The Logic of Spatiotemporal Dualism

ABSTRACT: DUALISM NEEDS TO BE SAVED FROM MONISM'S SOCIALLY DISRUPTIVE FORCES: INTERNALISM, FAVORITISM, NEPOTISM, CRONYISM, SYCOPHANTISM, COLLUSION, CONSPIRACY. THE MODEL IS MAXIMALLY DUALISTIC, YET IT ALLOWS FOR PEACEFUL SOCIAL INTERACTION AND -REALITY. IT IS THE EXTENDED ABSTRACT OF THE THEORY OF CONSTRUCTIVE RECOLLECTION AS WELL.

Spatiotemporality can be ontologically material or epistemologically immaterial. Modern philosophy, from Descartes (1644) to Kant (1790), also differentiated between material and immaterial substances. Descartes attributed immateriality to God, as dualism had separated Good and Evil, or heaven and earth, since AD 0. For Kant, materiality was empirical "sensibility after-the-fact", borrowed from Anglo-Saxon philosophy, while immateriality was rational "understanding before-the-fact", borrowed from Continental philosophy (Sanders 1981). After religion and philosophy, physical science now also appears to harbor dualism, in its concept of space-time or spatiotemporality.

For Kant, space and time were basic categories, in the 'noumenon' or object, as well as in the 'phenoumenon' or subject. Today, space and time have nearly become one, in the concept of spatiotemporality. However, in a Euclidean sphere, the three spatial dimensions of its periphery and the one temporal dimension of its radius, remain dualistically irreducible to each other, because the ratio (π) is a number carrying infinitely many, non-repetitive, decimal places (Sanders & Van Rappard 1982). The four dimensions allow for space to temporalize and separately, for time to spatialize, as in simultaneity, following the special theory of relativity and that of the intuition of duration, when time slows down inside a passing object, observed from the outside (Einstein 1905, Bergson 1922, Canales 2005).

Kant is the central figure in modern philosophy (Rohlf 2016). He discovered sensibility before-the-fact (the "synthetic apriori"), which is the independent confirmation of rational understanding before-the-fact, by empirical sensibility after-the-fact. This is what we trust, expect, presume, predict, believe, and intend. It is essential to research methodology, as in science, justice, and journalism. However, post-Kant, modern philosophy became post-modern philosophy, and dualism became monism, when the French Revolution started (1789) and Kant finished his magnum opus (1790). Since then, social reality and social identity underwent radical change.

Opposing Kant, Hegel claimed that the object was insignificant. To him, the thing-in-itself was clear, not opaque, since the object was the subject itself. If facts did not fit ideas, it was "too bad for the facts"[1]. The object for Kant was the noumenon, the unnameable thing-in-itself, which could establish intersubjectivity between subjects referring to it. For Hegel, intersubjectivity was a person or subject, dependently confirming (or 're-cognizing') the other, as they independently rejected a third. By literally 're-cognizing' the other, "the subject goes into the world and loses himself, or [else] he goes into himself

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[1] Hegel to a reporter, "umso schlimmer für die Tatsachen", at a conference in 1801

and loses the world" (Hegel 1807). This recognition, if selectively reciprocated by the other, was supposed to be a prerequisite for self-consciousness. Therefore, while for Kant the phe-noumenon or subject extended the noumenon or object, for Hegel the object, or inter-subjectivity based on recognition, extended the subject, which was exactly the reverse and revolutionary indeed.

If sensibility and understanding may be called sensing what-is-sensed and knowing what-is-known, then the subject is sensing and knowing, both of which are forms, while the object is what-is-sensed and what-is-known, both of which are contents. The subject or the sensing- and knowing organism/self/belief, interacts with the object or the sensed- and known environment/ /other/reality. One source, the sensed object, materially reflects itself in the sensing subject, while the other source, the knowing subject, immaterially reflects itself in the known object. In other words, what-is-sensed coordinately reflects itself in sensing, "here" or "there" in material space, while knowing coordinately reflects itself in what-is-known, "now" or "then" in immaterial time. This can only happen subconsciously, because sensing what-is-sensed is not (yet) knowing what-is-sensed, while knowing what-is-known is not (yet) sensing what-is-known.

Material- and immaterial forms, or the sensing and knowing organism/self/belief, must spatiotemporally coincide with-, and independently confirm one another, by negative (or unsuccessful) falsification, for the validity of knowing. Material- and immaterial contents, or the sensed and known environment/other/reality, must spatiotemporally coincide with-, and independently confirm one another, by positive (or successful) verification, for the reliability of what-is-known. Coincidence allows space to temporalize and time to spatialize, while independent confirmation allows what-is-sensed to be known, and what-is-known to be sensed.

SPATIOTEMPORAL DUALISM AND COINCIDENCE

Processing consists of spatiotemporal coincidence and independent confirmation, between material- and immaterial substances. If sensing what-is-sensed independently confirms knowing what-is-known, both forms, or sensing and knowing, can process both contents, or what-is-sensed and what-is-known. Forms are therefore copied and swapped. Knowing what-is-sensed (or realization[2]) and sensing what-is-known (or intuition) emerge from sub-consciousness, as different material- and immaterial substances, using new forms to process old contents.

Between object and subject, forms which are copied and swapped, also generate two streams of content, relative to form. Both flow from the depth to the periphery in spatializing time, and from the periphery to the depth in temporalizing space, teleologically as form-shaping-content and causally as content-shaping-form. One stream, in one direction, is knowing what-is-sensed (or realization), while the other, in the other direction, is sensing what-is-known (or intuition). They are essential for social interaction between object and subject. At the highest stage of processing, in social reality, they will turn into behavior internalizing as consciousness on the one side-, and consciousness externalizing as behavior, on the other side of social interaction.

If coincidence and independent confirmation can happen again, between forms (realizing and intuiting instead of sensing and knowing) and between contents (what-is-realized and what-is-intuited instead of what-is-sensed and what-is-known), they emerge at the next stage (1) as valuing what-is-valued, or intuiting what-is-realized (sensing what-is-known-what-is-sensed, or sensing what-is-known merged with knowing what-is-sensed), and (2) as trying what-is-tried, or realizing what-is-intuited (knowing what-is-sensed-what-is-known, or knowing what-is-sensed merged with sensing what-is-known). Thus, in processing, newly copied forms occur, while old forms are implied as new contents (Gendlin 1997).

At the highest stage of processing current content, trying what-is-valued, or reacting, and valuing what-is-tried, or acting, emerge as social interaction. Object and subject become other and self. The self trusts, expects, presumes, predicts, believes, and intends, suspended in action before-the-fact, as it reacts after-the-fact in response to the other's action. If the suspended action is independently confirmed by one's own reaction, it is set free. These are two phases in a social cycle, one's responding to the other and to the self. The other adds two more phases, in reverse, responding to the one and to the self.

The states-, stages- and phases of spatiotemporal dualism unite across two social cycles. Eight states of alternatingly material- and immaterial substance can be differentiated, due to forms, being copied and swapped. Four stages of independent confirmation are possibly reached, for each state, from sensing or knowing, to realizing or intuiting, valuing or trying, and reacting or acting. Two cycles of four phases follow each other in social interaction, varying from one to four states in duration. The number of states per phase is equal to the number of stages reached. Phases repeat themselves and overlap each other, as they begin one state apart, from the subject responding to the object and to itself, to the object

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[2] predicates coined by the author

responding to the subject and to itself, all simultaneously using the same states in different roles, taking contents from previous phases, processing- and passing them to following phases, across states. The first cycle applies to the subject, also taking the object's point of view, and the second cycle applies to the object, also taking the subject's point of view. The two cycles unite in social interaction between object and subject, or other and self.

STATES, STAGES AND PHASES OF SPATIOTEMPORAL DUALISM

		8	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
state	immaterial=I material=M	I	M	I	M	I	M	I	M	I
stage i	know=k=-/k sense=s=-/s	k	s	k	s	k	s	k	s	k
ii	intuit=i=s/k realize=r=k/s	i	r	i	r	i	r	i	r	i
iii	try=t=r/i value=v=i/r	t	v	t	v	t	v	t	v	t
iv	act=a=v/t react=r=t/v	a	r	a	r	a	r	a	r	a

A — organism/self/belief
senses-realizes-values-reacts
1   12   123   1234

B — organism/self/belief
knows-intuits-tries-acts
2   23   234   2345

phase

C — environment/other/reality
senses-realizes-values-reacts
3   34   345   3456

D — environment/other/reality
knows-intuits-tries-acts
4   45   456   4567

Social order, in Kant's moral philosophy, is "based on an objective, rationally necessary and unconditional principle that we must always follow, despite any natural desires or inclinations we may have to the contrary" (Johnson & Cureton 2016). A system of moral principles before-the-fact, following Kant's Categorical Imperative (1785), tells the autonomous or independent individual "to act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law".

Power and politics change facts to fit the ideas, while truth and ethics change ideas to fit the facts. Ideas relate facts and facts relate ideas. If facts are used in one idea, and reused in another, it depends on the ideas' respect for the facts, not to have relations within them entangled. Identically, people relate groups and groups relate people. When people belong to one group, as well as to another, it depends on the groups' respect for the people, not to have relations within them entangled.

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Power and politics motivate extrinsically, to avoid dependent rejection, like excommunication and homelessness, within-groups-between-people, and within-ideas-between-facts. Truth and ethics motivate intrinsically, to seek independent rational-, emotional-, and/or compassionate confirmation, within-facts-between-ideas and within-people-between-groups. Unfortunately, truth and ethics, in need of open- and dynamic dualism, were repealed and replaced by power and politics, in need of closed- and static monism (Bergson 1932). The entangled relations take their toll, of traumatic stress and tormenting dissociation.

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