
through seeking independent confirmation, it is through avoiding
dependent rejection. To survive, people need strength, either from
independent confirmation for- or from each other, or from the
power-distancing social hierarchies created by dependent
confirmation or 're-cognition' of the other and independent
rejection of third parties. The other needs to selectively
reciprocate the 're-cognition', supposedly required to achieve
self-consciousness (Hegel 1807,
3. Constructive Recollection
After religion and philosophy, physical science now
too appears to harbor dualism, as spatiotemporality can be
ontologically material or
epistemologically immaterial. Material space can temporalize and
immaterial time can spatialize, in the four dimensions of a
Euclidean sphere, although the three spatial dimensions of the
periphery cannot be reduced to the
one temporal dimension of the radius. Empirical sensibility
after-the-fact, or recollection, must independently confirm rational
understanding before-the-fact, or construction, for sensibility
before-the-fact, the "synthetic apriori". Essential to
research methodology, as in science, justice and journalism, it is
what we trust, expect, presume, predict, believe and intend.
By coordinated reflection ,
sources seek independent confirmation , to stay on track of truth, in constructive recollection .
Power and politics, in need of post-modern, closed and static
monism, should not dominate and submit truth and ethics, in need of
modern, open and dynamic dualism (Bergson 1932).
3a. Social Interaction
Groups are formed and society is ordered,
either by modern dualism or by post-modern monism. Normativity may
be sent and -received in social interaction, as both acting- and
reacting individuals are looking for independent confirmation for-
and from each other, within-facts-between-ideas and
within-people-between-groups, by offering freedom of
choice, like money or attention, if they believe the other has earned
it and for which he should be paid (forwardly). If independent confirmation happens, one
individual's independence confirms and strengthens the other's independence,
as well as his own. It is the final stage
of independent confirmation for the current content, "reacting
what-is-acted" and "acting what-is-reacted", as new content is
arriving. Normative rationality (Habermas
1982, 1991) is
minimized to personal preference only, not interfering with social
interaction per se, and unable to group-polarize or extremize
the private minds of independent, socially interacting, individuals
Content is brought
from one source to the other, by the source's self-reflection,
going around its periphery, to recollect
facts or construct ideas, shaping- or being shaped by
form. What is trusted, expected, presumed, predicted, believed and
intended in action before-the-fact, is set free in
action after-the-fact, when the subject's reaction, in response to the
object's action, independently confirms his action
before-the-fact, rationally, emotionally, and/or compassionately. In
social interaction, the self senses/realizes/values/reacts what the
other knows/intuits/tries/acts, whereas the other
senses/realizes/values/reacts what the self
knows/intuits/tries/acts, as the one's state which complements the
other's. Recollected content expands in four stages, to knowing
what-is-sensed (by the other) what-is-known (by the other)
what-is-sensed (by the self) what-is-known (by the self), while
separately, constructed content expands in four stages, to sensing
(by the self) what-is-known (by the other) what-is-sensed (by the
other) what-is-known (by the self).
While content is
continuously renewing, as moments pass and places change, even if
only an eye rolls, content must first shape-, or be shaped by,
form. In recollection, content-shapes-form
within-facts-between-ideas, as relations occur causally, while in
construction, form-shapes-content within-ideas-between-facts, as relations are implied teleologically. Alternating facts, or
what-is-sensed, and ideas, or what-is-known, process content. Thus,
relate ideas while ideas relate facts, until consciousness externalizes
as behavior on one side-, and behavior internalizes as consciousness
on the other side of social interaction, changing facts and ideas. Independent confirmation
takes place every time forms are copied and swapped, extending current recollection and construction, one to four times per
phase, which are responses from subject and object to the other and to
themselves, to dissolve as reacting what-is-acted,
in response to the other, and acting what-is-reacted, in response to
themselves, allowing for new facts and ideas to emerge.
States of coordinated
reflection and stages of independent confirmation add up to
phases of constructive recollection. States alternate between
material recollection and immaterial construction, for object
and subject or environment/other/reality and organism/self/belief in social interaction, possibly coinciding as
recollection or sensing what-is-sensed, "here" or "there" in
material space, and construction or knowing what-is-known, "now" or
"then" in immaterial time. They can be one of four kinds, different
for recollection and construction, depending on the stage of
independent rational-, emotional-, and/or compassionate
confirmation, following coincidence, reached for the
current content. Up to four states and four stages per phase,
constitute one social cycle. Subject and object, or self and other,
follow the other's recollection and construction, and their own, as
phases continuously repeat themselves and overlap each other.
Recollection after-the-fact must independently confirm construction
before-the-fact enough to keep interacting.
and phases unite across two
social cycles, or eight states of alternatingly material- and
immaterial substance, differentiated by forms, which are being
copied and swapped. Four stages of independent confirmation are
possibly reached, for each state, from sensing or knowing, to
realizing or intuiting, valuing or trying, and reacting or
acting. Two cycles of four phases follow each other in social
interaction, each from one to four states in duration,
depending on the number of stages reached. Phases repeat
themselves and overlap each other, as they begin one state
apart, from the subject responding to the object and itself, to
the object responding to the subject and itself, using the same
states in different roles, constituting different phases, and taking contents from previous phases,
processing- and passing them to following phases, across states.
The first cycle of four states applies to the subject, also taking the object’s
point of view, whereas the second cycle of four states applies to the object, also
taking the subject’s point of view.
All states, at all
stages, play four different roles in the phases of the social
cycle between other and self, since the
four phases overlap, across one to three states. For
example, the subject needs four
states for its reaction in response to the action of the object, or knowing
(by the other) what-is-sensed (by the other) what-is-known (by
the one) what-is-sensed (by the one), also called acting
what-is-acted. It started with knowing, and extended
with three new forms, one by one,
reducing the old forms to new contents. The latter two states are from
the object's point of view, while the former two are from the
subject's point of view. The latter three are
shared with the next phase, the subject's action in response to
his own reaction, to which one state was added, the
copied and swapped form of reacting, which is now part of
sensing (by the one) what-is-known (by the other) what-is-sensed
(by the other) what-is-known (by the one), also called acting
what-is-acted. Phases add one new state to the beginning and
delete one old state from the end.
3b. Social Reality
Recognition can be
about power, by dependently confirming the other, or "going into the
world and losing oneself", while independently rejecting who "goes into
himself and loses the world" (Hegel
1807). Recognition can also be about strength,
independently confirming other and self. The former creates a
power-distanced hierarchy, for whom checks-and-balances between the legislative, judiciary, and executive powers
(Montesquieu 1749). The latter
is Kant's social- and moral order, “based on an
objective, rationally necessary and unconditional principle that we
must always follow, despite any natural desires or inclinations we
may have to the contrary” (Kant 1785,
Johnson & Cureton 2016).
The Categorical Imperative tells the autonomous individual to “act
only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will
that it should become a universal law”. The "synthetic apriori" or
"sensibility before-the-fact" is "understanding before-the-fact",
independently confirmed by "sensibility after-the-fact".
Power and politics change
facts (what-is-sensed) to fit the ideas (what-is-known), while truth
and ethics change ideas to fit the facts. Ideas relate facts and
facts relate ideas. If facts are used in one idea, and reused in
another, it depends on the ideas’ respect for the facts, not to have
relations within them entangled. Identically, people relate groups
and groups relate people. If people belong to one group, as well as
to another, it depends on the groups’ respect for the people, not to
have relations within them entangled. Power and politics motivate
extrinsically, to avoid dependent rejection, like excommunication or
homelessness, within-groups-between-people, and
within-ideas-between-facts. Truth and ethics motivate intrinsically,
to seek independent rational-, emotional-, and/or compassionate
confirmation, within-facts-between-ideas and
within-people-between-groups. Power and politics, in need of closed- and static monism,
replaced truth and ethics, in need of open-
and dynamic dualism (Bergson 1932),
which entangled the relations.
People either seek power
and politics, or truth and ethics. The former led to people's
dependency, or their interdependency. Avoiding dependent rejection,
fearing excommunication or homelessness, 'enemies' are independently
rejected and 'friends' dependently confirmed, which hopefully
results in selective reciprocity and access to the fortunate few. As
far as the latter are concerned, truth and ethics can only be found
by looking for reality, independently confirming our beliefs -
rationally, emotionally, and/or compassionately. When object and
subject become other and self, this strengthens them as independent
individuals. However, independence needs dualism, which is difficult
to apply in personal- and social settings, because power and
politics turn 'seeking independent confirmation' into 'avoiding
dependent rejection'. Power and politics change facts to fit the
ideas, while truth and ethics change ideas to fit the facts.
Entangled relations within-ideas-between-facts show up
within-facts-between-ideas, as stress and dissociation.
Our world is divided and mixed. The largest
part was created by post-modern, immanently dialectic monism or
power and politics, while the rest was created by modern,
independent individual dualism or truth and ethics. Monism may look
like dualism, as it is dialectic, however it assumes that we are all
interdependent and that subgroups or individuals will compete for
their own dominance and the other's submission (Hegel
1807, Marx 1867,
Nietzsche 1901). Interdependency
leads to recognition by dependent confirmation of the other, and
independent rejection of third parties, bypassing truth, to provoke
polarization, extremism and terrorism. Dualism, on the contrary,
assumes that there are two sources instead of one, which interact
between any two individuals, other and self, or object and subject,
in social belief and social reality, to stay on track of truth.
Interdependency based on independent, autonomous individuals seeks
independent rational-, emotional-, and/or compassionate confirmation
for- and from each other, instead.
Both honesty by
independent rejection, and loyalty by dependent confirmation, help people avoid dependent rejection such as excommunication
and homelessness, within-groups-between-people. Values and norms,
within-people-between-groups, are personal and cannot be used to categorize other
people's behaviors as
honest or loyal. Disloyalty may be interpreted as honesty, and
dishonesty may be interpreted as loyalty. Therefore, manipulating
another person is always easily possible, by choosing the opposite interpretation. The difference between Hegel's literally
re-cognizing the other's cognition (1807),
or dependent confirmation of 'friends' and independent rejection of
'enemies', out of loyalty, and Kant's independently confirming the
other rationally, emotionally, and/or compassionately, out of
honesty, may hardly be noticeable and easily be mistaken. We cannot
know what we don't know, unless the group first takes away our
individual independence, as in revolutions, telling what we don't
know yet were supposed to.
If post-modern monism and modern dualism run into each other, role-sending and role-receiving
1978) by the former may either grow more intense, or it
may be weakened by the latter. The one's internal normativity is the
other's external normativity. The sender's external- and the
receiver's internal normativity are ignored by monism, which is
around since Hegel hacked Kant during the French Revolution and,
doubling down, since the Cultural Revolution of May 1968. At crucial episodes in history,
group-polarization was able to extremize monism into absolute dictatorship. This
has stimulated the will to power (Nietzsche 1901) and
action-ability through politics, media and marketing. Power
and politics can simply bulldoze their way forward and let facts it created "prove"
the ideas. This is what Hegel meant by "too bad for the facts". Thus, power and politics can disguise as truth and ethics. Power changes facts to fit
the ideas, making innocence defenseless, whereas truth instead changes ideas
to fit the facts.
3c. Social Identity
The kind of social
order that is recollected or constructed, determines how social identity
develops. If social order is created by power and politics,
motivating to avoid dependent rejection,
dependent confirmation of the other, hoping for selective
reciprocity, and independent rejection of any competition, is
what makes up one's mind. This is co-dependency or inter-dependency.
If, on the
contrary, social order is created by truth and ethics,
motivating to seek independent confirmation, independent
confirmation is sought to strengthen other and self. Recognition
of the other (or self) could be avoiding dependent rejection
(reciprocally) or seeking independent confirmation. The object
is absent in the former case, while in the latter, it is
controlled by classic- and operant conditioning (Pavlov
1910, Skinner 1930). Our reflexes
are conditioned responses to conditioning stimuli controlled
by nature or culture. They ought not to be conditioned by
power and politics demanding re-cognition and consequential selective
As the material
source of the object reflects itself in the subject, and the
immaterial source of the subject reflects itself in the object,
both in need of independent confirmation either by negative
falsification for the validity of the immaterial subject and by
positive verification for the reliability of the immaterial
object, in social interaction, object and subject or other and
self may become Significant Other and Self. As parents
united in looking after their children, the one's role is
looking after material substance in recollection while the
other's is looking after immaterial substance in construction,
making sure that knowing by the one is valid, and what-is-sensed
by the other is reliable. Knowing by the one is
what-is-known by the Significant Other of the other and in the
other, as what-is-sensed by the other is sensing by the
Significant Other of the one and in the one. The more significant
the other has become, the less independent confirmation needs to
be rational and the more it can be emotional or compassionate in
It is between modern
or truth and ethics, and post-modern philosophical monism
or power and politics, where and when
Self and Significant Other are most critical for the kind of social order,
commensurable with it. A partnership or relationship grows tense, when there is
competition which is valued at-, or above, the comparison level (Thibaut and Kelley 1959).
Are Self and Significant Other avoiding each other's dependent
rejection by dependently confirming each other and independently
rejecting third parties, or instead seeking each other's independent confirmation? The
former relies on the power and politics of relations within-groups-between-people as in large
families or (sub-)cultures, protecting each other against the
outside word, while the latter relies on the truth and ethics of relations
within-facts-between-ideas not getting entangled, when facts are
used in one idea, and reused in another, to establish objectivity or
intersubjectivity between subjects independently referring to them.
Ideas relate facts in
recollection, as knowing what-is-sensed, intuiting what-is-realized
or trying what-is-valued, while facts relate ideas in construction,
as sensing what-is-known, realizing what-is-intuited or valuing
what-is-tried. Relations create meaningful networks, defining the
situation. Relations within-facts-between-ideas are the relations
within-ideas-between-facts, where facts have been used in one idea
and reused in another. Normally, this widens the network of
meaningful relations, as facts or objects establish
inter-subjectivity or independent confirmation between subjects
referring to them. However, the motivation to avoid dependent
rejection within-groups-between-people and
within-ideas-between-facts may grow stronger than the motivation to
seek independent confirmation within-facts-between-ideas and
within-groups-between-people. When power and politics, in need of
closed and static monism, take over from truth and ethics, in need
of open and dynamic dualism, facts are changed to fit the ideas.
Modern philosophical, open-
and dynamic dualism can prevent post-modern philosophical, closed-
monism, from using polarized power and politics for
group-polarization and -extremization, because minority influence
has turned out to be strong, when consistent over long
periods of time and not dividing the majority’s attention (Moscovici
1974). Relations entangle within-facts-between-ideas and
within-people-between-groups, when different facts are used as if
they were the same, simulating independent confirmation, or the same
facts as if they were different, refuting independent confirmation. In a closed and static approach,
Bergson has been accused of criticizing Kant, asking how ideas could
categorically demand their own realization through the Categorical
and Moulard 2016). With "re-establish[ing] the duality,
the difficulties vanish", Bergson (1932)
referred to independent confirmation, between what his post-modern
biographers disqualified as "but two complementary
manifestations of life".
Notions of compassion,
emotion and/or rationality are facts we recollect. Apart from
healing illnesses caused by entangled relations,
within-people-between-groups and within-facts-between-ideas, to seek independent rational-, emotional-, and/or compassionate confirmation
can also help us reach our full potential. Meaningful networks of
logical-, chronological-, and/or associative relations
within-ideas-between-facts, reusing the same facts as their
linking-pins, may broaden and deepen their context. Multiple
perspectives in immaterial construction support
object-orientation in material recollection. The networks, by
linking-pin facts, merge into
larger contexts, visualize relations that went unnoticed and may
even change neural pathways. This will only happen if power
and politics respect the facts and do not overstep their bounds,
changing facts to fit the ideas, causing the entanglements,
isolating facts from their meaning and people from their identity,
thus stoking up traumatic stress and tormenting dissociation1.
Finding truth is an art we learned and
willingly unlearned. Truth can only be found by looking for
the facts, that independently confirm our ideas.
Independence needs dualism, which is difficult to apply in
personal- and social settings, as invariably, power and
politics turn 'seeking independent confirmation' into
'avoiding dependent rejection'. Truth and ethics change
ideas to fit the facts, while power and politics change
facts to fit the ideas. Thus post-modern philosophical
monism took over modern philosophical dualism to restore
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