You can’t be rooted unless you’re free and you can’t be free unless you’re rooted L. Ingalls Wilder

Constructive Recollection Philosophy Application

Finding Truth in Science, Justice, and Journalism

 

Ron de Weijze - September 2017

independent researcher

 

  Finding truth is an art we learned and willingly unlearned. Truth can only be found by looking for the facts, which independently confirm our ideas. Independence needs dualism, which is difficult to apply in personal- and social settings, as invariably, power and politics or dialectics turn 'seeking independent confirmation' into 'avoiding dependent rejection'. Truth and ethics change ideas to fit the facts, while power and politics change facts to fit the ideas. Thus post-modern philosophical monism took over modern philosophical dualism.   

 

When modern philosophy developed most articulately in Immanuel Kant's work (Rohlf 2016), post-modern philosophy was an accident waiting to happen, declaring our two sources of life, in dualism, or duality of origin (Bergson 1932), to be one, in monism. At the beginning of the French Revolution (1789), Kant published his great work (1790), in which Anglo-Saxon philosophical 'sensibility after-the-fact' independently confirms Continental philosophical 'understanding before-the-fact', making it the famous 'sensibility before-the-fact' (the 'synthetic apriori'). The subject or 'phe-noumenon' extended the object or 'noumenon', which could establish inter-subjectivity between subjects referring to it. Hegel inverted this, making the object extend the subject. A person or subject should inter-subjectively "re-cognize" another, dependently confirming him for selective reciprocation, while they independently reject another. "The subject goes into the world and loses himself, or [else] he goes into himself, and loses the world" (Hegel 1807). Who or what is dependently confirmed counts, and who or what is independently rejected does not, without reconciliation.

In Post-Modernism, deconstruction (Žižek 2012, Derrida 1992) implies that existence is only nothingness (Heidegger 1959, Sartre 1943), God is dead (Nietzsche 1882), truth is multiplicit or dialectical (Marx 1867), and reality can only be a mental phenomenon (Hegel 1807), without an independent object. This comprises phe-noumenalism/phenomenalism, instead of noumenalism/nominalism, or both. Even though post-modern philosophical monism praises Kant as the "Copernicus" of the Philosophical Revolution, calling space and time the basic categories of the phe-noumenon, he never forgot the noumenon or object, as phenomenalism did. One and a half century after the French Revolution (1789-1799), the Cultural Revolution of May 1968 doubled down on the monistic premise, as Post-Modernism had gone- and come around the world, leaving its brand of social values in collectivism, socialism, and communism. Confronted with missing open- and dynamic dualism, monism diverts to power, politics and dialectics, or groups competing to dominate and submit others, until only one still stands on top of a power-distancing hierarchy (cf. Mulder 1973). 

If our sources, sensibility and understanding, may be called what-is-sensed and knowing, then the subject is the sensing- and knowing organism/self/belief, while the object is the sensed- and known environment/other/reality. The sensed object reflects itself in the sensing subject, whereas the knowing subject reflects itself in the known object. In other words, what-is-sensed reflects itself in sensing, "here", or "there" on the other side of the object, as the subject moved in material space, while knowing reflects itself in what-is-known, "now", or "then" on the other side of the object, as the subject moved in immaterial time. Truth is found, if and when our sources and their opposite source's self-reflection coordinately coincide [1], and sensing what-is-sensed proves knowing what-is-known to be true, through independent confirmation [2]. Thus, by consecutive states of coordinated coincidence, at stages of independent confirmation, and in phases of two social cycles, the independent individual constructively recollects [3] his world, by social interaction [a], on the one hand constructing social reality [b], while on the other recollecting his social identity [c].

 

1. Coordinated Coincidence

    

From the outside, the subject is part of the object, and from the inside, the object is "ob-jected" or "off-thrown" (Sanders and Van Rappard 1982) from the subject. Our sources are the sensed object, or what-is-sensed, reflecting itself in the sensing subject, plus the knowing subject, reflecting itself in the known object, or what-is-known. Sources and their self-reflections are spheres, expanding either inwardly from space/content/behavior at the peripheries of the spheres, in recollection, or outwardly from time/form/consciousness at the depths of the spheres, in construction. Inwardly, space temporalizes, content-shapes-form, and behavior internalizes as consciousness, from the periphery to the depth of the sphere, while outwardly, time spatializes, form-shapes-content, and consciousness externalizes as behavior, from the depth to the periphery of the sphere. Sensing and what-is-sensed expand in the three spatial dimensions of the periphery, from the shared tangent point between their spheres, while knowing and what-is-known expand, in every direction, from the one temporal dimension at the depth or the radius of their spheres.

Today, space and time have nearly become monistically one, in the concept of spatiotemporality. However, in a Euclidean sphere, the three spatial dimensions of its periphery, and the one temporal dimension of its radius, do remain dualistically irreducible to each other, because their ratio π ("pi"), is a number carrying infinitely many, non-repetitive, decimal places. When the organism/self/belief interacts with the environment/other/reality, it uses space and time as separate sources, each source reflecting itself. Sensing "here" what-is-sensed at the peripheries of the source- and the self-reflection spheres, dualistically separated from knowing "now" what-is-known at the depths of the other source- and the other self-reflection spheres, it attempts to co-incide space and time again, as before. From the peripheries of the spheres in recollection, space temporalizes towards the depths, while from the depths of the spheres in construction, time spatializes towards the peripheries. Thus, when recollection and construction co-incide, their spheres become spatiotemporally commensurable, irrespective of their being material- and immaterial substances.

Our two sources, space and time, combined into the concept of 'space-time', describe the object or the sensed- and known environment/other/reality. The subject, or the sensing- and knowing organism/self/belief, processes space, through sensing what-is-sensed, separately from time, through knowing what-is-known. Our sources, as we experience them, are separate spheres, one for space at the periphery, and the other for time at the depth, as they are co-ordinated at one point, "here and now". They are separated once again, as sources, each co-ordinated with its own self-reflection, where the other source was. One source and its self-reflection recollect or sense "here" what-is-sensed, while the other source and its self-reflection construct or know "now" what-is-known. The sources (what-is-sensed, knowing) and their opposite's co-ordinated self-reflections (sensing, what-is-known) are thereby positioned to potentially co-incide, provided they are commensurable. Spatial co-ordination at the spheres' peripheries thus may lead to temporal co-incidence at the spheres' depths, as the self-reflections, going around their sources, recollect and construct.

Materially sensing what-is-sensed occurs (cf. Gendlin 1997), "here" in space/content/behavior, at the spheres' peripheries in recollection, between the one source, the sensed object, and its co-ordinated self-reflection, the sensing subject, whereas immaterially knowing what-is-known is implied (idem), "now" in time/form/consciousness, at the spheres' depths in construction, between the other source, the knowing subject, and its co-ordinated self-reflection, the known object. The self-reflections go around and come around, co-ordinately reflecting their sources at the three spatial dimensions of their peripheries, subliminally recollecting facts or what-is-sensed, because sensing what-is-sensed is not knowing what-is-sensed (yet), and supraliminally constructing ideas or what-is-known, because knowing what-is-known is not sensing what-is-known (yet). The self-reflections aim to co-incide with their opposite sources, at the one temporal dimension of their radiuses, requiring commensurability between the spheres, to stay on track of truth. The three spatial dimensions of all "heres" follow the temporal dimension of the "now" they share.

The peripheries of the spheres are material and spatial, while the depths of the spheres are immaterial and temporal. The spatiality of the spheres' peripheries enables them to co-ordinate their locations, while the temporality of the spheres' depths enables them to co-incide and synchronize their durations. Coincidence implies coordination in the "here and now", whereas coordination does not necessarily imply coincidence. The sources have their self-reflections go around-, and come around them, because they spatiotemporally co-ordinate their locations at the tangent-line, where all "heres" and all "nows" have met, meet or will meet, as the sources co-incide with their opposite's self-reflections, and synchronize in the subject as sensing and knowing, as well as in the object, as what-is-sensed and what-is-known. If and when possible, time about to spatialize in the subjective source, or knowing, and temporalized space in the objective self-reflection, or sensing, co-incide in the subject, whereas time about to spatialize in the subjective self-reflection, or what-is-known, and temporalized space in the objective source, or what-is-sensed, co-incide in the object.

The spatial dimensions at the peripheries of the sensed object and the sensing subject, in recollecting content and behavior, as well as those at the peripheries of the knowing subject and the known object, in constructing form and consciousness, co-ordinate "here" or "there". In recollection, space is about to temporalize from the peripheries to the depths of the spheres, in one direction, while in construction, time has spatialized from the depths to the peripheries of the spheres, in the opposite direction. The temporal dimensions at the depths of the sensing subject and the knowing subject, and those at the depths of the sensed object and the known object, may co-incide or synchronize "now" or "then". In recollection, space has temporalized from the peripheries to the depths of the sphere, in one direction, while in construction, time is about to spatialize from the depths to the peripheries of the spheres, in the opposite direction. Thus, co-incidence allows for space to temporalize and for time to spatialize, within the same sphere, if sources and opposite's self-reflections are spatiotemporally commensurable, as they stay materially and immaterially separate.

In recollection, space/content/behavior occurs causally, between the source and its self-reflection, or what-is-sensed and sensing, at their peripheries, temporalizing towards their depths. In construction, time/form/consciousness is implicated teleologically, at the depths of knowing and what-is-known, spatializing towards their peripheries. Reflections go around and come around their spheres, as sensing around what-is-sensed in material recollection, and as what-is-known around knowing in immaterial construction, to coincide with the opposite source, as forms in the sensing- and knowing subject, and as contents in the sensed- and known object. Once sources and opposite self-reflections coincide, their inner directions, from the peripheries to the depths in recollection, or from the depths to the peripheries in construction, "line up", between subject and object, in two opposing ways. Knowing, from the depth to the periphery, continues in what-is-sensed, from the periphery to the depth, in one direction, as what-is-known, from the depth- to the periphery, continues in sensing, from the periphery to the depth, turning into the opposite direction.

Recollection's source's self-reflection brings content from the object to the subject, for validity, as construction's source's self-reflection brings content from the subject to the object, for reliability, if and when these self-reflections co-incide with the opposite source. Thus, the sensing subject recollects the sensed object, going- and coming around it, to bring content to the knowing subject, as the knowing subject constructs the known object, going- and coming around it, to bring content to the sensed object. Both self-reflections go around their sources, spatially co-ordinated at their peripheries, to temporally co-incide with their opposite sources. In the Euclidean spheres of spatiotemporally co-ordinated space and co-incided time, the spatial dimensions reach from the periphery to the depth, processing what-is-sensed, as space temporalizes, content-shapes-form and behavior internalizes as consciousness, while the temporal dimension reaches from the depth to the periphery, processing what-is-known, as time spatializes, form-shapes-content and consciousness externalizes as behavior. In dualism, construction and recollection seek to co-incide, independently.

Thoughts without content are empty and intuitions without conceptions blind (Kant 1790). In recollection, the source or the sensed environment/other/reality and its self-reflection, the sensing organism/self/belief, subliminally, have 'empty' space/content/behavior at the peripheries-, while in construction, the source or the knowing organism/self/belief and its self-reflection, the known environment/other/reality, supraliminally, have 'blind' time/form/consciousness at the depths, of their spheres. To fill the emptiness and heal the blindness, the sensing- and knowing organism/self/belief makes its forms co-incide, while the sensed- and known environment/other/reality makes its contents co-incide, to align spatializing time and temporalizing space, form-shaping-content and content-shaping-form, plus consciousness externalizing as behavior and behavior internalizing as consciousness, between the depths of the sensing- and knowing subject on one side, and the peripheries of the sensed- and known object on the other side, in opposing directions. Interaction varies from supraliminal knowing and subliminal sensing, to social action and -reaction.

For sources to co-incide with the self-reflections of the opposite source, they need to produce their own self-reflections, both in the subject and in the object. Thus, through coordinated reflection, in recollection, the source that is the sensed environment/other/reality, needs to create its self-reflection that is the sensing organism/self/belief, while in construction, the source that is the knowing organism/self/belief, needs to create its self-reflection that is the known environment/other/reality. The self-reflections recollect or construct content, going around their sources, to bring it to the opposite source for processing, if the spheres are spatiotemporally commensurable. By material recollection, from the peripheries to the depths of the source and its self-reflection, space/content/behavior temporalizes, shapes form, and internalizes as consciousness, by causal occurrence, "here", or "there" on the opposite side. By immaterial construction, from the depths to the peripheries of the source and its self-reflection, time/form/consciousness spatializes, shapes content, and externalizes as behavior, by teleological implication, "now", or "then" on the opposite side.

Sources reflect themselves in space/content/behavior, "here" at the spheres' peripheries, or "there" on the opposite source's side, in recollection, as well as in time/form/consciousness, "now" at the spheres' depths, or "then" on the opposite source's side, in construction, while the self-reflections go around their sources, to "there" or "then", seeking to co-incide with the opposite source. If they do co-incide and they are commensurable, then from the depths to the peripheries of the spheres, time can spatialize, form can shape content and consciousness can externalize as behavior, whereas from the peripheries to the depths of the spheres, space can temporalize, content can shape form and behavior can internalize as consciousness, all in the same sphere. The subject or the sensing- and knowing organism/self/belief can now interact with the object or the sensed- and known environment/other/reality, lining-up knowing and what-is-sensed, streaming in one direction, as well as what-is-known and sensing, streaming in the opposite direction. Social interaction then is positioned to happen, between organism and environment, self and other, or belief and reality.

If space, "here" or "there" at the peripheries-, and time, "now" or "then" at the depths of the subjects' and objects' spheres do co-incide, then spatializing time, form-shaping-content and consciousness externalizing as behavior, in construction, line up, in both directions, with temporalizing space, content-shaping-form and behavior internalizing as consciousness, in recollection, between subject and object. Thus, the objective source reflecting itself in the subject, and the subjective source reflecting itself in the object, can interact "here and now". What-is-sensed can "here and now" be critical of what-is-known, if the sensed- and known object are commensurable in space and time as well, irrespective of their material- or immaterial status. If they are, then what-is-known may be positively verified and therefore proven reliable by what-is-sensed, in order to be trusted, expected, presumed, predicted, believed and intended. Sensing can "here and now" be critical of knowing as well, if the sensing- and knowing subject are also commensurable in space and time, when knowing is negatively falsified, warding off falsification, thereby proved valid through sensing.

figure 5

What-is-sensed are facts and what-is-known are ideas. As ideas relate facts, facts relate ideas, by being reused across them, in the ideas' meaningful networks. Thus, interpretations, in recollection, are relations within-facts-between-ideas, and in construction, within-ideas-between-facts. When relations draw closer, within-groups-between-people, as a result of group-polarization (Moscovici 1969, Meertens 1980, 2006), relations within-people-between-groups may get entangled and turn into conflicts of interest. To cope with this, the same facts may be treated as different, and different facts may be treated as the same, twisting and turning the truth, to reduce cognitive dissonance between the two (Festinger 1962). This is changing the facts to fit the ideas, instead of the other way around, like it ought to be. Changing the facts takes away the possibility, from those who are accused, to prove their innocence. Remaining options at the level of the independent individual, are to create dissociative disorders such as derealization and depersonalization (Dell and O'Neill 2009), possibly spreading into community socioses (Van den Berg 1956), at the collective level.

Facts are synthesized in the 'synthetic aposteriori' or sensibility after-the-fact, and ideas are analyzed in the 'analytic apriori' or understanding before-the-fact (Kant 1781). In recollection, from the periphery to the depth, relations in space/content/behavior, from the past (after-the-fact), through the present, cause the future ones to occur, within-facts-between-ideas. In construction, from the depth to the periphery of the spheres, relations in time/form/consciousness from the future (before the fact), through the present, teleologically imply those in the past, within-ideas-between-facts. Implication could be the "retrograde movement of the true growth of truth" (Bergson 1922b). Functional structuralism (Dooyeweerd 1935, Sanders 1976) contextualizes interpretations in recollection, temporalizing space, shaping form, and internalizing as consciousness. Structural functionalism (Parsons 1975) contextualizes interpretations in construction, spatializing time, shaping content, and externalizing as behavior. Truth and ethics change ideas to fit the facts, in open and dynamic dualism, while power and politics change facts to fit the ideas, in closed and static monism.

In temporalized space, the "here" relates the "now" to any other moment, in the past or in the future, whereas in spatialized time, the "now" relates the "here" to any other place. Thus, relations are functionally structured, by temporalizing space in recollection, within-facts-between-ideas, intrapolated from any "there and then" to the "here and now", and by spatializing time in construction, within-ideas-between-facts, extrapolated from the "here and now" to any "there and then". Therefore, intrapolation and extrapolation share places and moments in social reality or cultural history. Subliminally in sensing what-is-sensed, which is yet to be known, as well as supraliminally in knowing what-is-known, which is yet to be sensed, people should realize and intuit these entities and relations. They are the object, or the sensed- and known environment/other/reality, and the subject, or the sensing- and knowing organism/self/belief, of which the sources must co-incide with their opposite's self-reflections, to be trusted, expected, presumed, predicted, believed and intended, as in Kant's 'transcendental idealism' or 'sensibility before-the-fact' called 'synthetic apriori'.

The sensing- and knowing organism/self/belief, or the subject, interacts with the sensed- and known environment/other/reality, or the object. In the "here and now", sensing "here" what-is-sensed in recollection, needs to independently confirm knowing "now" what-is-known in construction, rationally, emotionally, and/or compassionately. What-is-sensed and what-is-known anywhere and anytime else also needs to be trusted, expected, presumed, predicted, believed, and intended, by the sensing- and knowing subject. Space is temporalized in recollection while time is spatialized in construction, in order to bridge the spatiotemporal distance. Only in the "here and now", both spheres of material recollection and both spheres of immaterial construction touch, or are the same, by spatiotemporal co-incidence. All other locations at the peripheries and moments at the radii (in all directions except one) of the spheres, have behavioral content or conscious form attached to them, extending towards- or from the depth. The "here and now" relates to all "theres and thens", any of which may once have had, or does currently possess, a "here and now" of its own.

2. Independent Confirmation

    

We cannot do without recognition. It gives us strength. Therefore, recognition has been institutionalized, to guide us all of our lives, and is only taken away as a punishment. However, we can do this to ourselves as well. Puritans and Protestants notoriously do so, by never complimenting another on his- or her achievements, nor ever expecting such things to happen to themselves. Still, there is a third way. This is by letting truth speak for itself, or things-in-themselves, which includes the rationality, emotionality or compassion of particular things (Strawson 1959) or living beings, only shared when they appear to the one, as they appear to the other, and as they appear to all, without any supportive commonality or bias, such as upbringing, perceptual training, subculture or general culture. A nod is enough, a smile, or just the way one looks out of his- or her eyes. This is what will never detach the organism/self/belief from the environment/other/reality, keeping him or her on track of truth, unbiased judgment and non-extremist self-expression. It can replace institutionalized recognition and it should, supporting (mental) health and happiness to survive.

Opposing Kant, Hegel claimed that the object was insignificant. To him, the thing-in-itself was clear and not opaque, since allegedly, the object was the subject itself. If facts did not fit ideas, it was “too bad for the facts”. Apparently, they needed to be changed, to make them fit the ideas. The object for Kant was what he called the "noumenon", or the "unnamable thing-in-itself", which still was able to establish intersubjectivity between subjects referring to it. For Hegel, intersubjectivity meant one person or subject, dependently confirming (or ‘re-cognizing’) another, as they independently rejected a third. By literally ‘re-cognizing’ the other, “the subject goes into the world and loses himself, or [else] he goes into himself and loses the world”. This re-cognition, if it were selectively reciprocated by the other, was believed to be a prerequisite for self-consciousness. Therefore, while for Kant the phenoumenon or subject extended the noumenon or object, for Hegel the object, or intersubjectivity based on re-cognition, extended the subject, which is precisely the reverse and revolutionary indeed, hacking Kant's work just after publication (Kant 1790).

Phenomenological monism describes cultural reality as social constructs which are based on intersubjectivity (Schütz 1945, Berger and Luckman 1966). We can wonder, whether such intersubjectivity leaves any room for independent confirmation, because independence needs dualism, which is difficult to apply in social- and personal settings, as sooner or later, power and politics turn the effort of 'seeking independent confirmation' into the effort of 'avoiding dependent rejection', requiring a wholly different attitude and probably much less energy. Power and politics allow changing facts to fit the ideas, by using different facts as if they were the same, or by using the same facts as if they were different. For example, when voters show behavioral contagion (Wheeler 1966), votes cannot be counted as independent confirmations. Truth and ethics' intrinsic motivation to seek independent confirmation may not be confused with power and politics' extrinsic motivation to avoid dependent rejection, by dependently confirming friends (cronyism), and independently rejecting enemies (prejudice). Truth and ethics change ideas to fit facts, not change facts to fit ideas.

Processing facts and ideas, or what-is-sensed and what-is-known, is finding spatiotemporal coincidence and independent confirmation between material- and immaterial substances. If sensing what-is-sensed independently confirms knowing what-is-known, then both forms, or sensing and knowing, can process both contents, or what-is-sensed and what-is-known. Forms are therefore copied and swapped between recollection and construction. Knowing what-is-sensed (or realization) and sensing what-is-known (or intuition) therefore emerge from subconsciousness, as different material- and immaterial substances, using the new forms to process old contents. Forms which are copied and swapped, also generate two separate streams of content, relative to form, between object and subject. Both flow from the depth to the periphery, in spatializing time, and from the periphery to the depth, in temporalizing space, teleologically as form-shaping-content and causally as content-shaping-form. One stream is knowing what-is-sensed (or realization) in recollection, whereas the other stream is sensing what-is-known (or intuition) in construction.

Intrinsically motivated by truth and ethics, modern dualism separates subject and object. Sensing what-is-sensed or external normativity, as temporalized space in recollection, and knowing what-is-known or internal normativity, as time about to spatialize in construction, co-incide. Independent confirmation should follow, between forms (sensing and knowing) at the depths of their spheres, through negative falsification, and between contents (what-is-sensed and what-is-known) at the peripheries of their spheres, through positive verification. However, post-modern monism is belief in dependency, or the one-ness, of subject and object (Hegel 1807), extrinsically motivated by power and politics. Recollection's external-, and construction's internal normativity are consecutive, not simultaneous, as in dualism. Internal normativity is sent from the top of the hierarchy, while external normativity is received at the bottom. Roles are sent and received (Boekestijn 1978), by dependent confirmation at the top, independent rejection at the bottom, and both in between. The lower ranks compete for selective reciprocity and sharing privileged power and politics.

If 'sensing what-is-sensed' has not turned yet into 'knowing what-is-sensed' and 'knowing what-is-known' has not turned yet into 'sensing what-is-known', then what-is-sensed, coordinately reflected "here" in sensing, and knowing, coordinately reflected "now" in what-is-known, have not yet co-incided for current facts and ideas or content. Interaction between the sensing- and knowing organism/self/belief on the one hand, and its sensed- and known environment/other/reality on the other, have to accomplish that. Once co-incidence has been reached, space can temporalize while time can spatialize, thus enabling independent confirmation between 'sensing what-is-sensed' and 'knowing what-is-known', to happen as well. When forms are copied and swapped, following independent confirmation, 'knowing what-is-sensed' and 'sensing what-is-known', or 'realizing what-is-realized' and 'intuiting what-is-intuited', at the second stage, emerge from subconsciousness. Depending on the reliability of what-is-known and the validity of knowing, the next stages of independent confirmation prove reliable and valid as well, to be reached in a similar way.

If the reliability of current contents, and the validity of current forms, prove to be robust enough, then co-incidence and independent confirmation reoccur at a higher stage, between forms (this time realizing and intuiting instead of sensing and knowing) and between contents (this time what-is-realized and what-is-intuited instead of what-is-sensed and what-is-known), then they can emerge as (1) 'valuing what-is-valued', or 'intuiting what-is-realized' ('sensing what-is-known-what-is-sensed', or 'sensing what-is-known' merged with 'knowing what-is-sensed'), and (2) 'trying what-is-tried', or 'realizing what-is-intuited' ('knowing what-is-sensed-what-is-known', or 'knowing what-is-sensed' merged with 'sensing what-is-known'). If reliability and validity then are still robust enough, the same copy-and-swap of forms between recollection and construction in the subject and in the object, happens between valuing and trying, making them emerge as 'trying what-is-valued' or 'reacting what-is-reacted' and 'valuing what-is-tried' or 'acting what-is-acted'. Thus, in processing, newly copied forms occur, while old forms must be implied as new contents.

Co-inciding facts or what-is-sensed, e.g. white swans, and ideas or what-is-known, "white swans", are proexamples of each other (Corcoran 2005). Contents (what-is-sensed and what-is-known), co-incided with forms (sensing and knowing), copy-and-swap them, to emerge as 'knowing what-is-sensed' or realizing white swans, and 'sensing what-is-known' or intuiting "white swans". Realizing counterexamples falsifies intuiting, and halts processing. More proexamples make contents (what-is-known-what-is-sensed or what-is-realized and what-is-sensed-what-is-known or what-is-intuited) copy-and-swap forms (realizing and intuiting), to emerge as 'intuiting what-is-realized' or valuing white swans, and 'realizing what-is-intuited' or trying "white swans". Valuing counterexamples falsifies trying and halts processing. More proexamples make contents (what-is-sensed-what-is-known-what-is-sensed or what-is-valued and what-is-known-what-is-sensed-what-is-known or what-is-tried) copy-and-swap forms (valuing and trying), to emerge as 'trying what-is-valued' or reacting to white swans, and 'valuing what-is-tried' or acting to "white swans", socially.

At the highest stage of processing current content, 'trying what-is-valued', or reacting, and 'valuing what-is-tried', or acting, emerge as social interaction. Object and subject turn into other and self. The self has built trust, expectation, presumption, prediction, belief, and intention, regarding current content, to be exchanged through social interaction, in social reality. This consciousness or internal normativity, is not externalized as behavior, until one's reaction in response to the other's action, or external normativity, independently confirms it, rationally, emotionally, and/or compassionately, internalizing it as consciousness. One's action before-the-fact is "unleashed" in response to one's own reaction after-the-fact (which is the other's action). Thus a social cycle appears, in which one reacts in response to the other's action, and acts in response to one's own reaction, followed by the other reacting in response to one's action, and acting in response to the other's own reaction. These are the four forms or phases in social interaction, between object and subject, or environment/other/reality and organism/self/belief, through which content is exchanged.

Recollection and construction take place in the sensing- and knowing subject, as well as in the sensed- and known object. Constructive recollection happens in the subject, between forms, as well as in the object, between contents (facts and ideas). Sources' self-reflections seek to co-incide with their sources' opposites, to copy-and-swap forms, if and when recollection independently confirms construction, in the subject by negative falsification, for validity, and in the object, by positive verification, for reliability. Due to independent confirmation, contents copy-and-swap forms. New forms in recollection and construction process old-forms-reduced-to-contents, letting them emerge as new substances, at a higher level of functional structure, or stage of independent confirmation. At the highest stage, recollection and construction have become part of social reality, where subject and object openly interact in social reality, noticeable to each other, externalizing as behavior in construction, and internalizing as consciousness in recollection, between time/form/consciousness at the depth-, and space/content/behavior at the periphery, of both their spheres.

In recollection, the object's source reflects itself in the subject, whereas in construction, the subject's source reflects itself in the object. Once object and subject have turned into other and self, at the highest level of independent rational-, emotional- and/or compassionate confirmation, while they are socially interacting, the other reflects him- or herself in the one, and the one reflects her- or himself in the other. Thus, in modern dualism, independent individuals can still relate to each other, without the other's actual presence. In post-modern monism, this is different. In modern dualism, truth and ethics motivate intrinsically, to seek independent rational-, emotional-, and/or compassionate confirmation, whereas in post-modern monism, power and politics motivate extrinsically, to avoid dependent rejection from the group, 're-cognizing' the other as a friend by dependent confirmation (cronyism) or as an enemy by independent rejection (prejudice), both of which may elicit reciprocity, as they allegedly lead to self-consciousness (Hegel 1807, Marx 1867). Thus, hierarchies develop through power-distancing (Mulder 1973) between elites and commons.

    

    

figure 9

    

   

3. Constructive Recollection

    

After religion and philosophy, physical science now appears to harbor dualism as well, because spatiotemporality can be ontologically material or epistemologically immaterial. Material space temporalizes from the periphery towards the depth-, while immaterial time spatializes from the depth towards the periphery, in the four dimensions of a Euclidean sphere, of which the three spatial dimensions at the periphery cannot be reduced to the one temporal dimension at the depth. Spatial, empirical sensibility after-the-fact, in recollection, can independently confirm temporal, rational understanding before-the-fact, in construction, the product of both of which is sensibility before-the-fact, or the 'synthetic apriori'. Science, justice, and journalism should be trusted, expected, presumed, predicted, believed and intended. Coordinated coincidence [1] and reflections seeking independent confirmation with opposite sources [2], in constructive recollection [3], should lead social interaction [3a] to social reality [3b] and social identity [3c]. Power and politics in post-modern monism, dominating and submitting truth and ethics in modern dualism, is not allowed.

3a. Social Interaction

Normativity between socially interacting, independent individuals, is rather different from that between members of the same group. At the individual level, seeking independent confirmation combines external normativity in recollection, and internal normativity in construction. At the collective level, avoiding dependent rejection separates external normativity received from superiors, and internal normativity sent to inferiors. Individually, truth does not change from within-facts-between-ideas to within-ideas-between-facts, or from within-people-between-groups to within-groups-between-people. Freedom of choice is offered or forwarded to whom deserves it. Collectively, group-polarization within-groups-between-people develops untruth within-people-between-groups, or from within-ideas-between-facts to within-facts-between ideas. In other words, collectively, facts are turned and twisted, to fit the narrative, and not allowing anyone to prove his or her innocence. Thus, normative rationality (Habermas 1982, 1991) for independent individuals and for dependently confirming friends and/or independently rejecting enemies are not similar.

Contents are brought from one source to the other by the sources' self-reflections, seeking co-incidence and independent confirmation, as they go around their source's peripheries, recollecting facts or constructing ideas, while they are shaping- or being shaped by form. What is trusted, expected, presumed, predicted, believed and intended in action before-the-fact, is 'unleashed' in action after-the-fact, if and when the subject's reaction, in response to the object's action, independently confirms the action before-the-fact, rationally, emotionally, and/or compassionately. The self senses/realizes/values/reacts, in social interaction, what the other knows/intuits/tries/acts, whereas the other senses/realizes/values/reacts what the self knows/intuits/tries/acts. Recollected content expands to 'knowing what-is-sensed (by the other) what-is-known (by the other) what-is-sensed (by the self) what-is-known (by the self)', while separately, constructed content expands, to 'sensing (by the self) what-is-known (by the other) what-is-sensed (by the other) what-is-known (by the self)', in four stages of independent confirmation, one state complementing the other.

Recollection and construction continuously seek coordinated co-incidence and independent confirmation, at consecutive levels, or sensing/realizing/valuing/reacting, and knowing/intuiting/trying/acting. Contents copy-and-swap forms, replacing older ones, reducing them to content, down the chain. Form and contents expand into higher order substances, both in the subject and in the object. Swapping forms makes recollection, at consecutive levels of independent confirmation, follow construction, as two-state dualities, at the same level, each time moving up one level. Alternating facts, or what-is-sensed, and ideas, or what-is-known, are processed by forms as content. In recollection, facts-relate-ideas, while in construction, ideas-relate-facts, until consciousness externalizes as behavior, on one side-, and behavior internalizes as consciousness, on the other side of social interaction, continuously renewing facts and ideas. Relations occur causally within-facts-between-ideas, as content-shapes-form in recollection, and are implied teleologically within-ideas-between-facts, as form-shapes-content in construction, before forms are copied-and-swapped.

States of coordinated co-incidence and stages of independent confirmation combine into phases of constructive recollection. States alternate between (dualities of) material recollection and immaterial construction, for both the object and the subject or the environment/other/reality and the organism/self/belief, co-inciding in material space as recollection or sensing "here" or "there" what-is-sensed, and in immaterial time as construction or knowing "now" or "then" what-is-known, in social interaction. Copied-and-swapped forms with their new contents, comprise one of four kinds, for recollection as well as for construction, depending on their stage of independent rational-, emotional-, and/or compassionate confirmation, following their current content's co-incidence and independent confirmation. Up to four states- and four stages per phase, constitute one social cycle. Subject and object, or self and other, follow the other's recollection and construction, and their own, as phases continuously repeat themselves and overlap each other. Recollection after-the-fact must independently confirm construction before-the-fact, sufficient to continue the cycling.

States, stages, and phases logistically integrate across two social cycles, or eight states, in pairs of recollected material- and constructed immaterial substance, differentiated by forms, when they are copied and swapped. Four stages of independent confirmation can possibly be reached, for each state, from sensing or knowing, to realizing or intuiting, valuing or trying, and reacting or acting. Two cycles of four phases follow each other in social interaction, each phase expanding from one to four states in duration, depending on the number of stages that were reached. Phases repeat themselves and overlap each other, as they start and finish one state beyond the previous phase, from the subject responding to the object and to itself, to the object responding to the subject and to itself, using the same states in different roles, constituting different phases, and taking contents from previous phases, processing- and then passing them to following phases, across states. The first cycle of four states applies to the subject, expanded to take the object’s point of view, while the second cycle of four states applies to the object, expanded to take the subject’s point of view instead.

All four states of coordinated co-incidence, at all four stages of independent confirmation, also simultaneously play roles in the four phases of the social cycle between other and self, since the phases overlap, across at least one to at most three states. For example, the subject needs four states for its reaction to take place in response to the action of the object, or 'knowing (by the other) what-is-sensed (by the other) what-is-known (by the one) what-is-sensed (by the one)', also called 'reacting what-is-reacted'. It started with sensing, and extended with three new forms, reducing, one by one, the old forms to new contents. The latter two states are from the object's point of view, while the former two are from the subject's point of view. The latter three are shared with the next phase, the subject's action in response to his own reaction, to which one state was added, the copied-and-swapped form of reacting, which is now part of 'sensing (by the one) what-is-known (by the other) what-is-sensed (by the other) what-is-known (by the one)', also called 'acting what-is-acted'. Phases add a new form-state to the beginning, and delete an old content-state from the end.


3b. Social Reality

Social reality needs social recognition, personally or collectively. At the personal level, "an objective, rationally necessary and unconditional principle that we must always follow, despite any natural desires or inclinations we may have to the contrary” (Johnson & Cureton 2016), was Kant's Categorical Imperative, instructing the autonomous individual to “act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law” (Kant 1785). This is the 'synthetic apriori' or 'sensibility before-the-fact', created when 'sensibility after-the-fact' could independently confirm 'understanding before-the-fact'. Soon after, Hegel described self-consciousness as the byproduct of one person's (literal) re-cognition of the other. The individual's autonomy was made dependent upon the other's confirmation, which meant "going into the world and losing oneself", as opposed to "going into oneself and losing the world" (Hegel 1807). Truth and ethics, seeking independent confirmation, thus were replaced by power and politics, avoiding dependent rejection, by dependently confirming friends and/or by independently rejecting enemies.

Power and politics change facts (what-is-sensed) to fit the ideas (what-is-known), while truth and ethics change ideas to fit the facts. Ideas relate facts, while facts relate ideas. When facts are used in one idea, and reused in another idea, it depends on the ideas’ respect for the facts, not to have relations within them logically entangled, for example, if one fact is treated as multiple, or multiple facts as if they are one. Similarly, people relate groups and groups relate people. If people belong to one group, as well as to another, it depends on the groups’ respect for the people, not to make their relations inconsistent. Power and politics motivate extrinsically to avoid dependent rejection, by the threat of excommunication or homelessness, within-groups-between-people and within-ideas-between-facts. Truth and ethics on the contrary, motivate intrinsically to seek independent rational-, emotional-, and/or compassionate confirmation, within-facts-between-ideas and within-people-between-groups. Power and politics, in need of closed- and static monism, replaced truth and ethics, in need of open- and dynamic dualism (Bergson 1932), causing relations to entangle.

People either seek power and politics, or truth and ethics. Power and politics lead to people's (inter)dependency, as they avoid dependent rejection from the group, fearing excommunication or homelessness. 'Enemies' or 'friends' (of their leader) are independently rejected or dependently confirmed, which can possibly result in selective reciprocity and access to those privileged few. Truth and ethics, on the contrary, lead to people's independency, as they look for reality, to independently confirm their beliefs, rationally, emotionally, and/or compassionately. When object and subject become other and self, truth between them, which they can both, inter-subjectively refer to, strengthens them as independent individuals, other and self concomittantly. However, independence needs dualism, which is difficult to apply in personal- and social settings, because power and politics turn 'seeking independent confirmation' into 'avoiding dependent rejection'. Power and politics change facts to fit the ideas, while truth and ethics change ideas to fit the facts. Entangled relations within-ideas-between-facts show up within-facts-between-ideas, as stress and dissociation.

Truth is 'knowing "now" what-is-known' or ideas, that are independently confirmed by 'sensing "here" what-is-sensed' or facts, rationally, emotionally, and/or compassionately. Between forms in the organism/self/belief, sensing (objectively, the subject) then negatively falsifies knowing (subjectively, the subject) for validity, whereas between contents in the environment/other/reality, what-is-sensed (objectively, the object), positively verifies what-is-known (subjectively, the object - cf. De Wit 1991) for reliability. Power and politics turn seeking independent confirmation between the sensing- and knowing organism/self/belief, objectively- and subjectively in the subject, and between the known- and sensed environment/other/reality, subjectively- and objectively in the object, however subtly, into avoiding dependent rejection, by taking a negative, non-constructive attitude. It creates monistic dialectics, forcing people to take sides (or leave), to dependently confirm friends and independently reject enemies (of their own or of their leader's). It is Hegel's and Marx' writing on the collectivist-, socialist-, or even communist wall.

 

Our world is divided and mixed. The main part was created by post-modern, immanently dialectic monism or power and politics, after the Kantian era and the French Revolution, while the rest was created by modern, independent individual dualism or truth and ethics, before that time. Monism can be made to look like dualism, comparable to dialectics, although monism assumes that we are all (inter)dependent and that subgroups or individuals will compete for their own pretense of dominance and the other's submission (Hegel 1807, Marx 1867, Nietzsche 1901). (Inter)dependency leads to re-cognition by dependent confirmation of the other, and independent rejection of third parties, bypassing truth, provoking polarization, extremism and terrorism. Duality, on the other hand, assumes that there are two sources instead of one, which interact between any two individuals, "other" and "self", or object and subject, in social belief and social reality, to stay on track of truth. (Inter)dependency based on independent, autonomous individuals seeks independent rational-, emotional-, and/or compassionate confirmation, for- and from each other, instead.

Within-groups-between-people, honesty by independent rejection of (the leader's) enemies, and/or loyalty by dependent confirmation of (the leader's) friends, help people avoid dependent rejection such as excommunication and homelessness. Within-people-between-groups, values and norms are personal and therefore, they cannot categorize the group's- or other people's behaviors as honest or loyal. Disloyalty can be explained as honesty, or dishonesty as loyalty. If one simply chooses the other explanation, intentionally manipulating another this way, is always easily possible. The difference between, on the one hand, Hegel's (1807) literal meaning of 're-cognizing' the other's cognition, or independent rejection of enemies, out of honesty, and dependent confirmation of friends, out of loyalty, and on the other hand, Kant's independent rational-, emotional-, and/or compassionate confirmation of the other, could be hardly noticeable as dualism, in monism. We cannot know what we don't know, unless the group takes away our individual independence, as it does in revolutions, telling us what we were supposed to know and then be force-fed with it.

If post-modern monism and modern dualism run into each other in daily life, role-sending and role-receiving by the former may either grow more intense, or it may be weakened by the latter. In monism, the one's internal normativity, which is sent, is the other's external normativity, which is received. Thus, ignored are the sender's external- and the receiver's internal normativity. Monism exists since Hegel hijacked Kant's dualism, cutting it in half, during the French Revolution and, doubling down, since the Cultural Revolution of May 1968. At crucial episodes in history, group-polarization was able to extremize monism into absolute dictatorship or the subject totally dominating and submitting the object. This has stimulated the will to power (Nietzsche 1901) and activism through politics, media and marketing. Power and politics can simply bulldoze their way forward and let facts it created "prove" the ideas. This is what Hegel meant by "too bad for the facts". Thus, power and politics can disguise as truth and ethics. Power changes facts to fit the ideas, making innocence defenseless, whereas truth instead changes ideas to fit the facts.

 

3c. Social Identity

The kind of social order that is recollected or constructed, determines how social identity develops. If social order is created monistically, by power and politics, motivating to avoid dependent rejection, then dependent confirmation of the other, hoping for selective reciprocity, and independent rejection of the competition, makes up one's mind, as co-dependency or inter-dependency. If social order is created dualistically, by truth and ethics, motivating to seek independent confirmation, strengthening other and self, then the object establishes inter-subjectivity between subjects. Thus, re-cognition of other and self could be (reciprocally) avoiding dependent rejection, in monism, or it could be seeking independent confirmation, in dualism. The object is absent in the former, while in the latter, it is controlled by classic- and operant conditioning (Pavlov 1910, Skinner 1930), through the object. Our reflexes are the conditioned responses to the conditioning stimuli, controlled by nature or by culture. They cannot be conditioned by power and politics, demanding 're-cognition' of another's cognition, gate-keeping a space to always enjoy safety and comfort for all.

As the material source of the object reflects itself in the subject, and the immaterial source of the subject reflects itself in the object, both self-reflections, the objective subject and the subjective object, in need of independent confirmation by their opposite sources, either by negative falsification for the validity of the immaterial subject and by positive verification for the reliability of the immaterial object, in social interaction, object and subject or other and self may become Significant Other and Self. As parents united in looking after their children, the one's role is looking after material substance in recollection, while the other's is looking after immaterial substance in construction, to make sure that knowing by the subjective subject is valid, and what-is-sensed by the objective object is reliable. Knowing by the one is what-is-known by the Significant Other, of the other and in the other, as what-is-sensed by the other is sensing by the Significant Other, of the one and in the one. The more significant the other has become, the less independent confirmation needs to be rational and the more it can be emotional or compassionate in their interaction instead.

Between modern philosophical dualism or truth and ethics, and post-modern philosophical monism or power and politics, the relation between Self and Significant Other is critical for the kind of social order, compatible with it. A partnership or relationship grows tense, when there is competition which is valued at-, or above, the comparison level (Thibaut and Kelley 1959). Are Self and Significant Other interdependent and will they therefore avoid each other's dependent rejection, by dependently confirming each other and independently rejecting the competition, or will they instead seek each other's independent confirmation? The former relies on the power and politics of the relations within-groups-between-people and within-ideas-between-facts, as in subjective cultures, subcultures or large families, protecting each other against the outside word, whereas the latter relies on the truth and ethics of relations within-facts-between-ideas and within-people-between-groups not getting entangled, when the facts are used in one idea, and reused in another, to establish objectivity or inter-subjectivity between subjects independently referring to them.

Somehow we are all related, either by receiving- and returning favors through dependent confirmation and cronyism, or by seeking independent confirmation, from- and for the other and ourselves. Thus, if it is basically two schemes, dependent reaction-and-action versus independent action-and-reaction, what happens when these two are mixed as in real life? The schema of reaction-and-action is extrinsically motivated by favors received and -returned, while that of action-and-reaction is intrinsically motivated by what-is-sensed, independently confirming what-is-known (hypotheses), shared through behavior. If an intrinsically motivated reaction responds to an extrinsically motivated action, it can only be an independent confirmation, when the hypothesis includes understanding of extrinsic motivation, being itself motivated intrinsically. The worlds are so apart that this is unlikely. If an extrinsically motivated reaction responds to an intrinsically motivated action, sharing truth may be taken as as a return of favor, which it never intended to be, assimilating the independent individual into a group, favoring its own, and intolerant of independence.

The subjective- and objective subject exchange forms when independent confirmation happens between recollection and construction. Ideas relate facts in recollection, as knowing what-is-sensed, intuiting what-is-realized, or trying what-is-valued, and facts relate ideas in construction, as sensing what-is-known, realizing what-is-intuited, or valuing what-is-tried. Relations create meaningful networks, defining the situation. Within-facts-between-ideas and within-ideas-between-facts, they are the same, as are facts used in one idea and reused in another. This widens the network of meaningful relations, since facts or objects establish inter-subjectivity or independent confirmation between subjects referring to them. However, motivation to avoid dependent rejection within-groups-between-people or within-ideas-between-facts can grow stronger than motivation to seek independent confirmation within-facts-between-ideas or within-people-between-groups. Changing facts to fit the ideas, power and politics, needing closed and static monism, takes over from truth and ethics, needing open and dynamic dualism, changing ideas to fit the facts, reversely.

Modern philosophical, open- and dynamic dualism can prevent post-modern philosophical, closed- and static monism, from using power and politics to polarize and extremize groups, because minority influence has shown to be strong, when consistent over long periods of time, and not dividing the majority’s attention (Moscovici 1974). Relations logically entangle within-facts-between-ideas and within-people-between-groups, when different facts are used as if they were the same, simulating independent confirmation, or when the same facts are used as if they were different, refuting independent confirmation, mishandling the truth. In a closed and static approach, Bergson has been accused of criticizing Kant, asking how ideas could categorically demand their own realization through the Categorical Imperative (Lawlor and Moulard 2016). With "re-establish[ing] the duality, the difficulties vanish", Bergson (1932) has referred to seeking independent confirmation, between recollection and construction, which his post-modern monistic biographers unfortunately called, in their opinion, "but two complementary manifestations of life".

Notions of compassion, emotion and/or rationality are facts we recollect. Apart from healing illnesses caused by entangled relations, within-people-between-groups and within-facts-between-ideas, to seek independent rational-, emotional-, and/or compassionate confirmation can also help us reach our full potential. Meaningful networks of logical-, chronological-, and/or associative relations within-ideas-between-facts, reusing the same facts as their linking-pins, may broaden and deepen their context. Multiple perspectives in immaterial construction support object-orientation in material recollection. The networks, by linking-pin facts, merge into larger contexts, visualizing relations that went unnoticed and could even change neural pathways. This will only happen, of course, if power and politics respect the facts and do not overstep their bounds, changing facts to fit the ideas, by calling facts that are the same, different, or facts that are different, the same. This causes truth to disappear and logic to entangle, isolating facts from their meaning and people from their identity, thereby stoking up traumatic stress as well as tormenting dissociation1.

 

   

  

  

Philosophy Application

     

figure 15

   

Conclusion

Finding truth is an art we learned and willingly unlearned. Truth can only be found by looking for the facts, which independently confirm our ideas. Independence needs dualism, which is difficult to apply in personal- and social settings, as invariably, power and politics or dialectics turn 'seeking independent confirmation' into 'avoiding dependent rejection'. Truth and ethics change ideas to fit the facts, while power and politics change facts to fit the ideas. Thus post-modern philosophical monism took over modern philosophical dualism.   

    

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