You can’t be rooted unless you’re free and you can’t be free unless you’re rooted L. Ingalls Wilder

Constructive Recollection Philosophy Application

Finding Truth In Science, Justice And Journalism





"How far you gonna go before you lose your way back home?"1 A spinning, although otherwise immobile gyroscope, suspended in three gimbals on board of a spaceship, indicates which direction is home. The outer- and inner components operate independently of each other, even when together they comprise one system. Independence of components is essential to its functionality. Any friction would cause the central component to lose its original direction, away from home.

Object and subject, our sources, will be called here the environment/other/reality and the organism/self/belief. They must be independent, to stay on track of truth and ethics, indicated by independent confirmation of one source by the other, followed as predictable truth and therefore accountable ethics. This duality was foundational to faith and reason, separating the material from the spiritual in religion, and what could- from what could not be doubted in philosophy (Descartes 1644).

The world revolutionized 200 years ago, when philosophical Post-Modernism mistook Modernism for monism instead of dualism. Post-Modern subject-subject dialectics as Hegel and Marx had reinterpreted Kant, replaced Modern subject-object interaction. The phenoumenon had excluded the noumenon to interact with and the object was now the "inter-subjective". Kant's unknowable object or thing-in-itself was now "the self-conscious subject", "that we can know so easily" (Hegel 1830).

Kant had discovered that basic categories of the human mind, space and time, were produced by the "phenoumenon" or the organism/self/belief itself. For Hegel and the Post-Modernists following him, this meant they could forget about objective space and time, and therefore the object called "noumenon" or the environment/other/reality. For Post-Modernists and Hegel this was simply "too bad for the facts" (1801), while for Modernists this was unacceptable, since facts always matter.

The following proposition assumes that dualism, or duality of origin (Bergson 1932), consists of two sources, sensibility and understanding or sensing and knowing, which coordinately reflect themselves (1) and seek to independently confirm each other as form in the organism/self/belief and as content in the environment/other/reality (2), in cognition and possibly in behavior or social interaction, for facts and ideas to be constructively recollected into a world, that to us is the best of all (3).


1. Coordinated Reflection


The environment/other/reality reflects itself in the organism/self/belief as what-is-sensed in sensing. Every living being is a reflection of nature, both in his perception and in his own nature, especially in being alive. By sensing what-is-sensed, one source, which consists of space, time and matter, expresses itself in two directions simultaneously, one that is nature itself and the other that is a mirror-image of nature (Rorty 1979), environment and organism, other and self, or reality and belief.

The organism/self/belief reflects itself in the environment/other/reality as knowing in what-is-known. Most clearly in our dreams, we construct our knowledge about the world outside of us, from lifelong recollection. It is our second source, which consists of space, time and the immaterial, impressing itself from two directions at once, one that is the organism, self or belief, and the other that is the environment, other or reality. These two should be one as phenoumenon and noumenon.



figure 1


If our two sources reflect themselves in each other, by perception or aboutness (apperception), in material- and immaterial space-time, then the "here and now" between one source and its reflection should be the same as between the other source and its reflection. Facts, between what-is-sensed and sensing, should have the same "here and now" as ideas, between knowing and what-is-known. A recollected fact and a constructed idea, may have the same "here and now" at one point.

Sources and their reflections touch "here and now" in any direction, mapping their facts or ideas in any amount of space-time, before they may share the same point with the other source and reflection, to which the map or the path followed, may lead. For the organism/self/belief, before-the-idea, all paths lead back from the end goal in creation, and for the environment/other/reality, after-the-fact, all paths lead forward from the root cause in evolution, to "here and now".


figure 2


The "here and now" between our two sources and their reflections expands "now", from "here" to "there" in any direction, and "here", from "now" to "then" in the past and future. Space and time are one in space-time as spatialized time and temporalized space. They are one in both sources, indicating "duality of origin" (Bergson 1932) and the possibility that both space-time frameworks fuse as functional structures, into culture-history (Bergson 1922, Dooyeweerd 1935, Sanders 1976).

We recollect facts, after-the-fact that is the root cause of what happens to us "here and now", and we construct ideas, before-the-idea that is the end goal of what happens by our doing "here and now", in creative evolution (Bergson 1911a). While evolution continues after the "here and now" into the future, creation continues before the "here and now" into the past. Thus, constructive recollection in each source is not the same, although it is coordinately reflected "here and now".



figure 3


Reflection of sources happens in every way. Sensing reflects what-is-sensed multiplicitly, and so does what-is-known reflect knowing. In recollection, all of what-is-sensed in sensing tonates and potentially detonates in all of what-is-known in knowing, if and when fusion happens between the one's temporalized space and the other's spatialized time. We are free to choose the criterion for this fusion to happen, although there is much at stake, as what-is-known should be what-is-sensed.

Tonation and detonation happen in recollection by impression from the surface to the centre-, and in construction by expression from the center to the surface of our being, as space temporalizes and time spatializes, in space-time or culture-history. Impressions and expressions are spatial and correspond to facts and ideas at the surface, while duration is temporal and rests at the center, as transcendental idealism (Kant 1781), a safe place holding the highest good that matters to man.

figure 4


2. Independent Confirmation


The sensed environment/other/reality cannot be known ("noumen-non") and the knowing organism/self/belief cannot be sensed ("phenoumen-non"), before they are lifted from subliminal awareness by knowing what-is-sensed and sensing what-is-known. Noumenon and phenoumenon (Kant 1781) are the latest terms for dualism since the dawn of Christianity, from heaven and earth to subject and object in philosophical Modernism. Monism is pheno(u)menological Post-Modernism.

If and when sensing what-is-sensed (noumenon) and knowing what-is-known (phenoumenon) independently confirm each other, awareness emerges as knowing what-is-sensed (realizing) and sensing what-is-known (intuiting). Realizing what-is-realized and intuiting what-is-intuited become intuiting what-is-realized (valuing) and realizing what-is-intuited (trying). And valuing what-is-valued and trying what-is-tried become trying what-is-valued (react) and valuing what-is-tried (act).

Independent confirmation can be rational, emotional or compassionate, when noticeable. Both sources and reflections are involved, the environment/other/reality to positively verify its opposite's reflection for reliability and the organism/self/belief to negatively falsify its opposite's reflection for validity. There is no independent confirmation as long as verification is negative when no proof or evidence is found, or falsification is positive when nothing or nobody is properly represented.


figure 5


Independent confirmation is detonation in one source and tonation in the other. What tonates in one, detonates to the next and refills from the previous source, where next and previous can be the same. In one source, sensing tonates to realization (knowing what-is-sensed), valuation (intuiting what-is-realized) and reacting (trying what-is-valued), as knowing tonates to intuition (sensing what-is-known), trying (realizing what-is-intuited) and action (valuing what-is-tried), to be detonated.

When the cycle of tonation and detonation between sources and their self-reflections has expanded from sensing and knowing to reacting and acting, it may turn into a wave, of social interaction. What only happened in cognition, then also happens in behavior, controlled by cognition. The environment/other/reality is accepted as the truth or the noumenon and is no longer a figment of the imagination, or phenomenology (phenoumenon) of the organism/self/belief, ready to interact.

Interaction between the environment/other/reality and the organism/self/belief, which may be externalized, from cognition (phenoumenon) only, to cognition and behavior (phenoumenon and noumenon), should not be any different from its exclusively phenomenological states. Social behavior is more precise than cognition and calls for more reliable and valid, independent rational-, emotional- and/or compassionate confirmation, by positive verification and negative falsification.


figure 6


Tonating and detonating sources and reflections, are forms processing contents. Recollection and construction expand content, by adding form to content, or sensing and knowing to what-is-sensed and what-is-known, alternatingly. Sensing and knowing (forms), turn into knowing (form) what-is-sensed (content) and sensing (form) what-is-known (content), and then into sensing (form) what-is-known-what-is-sensed (content) and knowing (form) what-is-sensed-what-is-known, etc.

Form is about contents, as the organism/self/belief is about the environment/other/reality, processing it by letting content shape form in recollection while form shapes content in construction, in tonation, and detonate both in social interaction (possibly still only covertly in cognition), as a propulsion from one source to the next, which may be another organism/self/belief processing its environment/other/reality. Independent confirmation then takes place between-, not within people.

Processing contents is determining independent rational-, emotional- and/or compassionate confirmation, between forms or sensing and knowing, and between contents or what-is-sensed and what-is-known, in recollection and construction. Positive verification is the successful attempt to let what-is-sensed show that what-is-known is true and therefore reliable, while negative falsification is the unsuccessful attempt to let sensing show that  knowing is false and therefore invalid.


figure 7


Content shapes form and form processes content in the dualistically functional structures of recollection and construction. Facts recollect spatialized time from construction, while ideas construct temporalized space from recollection. Constructive recollection therefore is a particular kind of functional structure, the forms and contents of which are relative to social interaction, when different social beliefs compete for independent confirmation of being true or false, by social reality itself.

Duality of origin is one source reflecting itself in the other, and the other source in the one. In other words, dualism exists both between the recollective source and the constructive reflection in the environment/other/reality, and also between the recollective reflection and constructive source in the organism/self/belief. Facts or recollected contents are the same for all, as ideas or constructed contents should be the same, re-legating in morality and religion, by independent confirmation.

Either power and politics within-groups-between-people or truth and ethics within-people-between-groups, propel social interaction. Organism and environment, self and other, or belief and reality, react in response to action from the other side and act in response to reaction from their own side, looking for-, finding, and looking after independent confirmation, indicating and calling for predictable truth and accountable ethics, being paid forward to other independent individuals.

The environment/other/reality gives facts and takes ideas as content, which it processes itself and interacts about with the organism/self/belief that is also processing them. Content meanders between forms it shaped itself by changing its state at every stage of constructive recollection, if and when independent confirmation happens, continuing without further shaping of form. Thus source and reflection finally become the interactively complementary social roles of self and other.


To confirm another strengthens independence, while independence is a necessary prerequisite to confirm another. - See more at:

figure 8




3. Constructive Recollection


Facts and ideas differentiate, immediately, actually, continuously changing and renewing "here and now". Content shapes form at different stages for all facts and ideas separately, as content flows towards or from a source, tonating and detonating as soon as forms as shaped and internal consciousness may be externalized in behavior, to find reliable positive verification, and valid negative falsification in social interaction, or independent confirmation between social reality and social belief.

Tonating facts in recollection and detonating ideas in construction, generates flow of content, interactively between the environment/other/reality and the organism/self/belief. As action and reaction alternate, expanding content alternatingly by what-is-sensed and what-is-known, relations within-ideas-between-facts are added at every stage. Therefore relations within-facts-between-ideas need structure by content shaping form and maximizing functionality for social interaction.

Constructive recollection is recollecting facts, from sensing what-is-sensed to reacting what-is-reacted, and constructing ideas, from knowing what-is-known to acting what-is-acted, at different stages, the highest of which no longer requires content shaping form, as it continuously communicates current content. The organism/self/belief responds to the environment/other/reality by recollecting what is constructed while it responds to itself by constructing what is recollected.


figure 9


Constructive recollection continues looking for independent confirmation after it externalized into social behavior, to find positive verification and negative falsification of the organism/self/belief, by the environment/other/reality, for reliability and validity. Not finding it is not negative verification or positive falsification, for then they independently confirm what was found to be (very) bad. This is the freedom to criticize the other as we do criticize ourselves, positively or negatively.

The significance of the other is proportional to how much freedom of choice he or she is offered, to tell the truth or to independently confirm one's behavior, good or bad, rationally-, emotionally- and/or compassionately. Truth thus found and therefore ethics applied, will then earn and (forward) pay attention to- and from those who deserve it, like the Significant Other. Positive verification and negative falsification mean he or she is reliable to us and he or she has a valid opinion of us.

Independent rational-, emotional- and/or passionate confirmation between Significant Others means they are together and still independent or far away and still together, because they are each other's 'better half'. When the environment/other/reality coordinately reflects itself in the organism/self/belief, the Significant Other independently confirms the Self, if and when possible, in cognition. When the roles are reversed, the same is true, in behavior. Yet, this is the same for both Selves.



  figure 10


Constructive recollection in social reality, exchanges content or facts and ideas, prepared by social belief, in empirical cycles (De Groot 1966) of four phases, each of which phase expands the state of what-is-sensed (fact) or what-is-known (idea) in four stages, if and when independent confirmation happens. Preparation happens when the other's construction occurs, implying recollection (Gendlin 1997), in response to which the one's construction occurs, implying the other's recollection.

Social belief, or social reality as trusted, expected, presumed, predicted, believed or intended to be, is constructively recollected by all and shared by "animals more equal" (Orwell 1945), the more independent confirmation is corrupted by independence bias and/or confirmation bias. States, stages and phases of independent confirmation and constructive recollection lose clarity and meaning, when the power and politics of dependent rejection replaces them, hardly noticeably.


figure 11


Freedom to positively or negatively criticize is paid forward, by offering the other independence to confirm which facts or ideas are (very) good, reliable by positive verification and valid by negative falsification, or are (very) bad, unreliable by negative verification and invalid by positive falsification. This freedom is taken away by power and politics, inducing fear of being rejected by the other while dependent, driving out all intrinsic motivation, and replacing it with extrinsic motivation.

Both recollection and construction have a (very) good side and a (very) bad side, as being predictable and accountable. In recollection, predictability is based on either truth or power. In construction, accountability is based on either ethics or politics/dialectics. Predictability and accountability in power and politics are determined by self-interest, while in truth and ethics they are determined by other-interest, because independent confirmation strengthens other independent individuals.

Within-ideas-between-facts, or within-groups-between-people, relations only account for ideas or groups themselves, while relations within-facts-between-ideas, or within-people-between-groups account for all ideas or groups they are part of or member of, which is exponentially more difficult. Contradictions and inconsistencies must be solved, although without using power and politics, which only call for socioses (Van den Berg 1956) and dissociations (Dell and O'Neil 2009).

Facts and ideas can mask feelings and thoughts, to keep up appearances. As power and politics always win from truth and ethics, the (very) bad always wins from the (very) good, because dependent rejection by dominance and submission is easier than looking for independent confirmation. Both styles handle independent rejection and dependent confirmation, the one at the group level, as prejudice plus cronyism, and the other at the individual level, as what is false plus what is accountable.



figure 12


Power and politics motivate extrinsically, within-groups-between-people, while truth and ethics motivate intrinsically, within-people-between-groups. Extrinsic motivation is either externally normative or internally normative, since the one dominates and submits the other dialectically, creating roles and calling for masks. Intrinsic motivation is both externally normative and internally normative, since the one and the other need to look for independent confirmation, between them.

Philosophical Modernism is dualistic, acknowledging both the sensed environment/other/reality (Kant's noumenon) and the knowing organism/self/belief (Kant's phenoumenon), while Post-Modernism only recognizes pheno(u)menology. Social interaction is therefore believed to be either dualistically interactive between two sources, or monistically and imminently dialectic within a single source. Social reality independently confirms one social belief is true, beyond power and politics.

Power and politics order society as a power-distanced hierarchy (Mulder 1973), extrinsically motivating to independently reject enemies (prejudice) and dependently confirm friends (cronyism) for fear of dependent rejection (excommunication, homelessness). Truth and ethics order society by constructive recollection, intrinsically motivating to earn and pay (forward) freedom of choice or positive and negative criticism, offered to- and received from other independent individuals.

Organism and environment, self and other or belief and reality dissociate, socially or personally, at the limits of extrinsic motivation by power and politics, within-groups-between-people. Normativity is either external or internal, as subjects dialectically dominate or submit in a power-distanced hierarchy of social roles. All dominate as one submits, progressively by prejudice or independence bias. In parallel all submit as one dominates, conservatively by cronyism or confirmation bias.



figure 13


Minority influence can be strong when consistent over long periods of time and not dividing the majority’s attention (Moscovici 1974). Reality is consistent and can always be used to positively verify and negatively falsify what is good or bad, to find truth or what can be independently confirmed, after predicting it and accounting for it. Therefore, intrinsic motivation within-people-between-groups could eventually win, from extrinsic motivation within-groups-between-people.

Relating all facts, is still a fact, or relating all ideas, is still an idea. If and when facts independently confirm ideas, meaningful networks emerge. Relations within-ideas-between-facts may be logical, chronological or associative. Within-facts-between-ideas, relations are less likely to be meaningful and show how (very) good or (very) bad and functional or dysfunctional they are. This may happen similarly from within-groups-between-people to within-people-between-groups.

Ideas stem from beliefs and facts from reality. Within beliefs, facts are related with relative ease, while in reality, ideas can only be related by science or activism, if they are not independence biased by prejudice or confirmation biased by cronyism. Therefore, how relations are structured within-facts-between-ideas, must be un-dysfunctionalized, by following the logic where and when ideas overlap, which reuse the same facts as their linking-pins, to better understand- and correct mistakes.





Philosophy Application


figure 14




Between social beliefs, social reality must decide which is better: truth and ethics in Modern philosophical dualism, or power and politics in Post-Modern philosophical monism. The latter used stealth tactics since the 1800s, and was presented a blank checque 50 years ago for a Cultural Revolution. It has not been necessary to lose the object from the subject-object equation when Kant declared time and space man-produced, for he did not abandon the noumenon. Imminent dialectics and inter-subjectivity are no match for sensibility and understanding, which in constructive recollection coordinately reflect- and independently confirm all content from both sources, in specialized forms. Society does not necessarily have to be ordered by extrinsic motivation or the threat of dependent rejection, driving people into groups. People within groups, like facts within ideas, may be un-dysfunctionalized, by understanding and correcting relations within-facts-between-ideas.



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